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The Eleventh Amendment has long been regarded as an embarrassment to 
the United States's aspiration to be a government of laws and not of men. 1 
This rule-of-law ideal has rightly been said to entail the existence of judicial 
remedies for the violation of legal rights, 2 and, relatedly, judicial power that 
is coextensive with legislative power.3 While the Constitution itself imposes 
numerous legal obligations on the states4 and gives Congress the power to 
impose additional obligations,5 the Eleventh Amendment by its terms prevents 
the federal courts from entertaining suits against the states brought by citizens 
of other states or of foreign states.6 Although scholars have argued that the 
Amendment can be read in such a way as not to withdraw federal jurisdiction 
over cases arising under federal law/ the Supreme Court in Hans v. 
1. See, e.g., John Norton Pomeroy, The Supreme Court and State Repudiation-The Virginia and 
Louisiana Cases, 17 AM. L. REv. 684, 684-85 (1883) (criticizing "national disgrace" resulting from 
Eleventh Amendment decisions that would prevent enforcement of legal rights against states); see also 
Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE 
L.J. I. 3-4 (1988) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment is "in tension with" rule-of-law maxims described 
below). 
2. Chief Justice Marshall put it most famously in Marbury v. Madison: ''The government of the United 
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to 
deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." 5 U.S. 
(5 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
3. As Alexander Hamilton explained: "If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the 
judicial power of a government being coextensive with its legislative may be ranked among the number." 
THE F'EDERAUST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). In Osborn v. Bank of 
the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court that judicial 
and legislative powers of "every well-constructed government" must be "co-extensive with each other," id. 
at 818, and that "[a]ll governments which are not extremely defective in their organization, must possess, 
within themselves, the means of expounding, as well as enforcing, their own laws," id. at 818-19. 
4. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
5. For example, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), discussed infra Section I.C. 
6. The Eleventh Amendment provides, in its entirety, that "[t]he Judicial Power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI. The Court has made it clear that it views the Eleventh Amendment as in some way having 
given constitutional force, or at least recognition, to a preexisting immunity of the states. For this reason 
my reference in this Article's title to "Eleventh Amendment immunity" may be misleading. It would 
perhaps be more accurate to refer to an immunity having its source in "postulates" lying behind the 
Eleventh Amendment and reaffirmed and given constitutional force by it. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 
U.S. 313, 322 (1934); see also Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (''That a state may not be 
sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence ... of which the [Eleventh] Amendment 
is but an exemplification."). Nevertheless, I shall refer to this immunity as "Eleventh Amendment 
immunity" for purposes of brevity--and with some justification, as it is this provision of the Constitution 
that is thought to reflect the immunity's constitutional status. Also for the sake of brevity, and at the cost 
of some precision (though, I hope, no confusion), I shall refer to the immunity "conferred" on the states 
by the Eleventh Amendment, as opposed to the immunity of states "recognized and given constitutional 
status" by that Amendment. 
7. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1466-92 (1987); 
William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an 
Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 
(1983) [hereinafter Fletcher, Historical Interpretation]; John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State 
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889 (1983); Jackson, supra note 1. But cf. 
William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, I 02 HARV. 
L. REv. 1372 (1989) (disagreeing with diversity thesis). For a reply to Marshall and other critics, see 
Correspondence, Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 117 (1990) (continuing debate 
over varying interpretations); and William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh 
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Louisiana8 held that it did apply to such cases. Indeed, the Court went further 
and interpreted the Amendment to protect states from being sued even by their 
own citizens,9 though the Amendment does not so provide. In subsequent 
cases, the Court has held that the Amendment also protects states from suits 
brought by foreign states 10 and Indian tribes, 11 even though neither category 
of plaintiff is mentioned in the Amendment. As so construed, the Amendment 
is in substantial tension with the rule-of-law axiom that for every federal right 
there must be a remedy enforceable in the federal court: Individuals, foreign 
states, and Indian tribes cannot enforce their federal rights in federal court suits 
against the states.12 
Over the years, the Court has found ways of avoiding some of the rule-of-
law problems posed by the Eleventh Amendment. The most important 
ameliorative doctrine is the one that we today associate most closely with Ex 
parte Young, 13 although its roots stretch back to the Founding period. As the 
Court reads it today, Ex parte Young establishes that a state official does not 
enjoy immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from suits seeking the 
prospective enforcement of federal law. 14 This doctrine greatly alleviates the 
rule-of-law problems posed by the Amendment, as it enables individuals to 
obtain a federal court order requiring state officials to conform their future 
conduct with federal law. Ex parte Young thus means that the Eleventh 
Amendment inhibits only retrospective relief for a state's past violations of 
federal law, 15 but its narrowing of the sphere of the Amendment's practical 
operation does not dispose of the rule-of-law problems created by the Eleventh 
Amendment. The rule-of-law ideal insists that federal courts have the power 
not just to stop ongoing violations of federal law, but also to remedy at least 
the most egregious past violations as well. 16 
Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261 (1989) [hereinafter Fletcher, Diversity 
Explanation]. 
8. 134 U.S. I (1890). 
9. See id. at 15. 
10. See Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330. 
II. See Blatchford v. Native Village ofNoatack, 501 U.S. 775,779-82 (1991). 
12. In the interest of brevity, I shall henceforth refer only to suits by, or liability to, individuals, with 
the understanding that what I say applies equally to foreign states and Indian tribes. 
13. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). As discussed below, this doctrine actually has its roots in much earlier 
decisions and its rationale extends to suits for damages as well. 
14. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). But cf infra note 15 
(suggesting that Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), may signal change in Court's 
interpretation of Ex parte Young). 
15. As Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. 1114, shows, the Eleventh Amendment does protect states from 
being sued eo nomine, even if only prospective relief is sought. But, unless Seminole Tribe signals a major 
alteration of Ex parte Young doctrine, see Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment and 
the Evisceration of Ex Parte Young: "The Double Progeny of the Same Evil Birth", 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
(forthcoming 1997), prospective injunctive relief against officials who violate federal law is not barred by 
the Eleventh Amendment, at least as long as Congress has not foreclosed it. See infra text accompanying 
notes 106-09. 
16. Akhil Amar defends a strong version of this point, apparently insisting that for every violation of 
law the legal system must provide for "full remedies." See Amar, supra note 7, at 1489. Richard Fallon 
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In its 1989 decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,17 the Court 
interpreted the Eleventh Amendment in ~ way that virtually closed the 
remaining remedial gap, at least with respect to federal statutory rights. A 
majority of the Court in that case held that the states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity could be abrogated by Congress pursuant to the Interstate Commerce 
Clause, 18 a decision that was widely understood to establish that Congress 
could do so under any of its legislative powers. 19 Under this regime, Congress 
could give individuals the power to sue states in federal court to enforce their 
federal rights. With respect to statutory rights at least,20 this congressional 
power largely obviated the rule-of-law problems posed by the Eleventh 
Amendment?' But the Supreme Court overruled Union Gas last term in 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida,22 and held that Congress may not abrogate the 
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when legislating under pre-Eleventh 
Amendment constitutional powers, such as the Commerce Clause.Z3 Although 
and Daniel Meltzer defend a weaker version calling for a system of remedies that on the whole keeps 
government tolerably within the law. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-
Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1736 (1991) ("The first principle, 
which is strong but not always unyielding, calls for effective redress to individual victims of constitutional 
violations. The second, more absolute principle demands a general structure of constitutional remedies 
adequate to keep government within the bounds of law."). 
17. 491 U.S. I (1989). 
18. See id. at 23. 
19. See Daniel J. Cloheny, Exclusive Jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment: Recognizing the 
Assumption of State Court Availability in the Clear Statement Compromise, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1306-07 
(1994). This is how all of the Justices in Seminole Tribe interpreted Union Gas. See Seminole Tribe, 116 
S. Ct. at 1126-27; id. at 1133-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1184 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
20. With respect to constitutional rights, a remedy against the states that depends on affirmative 
congressional action is not entirely satisfying, as many of the constitutional obligations of the states are 
countermajoritarian in nature and the Congress is, in theory at least, responsive to the preferences of 
electoral majorities. For this reason, the Union Gas decision did not entirely solve the "right without a 
remedy" problem. On this issue, see infra Parts V and VI. 
21. By retaining a strong presumption that a congressionally imposed obligation of a state does not 
necessarily carry with it a private right of action for damages against the state, the Union Gas regime did 
continue to pose a son of rule-of-law problem, for the possibility remained that a federal statute clearly 
imposing obligations on states towards individuals would be construed not to provide for retrospective relief 
in favor of such individuals. I am sympathetic to the view that a legal right unaccompanied by a 
retrospective remedy is problematic from a rule-of-law perspective. On this problem, see Jackson, supra 
note 15. This problem exists, however, whenever Congress creates a legal obligation towards individuals 
but denies such individuals a private right of action for damages, and no one disputes that Congress has 
the power to do this. This issue is discussed infra Part V. These rule-of-law considerations would cenainly 
justify a presumption in favor of private retrospective remedies against states whenever Congress has 
imposed on them an obligation towards individuals. At any rate, the rule-of-law problems that existed under 
the Union Gas regime were clearly of far less significance with respect to statutes than under the Seminole 
Tribe regime, as Congress by speaking clearly could attach a retrospective remedy to its statutes when it 
wanted them enforced vigorously and regarded a private retrospective remedy as necessary for this purpose. 
If Congress did not regard such a remedy to be necessary to give efficacy to the states' obligation, then 
the absence of such remedies does not pose much of a rule-of-law problem. The rule-of-law problems that 
admittedly arise when Congress enacts a statute but does not provide an effective remedy because it does 
not want the statute vigorously enforced are comparatively low in the hierarchy of rule-of-law concerns, 
and in any event they are problems we have to live with, since many Supreme Coun decisions clearly 
accept that Congress has such a power. 
22. 116 S. Ct. lll4. 
23. See id. at 1131. 
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the Seminole Tribe Court reaffirmed its decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer4 that 
Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment,25 Seminole Tribe resurrects the rule-of-law 
problems the Eleventh Amendment poses with respect to federal laws having 
their source in "antecedent" constitutional provisions. 
This Article focuses on a recent series of cases that has received far less 
notice than Union Gas and promises a somewhat different escape from the 
rule-of-law problems posed by the Eleventh Amendment. Perhaps until now 
these cases warranted less attention than Union Gas because Union Gas had 
already largely taken care of, or at least submerged, the rule-of-law problems 
posed by the Eleventh Amendment. If so, the reversal of Union Gas should 
raise significantly the doctrinal and theoretical profile of these cases. At the 
same time, however, Seminole Tribe includes hints that this second escape 
from the rule-of-law problems posed by the Eleventh Amendment may not 
long survive. 
The first and most important of these cases is McKesson Corp. v. 
Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco. 26 The Court in that case held 
unanimously that: (1) the Due Process Clause sometimes requires the states to 
make available to individuals a monetary remedy in their own courts; and (2) 
the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Supreme Court review of a state court 
judgment refusing to provide the remedy. Although neither of these holdings 
was itself novel,27 McKesson's juxtaposition of the two illuminated an 
alternative escape from the rule-of-law problems posed by the Eleventh 
Amendment.28 McKesson seemed to establish that the Amendment does not 
preclude remedies for state violations of federal rights or foreclose the exercise 
of federal judicial power to enforce such remedies, but merely defers the 
involvement of the federal judiciary in enforcing federal liabilities of the states 
24. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5. Section 5 of the Amendment gives Congress the "power to enforce, 
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of' the other sections of the Amendment. 
26. 496 U.S. 18 (1990). 
27. The due process holding was foreshadowed in Ward v. Board of County Commissioners, 253 U.S. 
17 (1920). The idea that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to the appellate jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court is usually traced to Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), but Chief Justice 
Marshall's opinion in that case does not clearly so hold. See Jackson, supra note I, at 19-25, 32. Vicki 
Jackson has argued, however, that post-Cohens, pre-McKesson decisions of the Supreme Court clearly 
establish that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 
See id. at 25-32. For a discussion of these cases, see infra Subsection ill.A.l. 
28. This understanding of the Eleventh Amendment had been defended at some length by Vicki 
Jackson two years earlier. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 73-75. Other commentators who espoused the 
forum-allocation view before McKesson include Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability of 
Federal Claims in State Court, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1146-47 (1984); Louis E. Wolcher, 
Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own Courts for 
Constitutional Violations, 69 CAL. L. REV. 189 (1981); and William L. Taylor, Note, Section 1983 in State 
Coun: A Remedy for Unconstitutional State Taxation, 95 YALE L.J. 414, 417-18 (1985). Commentators 
taking the forum-allocation position since McKesson include Cloherty, supra note 19. See also infra note 
34 (citing additional scholars who have embraced forum-allocation interpretation). But cf infra note 198 
(citing scholars who have expressed skepticism about forum-allocation view). 
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until the state courts have had a chance to afford the required relief. The 
following year, in Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission, 29 
the Court held that the Federal Employers' Liability Act subjects states to 
monetary liability to individuals, even though the Eleventh Amendment bars 
such individuals from recovering damages against the states in federal court. 
The Court said that "the Supremacy Clause makes that statute the law in every 
State, fully enforceable in state court."3° Finally, in Reich v. Collins,31 the 
Court reaffirmed McKesson's due process holding, unanimously, and added 
that while the Eleventh Amendment bars individuals from seeking the 
constitutionally required remedy against the states in the lower federal courts, 
the states are not free to deny the remedy in their own courts.32 
These three decisions reflect a view of the Eleventh Amendment as purely 
a forum-allocation principle. As construed in these cases, the Amendment has 
no bearing on Congress's power to regulate the states and subject the states to 
damage liability to individuals for violating such regulation. If the Constitution 
or a federal statute imposes such liability on the states, then the Supremacy 
Clause requires the states to award such damages in their own courts. If state 
courts decline to do so, the U.S. Supreme Court may review their decisions. 
The Amendment, on this view, limits only the original jurisdiction of the 
federal courts. Its function is merely to place the initial responsibility of 
adjudicating claims against the states on the state courts, whose compliance 
with the federal obligation to pay damages to individuals can be monitored by 
the Supreme Court on appeal. Indeed, the McKesson/Hilton/Reich 
understanding of the Eleventh Amendment may even permit Congress to 
authorize review by the lower federal courts of state court decisions rendered 
in suits against the states based on federal law?3 If so understood, the 
Eleventh Amendment is far from the embarrassment to the United States's 
rule-of-law aspirations that its detractors describe it to be. It is at worst a 
nuisance to federal rightholders, postponing but not barring federal judicial 
enforcement of federal laws making states liable in damages to individuals. 
Many scholars had concluded after this trio of cases that the Supreme 
Court had definitively embraced the forum-allocation interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment,34 but now it appears that the solution these cases 
29. 502 u.s. 197 (1991). 
30. /d. at 207. 
31. 115 S. Ct. 547 (1994). 
32. See id. at 549. 
33. Whether it does or not depends on whether the Eleventh Amendment was found inapplicable in 
McKesson because what was at issue was appellate jurisdiction, or because what was at issue was the 
Supreme Coun's exercise of appellate jurisdiction. To the extent that the McKesson Coun was relying on 
Cohens v. Virginia's holding that a writ of error is not a "suit" for Eleventh Amendment purposes, see 
McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18,26-27 (1990), it would 
appear that its holding has to have been that the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable to federal appeals 
from the state couns, see id., whether the appeal goes to the Supreme Coun or some other federal coun. 
34. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 385-86 (2d ed. 1994). Indeed, Henry 
1690 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 106: 1683 
appeared to bring to the rule-of-law problems posed by Hans may not survive 
Seminole Tribe. There are indications in that opinion that the Court does not 
regard the Eleventh Amendment as a mere forum-allocation principle. Most 
significantly, the Court indicated that the Supreme Court "is empowered to 
review a question of federal law arising from a state court decision where a 
state has consented to suit."35 This suggests that a state may avoid the 
exercise of federal judicial power simply by refusing to consent to a suit 
against it in its own courts. If so, then the rule-of-law problems discussed 
above reemerge. This and other statements in Seminole Tribe reflect an 
understanding of Eleventh Amendment immunity sharply at odds with the 
McKesson line of cases. They suggest that the Court regards the Eleventh 
Amendment as conferring on states an immunity from retrospective liability 
to individuals for their violations of federal law. They suggest, in other words, 
that the Court understands the Eleventh Amendment to establish that nothing 
in the Constitution requires or authorizes the courts (or gives Congress the 
power to require the courts) to award damages against states for the violation 
of their federal obligations to individuals. States are free to award such 
damages if they wish, but they are not required to do so by federal law. 
Whether the Eleventh Amendment precludes Congress from subjecting 
states to damage liability to individuals, or merely requires that any liability 
Congress chooses to impose be pursued initially in state courts is, of course, 
of enormous significance. To be sure, Congress would retain the power in 
either case to impose obligations on the states under Article I, such as the 
obligation not to infringe copyrights or patents. Under Ex parte Young, those 
obligations would be enforceable prospectively against state officials even if 
private damage actions were unavailable in either state or federal court. The 
question is whether, after Seminole Tribe, Congress's arsenal of potential 
enforcement mechanisms to give efficacy to the obligations it imposes on the 
states includes private damage actions. In other words, may Congress confer 
on individuals a right to damages from states that infringe their patents or 
Monaghan is so convinced that these cases established the forum-allocation view that he recently dismissed 
the contrary suggestions in Seminole Tribe as "plainly wrong." Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, The 
Sovereign Immunity "Exception", 110 HARV. L. REv. 102, 125 n.l61 (1996). For the reasons discussed 
in Parts III and IV, I would not be so sure that the suggestion was wrong, even if the test of the "rightness" 
of a Supreme Court decision were its conformity with prior Supreme Court decisions. 
State courts themselves have never been persuaded that they are obligated under the Supremacy 
Clause to entertain federal claims that cannot be maintained in federal court because of the Eleventh 
Amendment. See, e.g., Weppler v. School Bd., 311 So. 2d 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Board of 
Comm'rs v. Splendour Shipping & Enters., 255 So. 2d 869 (La. Ct. App. 1972); Widgeon v. Eastern Shore 
Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921 (Md. 1984); Morris v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 565 N.E.2d 422 (Mass. 
1991); Maloney v. New York, 144 N.E.2d 364 (N.Y. 1957); Mossman v. Donahey, 346 N.E.2d 305 (Ohio 
1976); Lyons v. Texas A&M Univ., 545 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Gross v. 
Washington State Ferries, 367 P.2d 600 (Wash. 1961). But see Clover Bottom Hosp. & Sch. v. Townsend, 
513 S.W.2d 505 (Tenn. 1974) (acknowledging obligation). 
35. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.l4 (1996) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 
(6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)) (emphasis added). 
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copyrights-a right enforceable initially only in state courts, but subject to 
federal court review?36 Or does the Eleventh Amendment immunize the states 
from any such liability? 
This Article examines this basic contradiction between McKesson and 
Seminole Tribe concerning the nature of Eleventh Amendment immunity and 
considers how the two cases might be reconciled. Part I defines more precisely 
the two competing interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment, which I call 
the "forum-allocation" interpretation and the "immunity-from-liability" 
interpretation, and explains the relationship between both interpretations and 
Congress's power to impose obligations on the states, a subject that has been 
addressed by the Court under the rubric of the Tenth Amendment rather than 
the Eleventh. Part II reviews the support in the pre-Seminole Tribe decisions 
of the Supreme Court for the forum-allocation interpretation. Part ill describes 
the Seminole Tribe case and examines the statements in the Court's opinion 
that are difficult to square with the forum-allocation interpretation. Part ill then 
reviews the pre-Seminole Tribe support for the immunity-from-liability 
interpretation and concludes that, to the extent that the Seminole Tribe decision 
supports it, it is part of a long line of Supreme Court authority that conflicts 
with the forum-allocation interpretation. 
Part IV considers another problem created by the Seminole Tribe holding, 
a problem that appears at first to take us far afield of this Article's main 
concerns, but that on closer inspection turns out to be quite pertinent. The 
Seminole Tribe Court held that Eleventh Amendment immunity cannot be 
abrogated by Congress pursuant to its Article I powers, but can be abrogated 
pursuant to its power to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment.37 The 
Fourteenth Amendment includes a clause that prohibits the states from 
depriving people of liberty or property without due process of law. It is well 
established that legislatures may create "property" rights for purposes of this 
clause by placing mandatory obligations on states vis-a-vis individuals. This 
suggests an easy way for Congress to evade the Court's holding in Seminole 
Tribe: Impose mandatory obligations on states pursuant to Article I, thus 
giving individuals a "property" interest, and then abrogate the state.'s Eleventh 
Amendment immunity to "enforce" the states' due process obligations with 
respect to this newly created property. Indeed, Congress has already attempted 
to abrogate the states' immunity using just this theory.38 Of course, 
recognizing Congress's power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in 
this fashion threatens to eviscerate Seminole Tribe's holding that Congress may 
not abrogate under Article I. I call this the abrogation reductio. 
36. Under the current statutory scheme, the federal courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over claims 
under these statutes. See infra Section III.A. 
37. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1127-28. 
38. It has invoked this theory in justifying its abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity 
from damage liability in patent and trademark cases. See infra notes 278-82 and accompanying text. 
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My search for an escape from the reductio in Part IV requires an 
examination of doctrine in a number of related areas, including the scope of 
Congress's power to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment under Section 5 of 
that Amendment. The most promising escape from the reductio relies on 
McKesson, in conjunction with related procedural due process cases. 
Examining McKesson's bearing on the abrogation reductio offers several 
insights into the nature of Eleventh Amendment immunity. It shows, first, that 
the conflict between McKesson and the immunity-from-liability interpretation 
of the Eleventh Amendment is deeper than it at first appeared. Rather than 
being an example of one instance in which the Constitution requires a remedy 
against states, McKesson appears to stand for the proposition that whenever 
federal law places a mandatory obligation on the states vis-a-vis individuals, 
the Due Process Clause itself requires a damage remedy if the state violates 
the obligation without offering a predeprivation hearing and no other remedy 
would cure the injury. Although McKesson and related due process cases do 
supply a rationale for escaping the abrogation reductio--a rationale consistent 
only with the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment-analyzing McKesson's implications exposes vulnerabilities of the 
conventional reading of that case that ultimately lead to its unraveling. 
Specifically, the analysis places McKesson in conflict with decisions 
recognizing Congress's power to place mandatory obligations on states vis-a-
vis individuals without granting individuals a damage remedy. 
To avoid this conflict, and to reconcile McKesson with doctrine in other 
areas as well, I propose in Part V a reinterpretation of McKesson that would 
save what I regard as its most important insight, its recognition of the 
importance of retrospective relief for the violation of constitutional rights. The 
proposed reinterpretation would read the case to establish a constitutional right 
to damages from state officials responsible for violating the Constitution, rather 
than from the states themselves, a right of action having its source in the 
Supremacy Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause. This reinterpretation 
of McKesson does not require rejecting the forum-allocation interpretation of 
the Eleventh Amendment, but it does make possible a reading of McKesson 
that would reconcile it with Seminole Tribe's suggestion that a state's 
"consent" to suit in its own courts is a condition of the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction to review state court decisions against states. It thus removes 
McKesson and Reich from the ranks of the cases supporting the forum-
allocation interpretation and leaves that interpretation on considerably weaker 
ground. 
Part VI explores the options that remain open to Congress under the 
immunity-from-liability interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment to give 
efficacy to the obligations it validly imposes on the states, and it examines 
more generally the rule-of-law ramifications of adopting that interpretation. I 
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conclude that as long as McKesson and other cases are understood to recognize 
a constitutional right of individuals to damages from state officials who have 
willfully violated their constitutional rights,39 and as long as Congress retains 
the power to make such officials personally liable in damages for violating 
obligations that Congress has validly imposed on the states,40 the rule-of-law 
problems with an immunity-from-liability interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment are not severe. Indeed, it is not at all clear that the forum-
allocation interpretation is superior to the immunity-from-liability interpretation 
from a rule-of-law perspective. The availability of damages from state officials 
appears to satisfy tolerably well the demand for effective sanctions for 
government violations of law. The immunity-from-liability interpretation 
appears to come out ahead, however, when other rule-of-law values are taken 
into account, values such.as respect for precedent and the coherence in law. 
Among the most pertinent demands of the rule of law is its demand that the 
law be settled and clear. It is this test that the Court's current Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence clearly fails. In the end, which of the two 
interpretations of the Amendment the Court adopts is less important from a 
rule-of-law perspective than that it clearly and definitively adopt one position 
and permit the rest of us to arrange our affairs accordingly. 
I. THE COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF 1HE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
In this Part, I examine the varying ways in which the Eleventh 
Amendment may be interpreted and the implications of each interpretation. In 
Section A, I trace the history of the "diversity interpretation" of the 
Amendment. I explore the Supreme Court's initial rejection of this 
interpretation, the withering scholarly attacks that culminated in the Court's 
eventual adoption of what might be regarded as a version of the diversity 
interpretation in Union Gas, and the Court's recent change of heart in Seminole 
Tribe. As I will explain below, adopting the diversity interpretation would 
render largely moot the issues I develop in this Article. Because the Court 
rejected this interpretation in Seminole Tribe, Section B describes the central 
features of the forum-allocation and immunity-from-liability interpretations. In 
Section C, I explain the relationship between both interpretations and the 
Court's approaches in recent years to questions of congressional powers to 
impose primary obligations on the states under Article I. I here examine the 
complex relationship between the Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence and 
the competing interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment on which this Article 
focuses. 
39. See infra Part V. 
40. See infra notes 448-58 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Rise and Fall of the Diversity Interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment 
For a number of years now, the Supreme Court's approach to the Eleventh 
Amendment has been the subject of great controversy and intense scrutiny. 
With rare unanimity, scholars have argued that the Supreme Court's early 
decision in Hans v. Louisiana41 was fundamentally mistaken and should be 
reversed.42 In Hans, the Court held that even though the Eleventh 
Amendment applies by its terms only to suits against states by citizens of other 
states or foreign states, the Amendment protects states from being sued in 
federal court by its own citizens, even in cases arising under federallaw.43 
The Court reasoned that the Amendment was adopted to overrule the Supreme 
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,44 in which the Court had held that 
the states had given up their sovereign immunity when they adopted a 
Constitution that under Article III subjected them to the federal judicial power 
in, inter alia, cases between a state and citizens of another state. The Eleventh 
Amendment, the Hans Court held, served to restore and constitutionalize the 
original understanding that states would be immune from being sued by private 
individuals. Since then, the Court has elaborated a complex jurisprudence of 
state sovereign immunity under the rubric of the Eleventh Amendment, but one 
that bears little relation to the Amendment's text. In particular, the Court has 
held that the Amendment shields states from suits by foreign states45 and 
Indian tribes,46 even though neither category of plaintiff is mentioned in the 
Amendment, and that it applies to suits in admiralty,47 even though the 
Amendment refers only to suits at law and in equity. By contrast, the Court 
has held that the Amendment does not apply to suits brought by the United 
States48 or by sister states,49 to nonfederal actions brought by individuals in 
the state courts,50 to suits against state officials seeking prospective relief 
41. 134 u.s. l (1890). 
42. See Jackson, supra note l, at 4-5. Scholars critical of Hans include, in addition to those cited 
supra note 7, CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTII AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972); JOHN 
V. 0RTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY (1987); David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 
U. COLO. L. REV. l (1972); and Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling 
Hans v. Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1260 (1990). Even scholars who are critical of "revisionist" 
Eleventh Amendment scholarship are critical of Hans. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of 
the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1342, 1343 (1989). 
43. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 15. 
44. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
45. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934). 
46. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatack, 501 U.S. 775, 779-82 (1991). 
47. See Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921). 
48. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 136-38 (1965); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 
621, 643-46 (1892). 
49. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 83 (1907). 
50. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 418-21 (1979). 
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from violations of federallaw,51 or to suits seeking damages from individual 
defendants who hold public office.52 
Scholars have objected most strenuously to the Court's conclusion in Hans 
that the Eleventh Amendment grants states constitutional immunity from suits 
arising under federal law. While recognizing that sovereign states at the time 
of the Constitution's framing were thought to possess immunity from private 
lawsuits, revisionist scholars53 have denied that either Article lli or the 
Eleventh Amendment was intended to make that immunity applicable to cases 
arising under "supreme" federal law.54 The Court has held that the 
Constitution itself places certain legal obligations on states vis-a-vis individuals 
and empowers Congress to impose additional obligations. 55 To recognize state 
immunity from federal jurisdiction in cases arising under federal law would be 
to place awkward, and possibly severe, obstacles in the way of the enforcement 
of the obligations towards individuals that the Constitution plainly placed on 
the states. If the Amendment's Framers had intended to leave such a gap in the 
federal government's power to enforce the legal obligations it has the power 
to impose, they certainly could have chosen clearer language to do so. 
Much of the revisionist scholarship on the Eleventh Amendment appears 
to have been driven by profound discomfort with this enforcement gap created 
by the Hans interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. 56 I too find such a 
gap to be constitutionally problematic. As explained below, however, I am 
satisfied that the "fictions" that the Court has used to alleviate the problems 
created by Hans reduce the gap to manageable proportions, even if the 
immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment is thought to operate at the 
level of remedy. I discuss below the opportunities that remain available to 
Congress and the courts to "manage" this gap, but first I shall discuss the 
solution proposed by the diversity theorists. This solution would have entirely 
bridged the gap, and it would have done so in a way that would render largely 
moot the question that is the focus of this Article. The Supreme Court flirted 
51. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150-54 (1908). 
52. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974). 
53. The term is not mine. See George D. Brown, Has the Supreme Court Confessed Error on the 
Eleventh Amendment? Revisionist Scholarship and State Immunity, 68 N.C. L. REv. 867, 871-75 (1990). 
54. This is the thrust of the "diversity" explanation of the Eleventh Amendment. See infra text 
accompanying notes 63-64. 
55. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (affirming Congress's power to 
make applicable to states "generally applicable" laws imposing obligations towards individuals); Fletcher 
v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-39 (1810) (finding that Contracts Clause prohibits states from 
impairing their own contracts with individuals). 
56. Depending on whether one views the immunity as a forum-allocation principle or an immunity 
from damage liability (an issue to which revisionist scholars have not devoted much attention), the 
Amendment will be viewed as doing one of two very different things. If the immunity is from liability, the 
Amendment prevents Congress from subjecting states that violate their obligations to individuals to damage 
liability to such individuals, thus creating a gap between primary obligations and secondary, or remedial, 
obligations. If the immunity is jurisdictional, however, then the Amendment permits Congress to impose 
such liability but prevents the federal courts from enforcing it, thus creating a gap between secondary 
obligation and federal judicial power. 
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briefly with this approach, but then gave renewed significance to this question 
by abandoning the approach in Seminole Tribe. 
Most scholars agree with the Hans Court's premise that the Amendment's 
purpose was to reverse Chisholm. Revisionist scholars, however, disagree with 
the Hans Court about which feature of Chisholm the Eleventh Amendment was 
intended to reverse. Some stress that the principal flaw of the Chisholm 
decision, the one the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment sought to correct, 
was the one that caused Justice Iredell to dissent. In particular, Congress had 
not specifically withdrawn the states' immunity from private lawsuits, and 
Justice Iredell argued that Article III should not be construed as itself an 
abrogation of the states' common law sovereign immunity.57 On this view, 
the Eleventh Amendment does not give constitutional status to the states' 
sovereign immunity; it merely reversed Chisholm's holding that the 
Constitution itself did away with this immunity. Adherents to this view accept 
that state sovereign immunity remains as a common law immunity, but they 
maintain that, as such, it is subject to plenary abrogation by Congress.58 
Other scholars stress that Chisholm was an action in assumpsit involving 
an ordinary commercial dispute between an individual and a state. They argue 
that the Eleventh Amendment merely reversed the Chisholm Court's holding 
that the states could be sued in federal court by individuals on nonfederal 
causes of action.59 This interpretation makes some sense in light of the 
Amendment's reference to suits brought by citizens of other states or foreign 
states, but not suits brought by the states' own citizens.60 Since the latter 
cases can be brought in federal court only if the action is based on federal 
law,61 the Amendment could be read simply to withdraw two of the 
57. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435-37 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
58. See Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: 
Congressional Imposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1261-62 (1978) [hereinafter 
Field, Congressional Imposition]; Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity 
Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515,54045 (1978); John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional 
Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and 
Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1441-45 (1975); Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental 
Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About 
Federalism, 89 HAR.v. L. REV. 682, 693-96 (1976). 
59. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 428. 
60. Article ill extends the judicial power of the United States to, inter alia, "Cases ... arising under 
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority," and "Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State ... and between a State, 
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 2. The Eleventh 
Amendment provides, in its entirety: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens 
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." /d. amend. XI. The diversity 
interpretation holds that the Amendment merely repealed the state-citizen and state-alien diversity 
provisions insofar as they gave the federal courts jurisdiction over suits against the states. 
61. Here I include admiralty, which is today regarded as federal law. See Moragne v. States Marine 
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 388-93 (1970). But cf Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 
354, 359--80 (1959) (holding that general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994), does not confer 
jurisdiction over admiralty cases). I am also using "based upon" broadly to accommodate Congress's power 
(if any) to confer "protective" jurisdiction. See generally Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the 
1997] Eleventh Amendment Immunity 1697 
"diversity" bases of federal jurisdiction over suits against states, leaving 
untouched the federal judicial power over cases "arising under" federallaw.62 
This construction neatly solved the problem that the Hans interpretation posed 
for the effective enforcement of the federal obligations of the states, for under 
this interpretation, the Eleventh Amendment does not reach cases arising under 
federal law. 
By the late 1980s, these strands of revisionist Eleventh Amendment 
scholarship coalesced into what became known as the "diversity" 
interpretation.63 Although they differ on some details, diversity scholars agree 
that the Amendment should not be understood to bar Congress from conferring 
jurisdiction on the federal courts over cases arising under federal law but 
should instead be read to preclude only federal jurisdiction over suits against 
states predicated solely on diversity.64 Most of them also agree that state 
sovereign immunity could continue to play a role as a subconstitutional 
doctrine tied loosely or not at all to the Eleventh Amendment, but they all 
insist that Congress has plenary power to abrogate any such immunity pursuant 
to any of its legislative powers. 
The question that is the focus of this Article-is Eleventh Amendment 
immunity just a forum-allocation principle or does it also create an immunity 
from federal liability?-would of course not even arise for a scholar who did 
not regard the Eleventh Amendment to be applicable at all to suits arising 
under federal law. If the scholar accepted the existence of state sovereign 
immunity but regarded it merely as a matter of common law, the question 
whether this subconstitutional immunity is merely an immunity from original 
federal jurisdiction or also an immunity from federal liability would be a 
relatively unimportant one, for in either case the "immunity" could be 
withdrawn by Congress. Indeed, it seems awkward to call it an "immunity" at 
all if Congress has the power to withdraw it. Such an "immunity" would 
operate merely as a presumption that generally applicable laws have not been 
District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157 (1953). 
62. See Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 7, at 1033; Gibbons, supra note 7, at 1889. 
63. In addition to the articles cited above, see Amar, supra note 7, at 1425; and Jackson, supra note 
1. A minority of scholars has rejected aspects of the interpretation. See Marshall, supra note 42; Marshall, 
supra note 7; Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 61 (1989). 
64. Some scholars appear to go even further and maintain that the Eleventh Amendment limited only 
the federal judiciary's power to exercise jurisdiction directly under the Constitution, not Congress's power 
to grant federal jurisdiction. See Nowak, supra note 58, at 1442. If so, then Congress would presumably 
be free to confer jurisdiction over suits against states not based substantively on federal law. Since the 
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is entirely dependent on congressional authorization, the Eleventh 
Amendment as interpreted by Professor Nowak would only affect the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. The 
interpretation is highly implausible. It is true that the Amendment limits only the 'judicial power," but it 
is well understood that the limits on the judicial power are limits on Congress's power to confer jurisdiction 
on the lower courts. Justice Jackson's suggestions to the contrary in National Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 592 (1949) (plurality opinion), were clearly rejected by a majority 
of the Court. See id. at 626 (Rutledge, J., concurring); id. at 640-41 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); id. at 655 
(Frankfurter, J ., dissenting). 
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made applicable to the states. The question whether this type of immunity is 
an immunity from original federal jurisdiction only or an immunity from 
liability as well might be relevant in determining whether Congress, in order 
to remove it, need only make known its intent to subject states to suit in 
federal court or must also express its intent to make states liable in damages 
to individuals. Few diversity scholars have addressed this issue at all.65 
On the Supreme Court, the first signs of dissatisfaction with the Hans line 
of cases came in dissenting opinions by Justice Brennan. At first, Brennan 
advocated a literal interpretation of the Amendment, under which the 
Amendment would apply to suits "arising under" federal law, but only if the 
suit was brought by a citizen of a different state or of a foreign state.66 He 
combined this view, however, with a broad theory of congressional power to 
abrogate sovereign immunity under Article !.67 Eventually, Brennan embraced 
the diversity interpretation, under which the Amendment would have no 
application to suits arising under federal law and the states would enjoy at best 
a subconstitutional immunity subject to congressional abrogation.68 Three of 
his colleagues concurred in this view,69 and at one point the Court was evenly 
divided on whether to adopt it.70 In Union Gas, however, Justice Brennan 
switched gears in an apparent attempt to garner a fifth vote. Rather than press 
the diversity interpretation, he now relied on his reasoning in Parden v. 
Terminal Railway71 to extend to the Commerce Clause the Court's holding 
in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer72 that Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh 
65. A notable exception is Jackson, supra note I, who gave the issue sustained attention in 1988. This 
Article argues that the forum-allocation intetpretation is not as well grounded as Jackson suggests. William 
Aetcher also gave more than passing consideration to the issue. See Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, 
supra note 7. While Fletcher concludes that the Eleventh Amendment has no bearing on Congress's power 
to subject states to damage liability, he acknowledges that other provisions of the Constitution may limit 
Congress's power in this respect. He argues that the scope of Congress's power to subject states to damage 
liability to individuals should be regarded as a clause-specific question of substantive law, a question the 
courts should approach as a matter of intetpreting the specific constitutional provision that assertedly gives 
Congress the power to legislate substantively on the matter. See id. at 1107. I suggest below that the Court 
may now understand this issue to be governed by the Eleventh Amendment, which distinguishes only 
between pre- and post-Fourteenth Amendment obligations of the states. 
66. See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 
U.S. 279, 313 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
67. The theory was that the states surrendered their sovereignty to the extent that they gave Congress 
the power to legislate under Article I. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 196-97 (1964). 
68. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 261-63, 301 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
69. Justices Marshall, B1ackmun, and Stevens concurred in Brennan's Atascadero dissent. See id. at 
247 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
70. In Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468 (1987), Justice 
Scalia reserved judgment on the question, see id. at 495-96 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment), but in Union Gas, he ultimately came down in favor of affirming Hans, see Pennsylvania 
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 35 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
71. 377 U.S. at 196-97 (suggesting that states waived their sovereign immunity from suit under federal 
statutes when they ratified Constitution giving Congress power to enact those statutes). 
72. 427 u.s. 445 (1976). 
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Amendment immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment.73 Justice White 
apparently agreed that the reasoning of Fitzpatrick could not be confined to 
obligations imposed on states under the Fourteenth Amendment and so he 
provided a fifth vote for the holding that Congress may abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce 
as well.74 Union Gas was widely understood to establish that the Eleventh 
Amendment could be abrogated by Congress under any of its legislative 
powers.75 
Although the Union Gas decision did not explicitly adopt the diversity 
interpretation, it produced virtually the same result. Proponents of the diversity 
theory maintain that the Amendment has no application in federal question 
cases, but they accept a subconstitutional doctrine of state sovereign immunity. 
The doctrine is subconstitutional in the sense that Congress may abrogate it. 
The plurality in Union Gas did not say that Eleventh Amendment immunity 
was not of constitutional stature, but its holding that Congress may abrogate 
the immunity under any of its legislative powers rendered the immunity 
subconstitutional in the very sense urged by the diversity theorists. Whether the 
immunity was an immunity from original federal jurisdiction only or an 
immunity from federal liability as well was accordingly unimportant, as in 
either case Congress had the power to do away with it. 
Union Gas was expressly overruled last term in Seminole Tribe, where a 
majority of the Court held that Eleventh Amendment immunity could not be 
abrogated under Article 1.76 This decision, of course, resurrects the issue that 
mattered little under the diversity view. State sovereign immunity is once again 
beyond Congress's reach, and it is accordingly once again important to know 
exactly what the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from doing. Does it 
merely prevent Congress from subjecting states to the original jurisdiction of 
the federal courts, or does it disable Congress from subjecting states to damage 
liability to individuals? 
73. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 15-19. 
74. The other four Justices in the majority had embraced the diversity interpretation in Atascadero. 
In his concurring opinion, Justice White wrote cryptically that he agreed with Justice Brennan's conclusion, 
though not all of his reasoning. See id. at 45 (White, J ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
75. All of the Justices in Seminole Tribe so interpreted the decision. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 
116 S. Ct. 1114, 1126-27 (1996); id. at 1133-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1184 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
76. See id. at 1128. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented. Justice Stevens, who had 
earlier embraced the diversity interpretation, maintained, as he had done in Union Gas, that there are two 
Eleventh Amendments, one having constitutional stature, which Congress may not abrogate, and another 
having subconstitutional stature and subject to plenary congressional abrogation. See id. at I 144 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). Justice Souter (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer) would have affirmed the Union Gas 
holding that Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under any of its legislative 
powers. They would have interpreted Hans as resting on the lack of an act of Congress expressly 
withdrawing the states' sovereign immunity. See id. at I 184-85 (Souter, J., dissenting). These three Justices 
would thus have accepted the diversity theory in substance if not in name. 
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B. The Forum-Allocation and Immunity-from-Liability Interpretations 
Unlike the diversity issue, the issue that is the focus of this Article has not 
received sustained attention from either judges or scholars, and (perhaps 
because the Justices have failed to focus on the issue) the Supreme Court's 
Eleventh Amendment opinions have for some time been sending conflicting 
signals about it. I shall provisionally put the question this way: Is the immunity 
conferred on the states by the Eleventh Amendment an immunity from liability 
under federallaw,77 or is it merely an immunity from the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts? 
The Amendment's text appears to provide a clear answer to that question. 
By its terms, the Amendment limits "the Judicial power of the United 
States."78 This phrasing suggests that it relates only to federal jurisdiction, but 
reflection reveals the dichotomy, as posed above, to be a false one. 
Recognizing this falsity, moreover, permits us to see that the text of the 
Amendment actually supports the view that the Eleventh Amendment confers 
an immunity from liability. Whatever the nature of the immunity conferred by 
the Eleventh Amendment, it is relevant only where retrospective monetary 
relief9 is being sought by individuals. Assume that Eleventh Amendment 
immunity is "only" an immunity from federal court jurisdiction. Assume 
further that a federal statute purports to obligate the states to pay damages to 
individuals under certain circumstances. If no federal court is empowered to 
enforce that liability, then it is questionable whether the states can be said to 
be under a legal obligation to pay those damages.8° For present purposes, it 
suffices to observe that a federal liability of the states that is enforceable only 
in state courts is not an effective liability. It is more like a congressional 
recommendation that states pay damages to individuals. Chief Justice Marshall 
77. The Supreme Court has clearly held that the Amendment does not protect the states from liability 
under the law of sister states, or from being sued in the courts of sister states. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 
410, 426-27 (1979). Presumably the Amendment also does not protect the states from being subjected to 
liability under the laws of foreign states, a liability that would be enforceable in the courts of sister states 
(if permitted by sister states). Thus, to the extent that the Amendment can be an immunity from liability, 
it would at best be an immunity from liability under federal law (unless the 6-3 decision in Nevada v. Hall 
were to be revisited). 
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
79. See Edelman v. Jordan,415 U.S. 651, 668-<i9 (1974), discussed il!fra Part ill. As discussed below, 
suits against state officials for prospective relief from violations of federal law are not barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment is accordingly not an obstacle to individuals seeking 
prospective relief from continuing violations of federal law by the states. As Seminole Tribe itself reminds 
us, the Amendment protects states from being sued by private parties in their own names even for 
prospective relief. Seminole Tribe may further establish that a suit seeking prospective relief from violations 
of federal statutes may be available only if the statute that imposes the primary obligation does not preclude 
such relief. 
80. In another piece, I not only defend such an understanding of what it means to be under a legal 
obligation but also argue that the Supremacy Clause embraces such an understanding of the term "law." 
See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Constitution as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and 
Constitutional Remedies (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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noted in Osborn v. Bank of the United States81 that "the legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers, of every well constructed government are co-extensive 
with each other" and that "[a]ll governments which are not extremely defective 
in their organization, must possess, within themselves, the means of 
expounding, as well as enforcing, their own laws."82 Marshall was referring 
to the need for a federal forum to give efficacy to all federal laws. The point 
is even more compelling when the federal law at issue is one that imposes a 
liability on the states. It is one thing to rely on state courts to enforce the 
federal liabilities of private individuals; it is quite another to rely on state 
courts to enforce the federal liabilities of the states. Whether we consider a 
liability to be a legal one if it depends on the willingness of the obligated party 
to comply is a question I leave for another day. Surely it is a liability of 
questionable efficacy. If all federal courts lack jurisdiction over cases in which 
individuals seek money damages from the states under federal law, then the 
states are effectively immune from federal liability to individuals for 
damages.83 
In one of its many departures from the text of the Amendment, the 
Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment does not constrain the 
jurisdiction of all federal courts: It does not limit the Supreme Court's own 
appellate jurisdiction. The most forceful recent articulation of this idea came 
in McKesson, in which a unanimous Supreme Court concluded that "the 
[Eleventh] Amendment does not circumscribe our appellate review of state-
court judgments."84 As discussed below, this decision is one of the 
cornerstones of the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh 
81. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
82. !d. at 818-19. 
83. The federal liabilities of the federal government are enforceable only by federal courts. Because 
both the tribunal and the obligated party are federal entities, it might be argued that my analysis would 
require me to say that the federal liabilities of the federal government are not really legal liabilities either. 
But, the situations are different in important respects. First, the federal courts are constitutionally insulated 
from pressure from the political branches. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I. Second, the liabilities of the federal 
government have been enacted by the federal Congress. Thus pressure from that quarter would serve only 
to increase the efficacy of the federal liability. By contrast, a damage liability imposed on states from 
without is likely to be opposed by the political branches of the state governments, and the state courts are 
not as a general matter insulated from state legislatures or from popular pressures. 
The analogy to the sovereign immunity of the United States actually supports the conclusion that state 
sovereign immunity is an immunity from liability, for the Supreme Court has treated the sovereign 
immunity of the United States as negating the existence of any legal right against the United States, not 
just precluding access to a court for the enforcement of an existing right. See The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 
419, 433 (1922) ("Legal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law 
but that are elusive to the grasp."); cf. Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) ("[T]here can 
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the Law on which the right depends."). For a further 
defense of the conclusion that a federal liability of states that no federal court is empowered to enforce is 
not a legal liability, or is, at any rate, an ineffective liability, see infra text accompanying notes 438-40. 
84. McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 28 (1990). On 
whether the forum-allocation view would permit congress to authorize lower federal courts to hear appeals 
from state courts in suits against states, see supra note 33. 
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Amendment. 85 The immunity it confers under this view is only an immunity 
from the original jurisdiction of the federal courts. It has nothing to say about 
the liability of states to individuals under federal law; it merely channels 
damage actions by individuals against the states into the state courts. If federal 
law subjects the states to liability to individuals, the state courts are required 
by the Supremacy Clause to award the required relief, and, if they do not, 
McKesson holds that the Supreme Court may reverse their judgments. The 
Eleventh Amendment, on this view, protects the states' dignity by delaying the 
exercise of the federal courts' coercive power, but it does not protect state 
coffers. It assumes that the states will ultimately comply with any federal 
obligation to pay damages to individuals, and it holds in reserve a federal 
judicial power to compel such payment if the states prove recalcitrant. 
In light of McKesson, the question posed above may be rephrased as 
follows: Is the immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment on the states 
only an immunity from the original jurisdiction of the federal courts, or is it 
also (effectively) an immunity from liability to individuals under federal 
law?86 Because the Eleventh Amendment is phrased as a limitation on the 
"judicial power of the United States," the Amendment's text appears 
incompatible with the forum-allocation reading,87 but the Amendment's text 
has long ceased to do any dispositive work, and the decisions in McKesson and 
other Supreme Court cases88 seem to reject the immunity-from-liability 
reading. On the other hand, Supreme Court decisions dating back to Hans, and 
indeed to Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia,89 are in substantial 
tension with the forum-allocation view. Significantly, the Court's most recent 
pronouncement on the Eleventh Amendment, its opinion in Seminole Tribe, 
strongly hints that the Court regards Eleventh Amendment immunity as 
(effectively) immunizing the states from monetary liability to private 
individuals. The majority stated that the Supreme Court may exercise appellate 
jurisdiction over suits arising in the state courts "where a State has consented 
85. Cf. Jackson, supra note I, at 7 (identifying forum allocation as important aspect of Eleventh 
Amendment doctrine). 
86. I shall henceforth describe an immunity of states from the jurisdiction of all federal courts as an 
immunity from federal liability on the theory that a liability that Congress has the power to impose on the 
states but only state courts have the power to enforce is no liability at all. Readers who are unwilling to 
go that far may insert the term "effectively" as indicated in brackets. 
As the text indicates, I am not posing an "either-or" choice. It is clear that Eleventh Amendment 
immunity is at least an immunity from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. The question is whether 
it is also an immunity from liability under federal law. On whether the existence of an immunity from 
federal court jurisdiction has any relevance if the states are in any event immune from liability under 
federal law, see infra note 270. 
87. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can, of course, be no broader than the whole 
"judicial power of the United States." 
88. See cases discussed infra Part II. 
89. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429-50 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting); see also infra note 238 and 
accompanying text. The Court has relied on Justice Iredell's dissent in construing the meaning of the 
Eleventh Amendment. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I, 18-19 (1890). 
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to suit,"90 thus suggesting that a state's successful invocation of sovereign 
immunity in state court will immunize the state court decision from Supreme 
Court review.91 This language from Seminole Tribe, and statements to the 
same effect in other recent cases,92 invite a closer look at McKesson and the 
judicial support for the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
Seminole Tribe is not the only recent decision that supports the immunity-
from-liability interpretation-indeed, in the previous Term the Court used 
language that supports it even more clearly93 -but its principal holding 
elevates substantially the significance of the issue. As noted, Seminole Tribe 
overruled Union Gas, in which the Court had held that Congress has the power 
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to any of its Article I 
powers. By affirming that the Eleventh Amendment is beyond Congress's 
power to abrogate except in certain circumstances, this decision obviously 
makes understanding the scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity all the more 
important. 
C. The Relationship Between the Immunity-from-Liability Interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment and the Court's Tenth Amendment Jurisprudence 
An interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as limiting not just the 
original jurisdiction of the federal courts but also Congress's power to subject 
the states to monetary liability to individuals would arguably encroach upon 
some of the turf currently occupied by the Court's Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence. This Section addresses the relationship between the immunity-
from-liability interpretation and the Court's recent Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence. We might understand the immunity-from-liability interpretation 
as dividing up the relevant turf along the following lines: While Congress's 
power to impose obligations on the states is governed by the Court's Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the availability of remedies for the violation of such 
obligations is determined by the Eleventh Amendment. 
The relationship between the immunity-from-liability interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment and the Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is 
complex. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,94 the 
90. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.14 (1996). 
91. Indeed, the statement suggests that even an unsuccessful invocation of sovereign immunity in the 
state courts would preclude the Supreme Court from reviewing a decision on the merits favoring the state. 
92. See, e.g., Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400. Even McKesson itself has language that supports the immunity-
from-liability interpretation. See infra text accompanying note 128. 
93. See Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400 ("The Eleventh Amendment largely shields States from suit in federal 
court without their consent, leaving parties with claims against a State to present them, if the State permits, 
in the State's own tribunals."). 
94. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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Court overruled National League of Cities v. Usery,95 in which it had held 
that the Tenth Amendment protected the states from being regulated by 
Congress in certain spheres-i.e., in areas of the states' "traditional 
governmental functions."96 Largely because the Court had had difficulty 
specifying exactly which activities fell within that category, Garcia discarded 
this limitation.97 It held that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a federal 
statute requiring employers to pay employees a minimum wage, could 
constitutionally be applied to the states acting as employers. In New York v. 
United States,98 the Court backtracked somewhat, but left Congress with 
considerable power to regulate the states. The Court limited Garcia to federal 
laws that regulate the states as a part of a broader category of regulated parties 
that includes nonstate actors.99 Thus, after New York v. United States, 
Congress remains free to regulate the states as, for example, employers, as it 
did in the FLSA. 
How does the Eleventh Amendment bear on all of this? The FLSA 
authorized suits against employers for back pay, and in Garcia the Court 
permitted the suit to go forward against the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, a local agency. Because the defendant was not a state agency, as 
that term is understood in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, 100 the case did 
not raise an Eleventh Amendment issue. Post-Garcia, the lower courts held 
that Congress, in amending the FLSA in 1974, clearly expressed its intent to 
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 101 Under the Union Gas 
holding, Congress had the power to do this, but Seminole Tribe calls into 
95. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528. 
96. /d. at 852. 
97. To be precise, the Court said that any limits on Congress's power in this regard were not judicially 
enforceable. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556-57. The Court thus left open the possibility that the Tenth 
Amendment might indeed impose limits, but it held that any such limits were "enforceable" only through 
the political process. I would question the legal status of constitutional limits that can be "enforced" only 
through the political process. See Vazquez, supra note 80. Others apparently share this skepticism, for 
Garcia has come to be understood as holding that the Tenth Amendment does not place limits on 
Congress's power to regulate the states. See, e.g., Southeastern Pa Transp. Auth. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Uti!. 
Comm'n, 826 F. Supp. 1506, 1518 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 27 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 1994); Karl M. Tilleman, 
Note, Does the Tenth Amendment Pose Any Judicial Limit on the Commerce Clause After Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority and South Carolina v. Baker?, 1989 BYU L. REv. 231. Indeed, 
the Supreme Court itself appears to have so interpreted its Garcia holding. See South Carolina v. Baker, 
485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) (stating that "Garcia left open the possibility that some extraordinary defects in 
the national political process might render congressional regulation of state activities invalid," thus implying 
that without such defects such regulation would be valid). 
98. 505 u.s. 144 (1992). 
99. See id. at 160. 
100. For Eleventh Amendment purposes, a "state" includes a statewide agency but not local 
governments or local government agencies. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S 
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1056 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. 
For Tenth Amendment purposes, as Garcia itself shows, local governments and local government agencies 
are treated as the state. 
101. See Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1556 (lOth Cir. 1995); Brinkman v. Department of 
Corrections, 21 F.3d 370, 372 (lOth Cir. 1994); Reich v. New York, 3 F.3d 581, 590 (2d Cir. 1993); Hale 
v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993) (en bane). 
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question the validity of this abrogation, as the FLSA appears to have been 
enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 102 If Eleventh Amendment 
immunity were merely a forum-allocation principle, then Seminole Tribe would 
mean that Congress may require states as employers to pay a minimum wage, 
and it may subject states that violate this obligation to suit by private 
individuals, but such suits would have to be brought in state courts. The 
Supremacy Clause would obligate the state courts to enforce the states' 
statutory obligations, and the Supreme Court through its appellate jurisdiction 
would have the power to monitor the state courts' compliance with this 
obligation.103 If Eleventh Amendment immunity were an immunity from 
liability, then Congress would lack the power to subject the states to any 
monetary liability to individuals. The state courts would thus not be under any 
obligation to entertain damage actions brought by private individuals in state 
courts alleging the violation by states of statutes enacted by Congress pursuant 
to Article I and clearly made applicable to the states (as permitted by New 
York v. United States104). 
I 02. A federal circuit court and three district courts have already found this abrogation to be 
unconstitutional under Seminole Tribe. See Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, Nos. 95-3086, 95-3143, 1996 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 28067 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1996); Adams v. Kansas, 934 F. Supp. 371, 372 (D. Kan. 1996); 
Taylor v. Virginia, No. 3:95cv1026, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19748 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 1996); American 
Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. Virginia, No. 94-097-A, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18810 
(W.D. Va. Dec. 13, 1996). In addition, a federal district court in Alabama has found the abrogation of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to be 
unconstitutional under Seminole Tribe. See MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785, 
788-89 (N.D. Ala. 1996). On the other hand, a district court has found the Eleventh Amendment abrogation 
in the ADEA to be a valid exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Teichgraeber v. Memorial Union Corp., No. 95-4118-SACS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18131 (D. Kan. Nov. 
26, 1996). Courts have also reached conflicting conclusions on whether Congress's abrogation of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity for suits brought under section 106 of the Bankruptcy Act was a valid exercise of 
its Section 5 power. Compare In re Burke, No. 92-11482, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1614 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 
1996) (valid), with In re Koehler, No. 4-94-6040, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 9 (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 1997) (invalid), 
and In re Charter Oaks Assocs., No. 91-23999, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1554 (D. Conn. Nov. 25, 1996) 
(invalid), and In re Lush Lawns, Inc., No. 96-13469, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1576 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 1996) 
(invalid). An appellate court has found Congress's abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits 
under the Equal Pay Act to have been a valid exercise of its Section 5 power. See Timmer v. Michigan 
Dep't of Commerce, No. 95-1706, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 545 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1997). Two district courts 
have held that Congress's abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) was a valid exercise of its enforcement power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Kaufman v. Carter, No. 1:95-CV-313, 1996 WL 731925 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 1996); 
Mayer v. University of Minn., 940 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Minn. 1996) (also finding abrogation under 
Rehabilitation Act to be valid). Furthermore, an appellate court has found, notwithstanding Seminole Tribe, 
that Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under its War Power. See Diaz-
Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 616 n.9 (1st Cir. 1996) (upholding abrogation of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act); see also Knussman v. Maryland, 935 F. 
Supp. 659,663 (D. Md. 1996) (reserving judgment on validity of abrogation in Family and Medical Leave 
Act); infra notes 278-82 (discussing Congress's abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity under patent 
and trademark laws). 
103. See generally infra Section II.A. 
104. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Alternatively, one might say that the Supremacy Clause obligates the states 
to award such damages, but that no federal court has the power to monitor the state courts' compliance with 
this obligation. As discussed above, this is tantamount to an immunity from liability. 
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It bears emphasizing that adoption of the immunity-from-liability 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment would not be a backhanded way of 
overruling what New York left of Garcia. It is important to distinguish three 
concepts: (1) the primary obligations imposed by the law; (2) the secondary 
or remedial obligations the law imposes in the event the primary obligation is 
violated;105 and (3) the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. Garcia held 
that Congress could impose primary obligations on the states, such as the 
obligation to pay employees a minimum wage. Under the forum-allocation 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, Congress possesses the power to 
subject states that violate those obligations to damage liability to aggrieved 
individuals. The immunity-from-liability interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment holds that Congress may not subject the states to such liability, 
but there are other ways to give efficacy to the states' primary obligations. 
First, individuals may sue state officials in their official capacities for 
prospective relief. 106 Thus an individual who is aggrieved by a state's failure 
to pay him the required minimum wage could obtain a court order requiring 
the responsible state official to pay him the minimum wage. This order would 
comply with the Eleventh Amendment under current doctrine so long as the 
order required the official to pay wages that accrue after the court's order was 
entered. 107 If the official violates that order, she would subject herself to 
contempt sanctions and, if the violation amounted to bad faith, the court would 
have the power to require the state itself to pay the unpaid amounts due under 
the court's order. 108 This regime appears effective to ensure prospective 
compliance with an obligation, for example, to pay a minimum wage.109 To 
be sure, limiting the individual to prospective relief appears to give states the 
opportunity to avoid compliance for at least some period of time. But there are 
ways, short of subjecting the states to damage liability, to deter the states from 
even temporarily violating their obligation. Congress could, for example, 
subject states that violate the minimum wage obligation to a fine collectible by 
a federal agency. The Eleventh Amendment does not protect the states from 
suits by the United States. no There may be other ways to give efficacy to the 
105. On the distinction between primary and secondary obligations, see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, 
Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1089-90 & n.26 (1992). 
106. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. lll4, 1131 n.l6 (1996). 
107. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668-69 (1974) (affirming order requiring state official to 
comply with federal obligation to pay money to individuals from state funds, insofar as order required 
payment of amounts that accrued after entry of court's order). 
108. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691-92 (1978). But cf. infra text accompanying note 443 
(noting that adoption of immunity-from-liability interpretation of Eleventh Amendment may protect states 
from contempt sanctions and costs where official has violated court order requiring prospective compliance 
with duty imposed by Congress under Article 1). 
109. By "prospective" in this context, I mean from the time of the court's order forward. 
110. See supra text accompanying note 48. The Court has held that states may not, consistently with 
the Eleventh Amendment, maintain parens patriae actions against sister states. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil 
Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258 n.l2 (1972); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 90-91 (1883). If this 
principle extends to the federal government as well, then there may be Eleventh Amendment problems with 
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underlying federal obligation. 111 Congress might make waiver of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity a condition of participation in some related federal 
program.112 What I have said, however, is sufficient to show that interpreting 
the Eleventh Amendment as an immunity from liability is not tantamount to 
denying Congress the power to regulate the states as permitted by Garcia and 
New York. 
The immunity-from-liability interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment 
would, however, limit in an important way Congress's options for giving 
efficacy to the obligations it imposes on the states vis-a-vis individuals. It 
would eliminate (or at least place significant obstacles in the way of) perhaps 
the most effective, and certainly the most straightforward, method of enforcing 
those obligations: private lawsuits for damages by aggrieved individuals against 
the state itself. It is true that even the narrower, forum-allocation interpretation 
of the Eleventh Amendment places a potentially awkward obstacle in the way 
of such lawsuits: They must be brought in the state courts as an initial matter, 
with federal court involvement available only on appeal. But at least this 
option would remain available to Congress under the forum-allocation 
interpretation, whereas it would be unavailable under the immunity-from-
liability interpretation unless Congress could secure a waiver of immunity 
under a Spending Clause program. It is also true that even if the Eleventh 
Amendment were merely a forum-allocation principle, Congress might prefer 
to devise a scheme to procure a waiver of the immunity and thus permit suits 
a regime in which a federal agency obtains fines against states that violate federal obligations towards 
individuals, and then turns over the fines to the aggrieved individuals. One scholar has argued that Congress 
does have the power to turn over the proceeds to the injured individuals, and that Congress may even 
authorize the individuals to sue the states in a qui tam action on behalf of the U.S. government, and perhaps 
even to sue the states in their own names. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress's Power 
to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX. L. REV. 539 (1995). The Court's opinion in Blatchford v. 
Native Village of Noatak throws cold water on (at least) the latter two suggestions. See 501 U.S. 775, 785 
(1991) (expressing "doubt" that United States's power to sue states can be delegated even "to persons on 
whose behalf the United States itself might sue"). The water was thrown before the arguments were made, 
but the author did not consider it too cold. See Siegel, supra, at 568. 
111. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 110, at 564-69 (proposing that individuals use qui tam actions to 
enforce their own rights in place of U.S. government). In Pan VI, I discuss Congress's power to authorize 
individuals to obtain damages from state officials responsible for violations of federal statutes. 
112. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding congressional use of spending power 
to "encourage" states to impose minimum drinking age). With regard to this conditioning power, Judge 
Frank Easterbrook has stated that Congress '"has the whip hand in all of this.' For example, ... Congress 
can wield its 'conditioning power,' tying a state's receipt of federal money to its promise not to infringe 
copyrights." Constitutional Law Scholars Attempt to Distill Recent Supreme Court Term, 65 U.S.L.W. 2274, 
2288 ( 1996). Easterbrook mistakenly assumes here that Seminole Tribe denies Congress the power to make 
the copyright laws applicable to the states, however. At most, Seminole Tribe denies Congress the power 
to make states liable in damages for infringing copyrights. This misconception may explain Easterbrook's 
further statement that Seminole Tribe is incompatible with Garcia. See id. 
It has been suggested that in light of its recent holding in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 
(1995), the Court should scale back Congress's power to induce states to act under the Spending Clause 
in circumstances in which Congress could not require the states to act under its other enumerated powers. 
See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1916 (1995). 
If the Court does so, then the option noted in the text accompanying this footnote may become less 
promising than under current doctrine. 
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in federal court. Whichever way the matter is analyzed, however, determining 
whether the Eleventh Amendment confers only an immunity from the original 
jurisdiction of the federal courts or also an immunity from liability will be 
important to Congress in determining how to respond to the recent decision in 
Seminole Tribe. 
The issue has already attracted the attention of litigants, ll3 and it should 
soon attract Congress's attention. 114 At issue is the efficacy with respect to 
the states of such generally applicable laws as those prohibiting copyright and 
patent infringement. Does Seminole Tribe mean that Congress may not allow 
copyright holders to sue state agencies that infringe their copyrights for 
damages in federal court (absent waiver), and thus that copyright holders 
would be relegated to a remedy in state court (if Congress should authorize 
one), subject to Supreme Court review? Or does it mean that Congress may 
not give copyright holders a right to obtain damages in any court from state 
agencies that infringe their copyrights? I will discuss in Part IV what Seminole 
Tribe suggests on that question, but first I shall discuss what recent pre-
Seminole Tribe cases suggested. 
II. PRE-SEMINOLE TRIBE SUPPORT FOR READING THE ELEVENTH 
AMENDMENT AS MERELY A FORUM-ALLOCATION PRINCIPLE 
Readers of the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment opinions before 
Seminole Tribe would certainly have had grounds to conclude that the Court 
had definitively rejected what I have called the immunity-from-liability 
interpretation of that Amendment. Not only did a number of those opinions 
state broadly that the Amendment has no application in state courts, 115 but 
the Court also unanimously ruled that the Eleventh Amendment does not limit 
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 116 It found that certain federal 
constitutional and statutory provisions impose damage liabilities on states, and 
it held that the Supremacy Clause requires the states to entertain suits seeking 
such damages in their own courts. 117 In this Part, I review the indications in 
the pre-Seminole Tribe cases that the Court has viewed the Amendment as 
bearing only on original federal jurisdiction-that the Amendment, in other 
words, does not have any bearing on whether states are liable to individuals 
I 13. See Victoria Slind-Fior, High Court Gambling Case May Give States Big Payoff, NAT'L L.J., July 
8, 1996, at Bl. 
114. See Letter from Jonathan R. Siegel, Associate Professor, George Washington Univ., to Betty 
Wheeler, Democratic Counsel, Courts & Intellectual Property Subcomm., Judiciary Comm., U.S. House 
of Representatives (Apr. 12, 1996) (on file with author). 
115. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1989); Maine v. Thiboutot, 
448 U.S. I, 9 n.7 (1980); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1979). 
116. See infra text accompanying notes 123-27. 
117. See infra text accompanying notes 144-51. 
1997] Eleventh Amendment Immunity 1709 
for damages, but merely requires that any federal liability of the states toward 
individuals be enforced in the state courts, subject to review in the Supreme 
Court. 
A. Cases Recognizing a Constitutional Obligation of States to Afford 
Monetary Relief to Individuals in Their Own Courts 
Authority for the proposition that the Eleventh Amendment does nothing 
more than confer an immunity from the original jurisdiction of the federal 
courts can be found in the cases in which the Supreme Court appears to have 
recognized that the Constitution itself in certain circumstances requires the 
states to afford monetary relief to private individuals. These cases indicate that 
if the states do not afford that relief voluntarily, individuals are entitled by the 
federal Constitution to maintain an action against the states in the state courts, 
and the Supreme Court may review the state courts' decisions to ensure that 
those courts have enforced the states' constitutional obligation to afford the 
required relief. These cases indicate that neither the Eleventh Amendment nor 
the states' own law of sovereign immunity may be interposed to avoid such 
a suit, and that the Eleventh Amendment similarly does not bar Supreme Court 
review of the state courts' decisions. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the Court has found a right of individuals to damages 
from the states in only two provisions of the Constitution. One of them is the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. This is one of the few constitutional provisions 
that expressly addresses issues of liability. It provides that "private property 
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."118 The 
Supreme Court has held that "a landowner is entitled to bring an action in 
inverse condemnation as a result of '"the self-executing character of the 
constitutional provision with respect to compensation.""'119 The Court has 
indicated that this remedy is available in the state courts even if there is no 
state statute that authorizes it. 120 Nor may the state courts interpose their own 
law of sovereign immunity to bar such claims. 121 The Eleventh Amendment 
is not regarded as a bar to Supreme Court review of inverse condemnation 
118. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
119. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) 
(quoting United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (quoting 6 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 
25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972))). 
120. See id. (citing San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654-55 (1981) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
121. See id. at 316 n.9 (rejecting Solicitor General's argument that ''principles of sovereign 
immunity [help] ... establish[] that the [Fifth] Amendment itself is ... not a remedial provision"). 
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actions from the state courts raising takings issues under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 122 
The other constitutional provision that the Court has held sometimes 
requires the states to afford monetary relief to individuals is the Due Process 
Clause. The relevant holdings have come in tax refund cases in which the 
Court has held that if a state does not offer taxpayers an opportunity to 
challenge the lawfulness of a tax before paying it, then the state must give the 
taxpayer a postpayment hearing to determine the tax's validity and, if the tax 
turns out to have been invalid, a refund of the tax or some other remedy that 
would cure the violation. 123 The Court's clearest recent articulation of this 
principle came in McKesson. The McKesson principle appears to require the 
state itself to provide persons a damage remedy whenever it deprives them of 
liberty or property without giving them a predeprivation hearing and the 
deprivation turns out to have been in violation of state law. I consider this 
issue below. 124 For the moment, we may assume that the principle applies 
only in cases involving state deprivations of property that are challenged as 
violating federal law. What is important is that the Court recognized that the 
Constitution requires the state to confer a refund if the deprivation was invalid 
and no other remedy would cure the violation, and that the state may not 
interpose its own law of sovereign immunity to bar a lawsuit seeking such a 
remedy. 125 The defendant in McKesson was a state agency, and the Court's 
opinion appears to hold that the Due Process Clause requires a damage remedy 
from the state itself. 126 As discussed above, the Court also reaffirmed in 
McKesson that the Eleventh Amendment does not protect the states from 
Supreme Court review of tax refund cases brought initially in the state 
courts. 127 
There is language in McKesson, however, that may cast doubt on whether 
the case in fact stands for the broad propositions just stated. In describing its 
Eleventh Amendment holding, the Court stated that "when a state court takes 
122. See Jack M. Beennann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and State 
Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REv. 277, 337 (1988). The Eleventh Amendment does, however, bar 
individuals from maintaining takings claims against states in the lower federal courts. See John G. & Marie 
Stella Kenedy Mem'l v. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir. 1994); McMurtray v. Holladay, 11 F.3d 499, 
504 (5th Cir. 1993). 
123. If the tax is invalid because discriminatory, the state may be able to cure the violation by 
collecting more taxes from the previously favored parties. If the state does so, it may not be required to 
provide a refund to the disfavored party. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & 
Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 39-41 (1990). If the tax was invalid because the state lacked the power to impose 
it, the state is required to provide a refund. See id. at 39; Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 
24 (1920). 
124. See infra text accompanying notes 421-27. See generally Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 16, at 
1826 (suggesting that McKesson applies only to tax refund cases). 
125. The Court made the latter point clear in Reich v. Collins, 115 S. Ct. 547, 549 (1994). 
126. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 22; see also American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 
182-83 (1990). 
127. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 26-31. 
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cognizance of a case, the State assents to appellate review by this Court of the 
federal issues raised in the case."128 This suggests that if the state refuses to 
take cognizance of the case by, for example, invoking its own law of Sovereign 
immunity, the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction would be defeated. This 
interpretation is in substantial tension, to say the least, with the Court's due 
process holding. The Court held that the Due Process Clause requires the states 
to afford a hearing and award a monetary remedy if the hearing discloses the 
tax to have been illegal. A state that denies a remedy on the ground of 
sovereign immunity is not in any meaningful sense offering a postdeprivation 
hearing, let alone the required postdeprivation remedy. In Reich v. Collins, 129 
the Court, again unanimously, made it clear that the state is not free to deny 
the constitutionally required damage remedy by invoking its own law of 
sovereign immunity. 130 Is it conceivable that the Court meant that the Due 
Process Clause prohibits the state from invoking its sovereign immunity law 
to deny a hearing and a remedy, but that if the state (illegally) does so, the 
Supreme Court for that very reason lacks appellate jurisdiction? That would 
certainly be a problematic holding, one that would effectively gut the supposed 
"obligation" to provide a hearing and remedy. I shall accordingly interpret 
McKesson as permitting the Supreme Court to review state court decisions 
denying the remedy required by the Due Process Clause even if the state does 
not consent. 
The takings and tax refund cases appear to establish that in certain 
circumstances the Constitution itself obligates the states to confer a 
retrospective monetary remedy to private individuals. 131 In those 
circumstances, the Eleventh Amendment requires that the remedy be sought 
initially in the state courts, 132 but the Supremacy Clause obligates the state 
courts to entertain actions seeking the remedy and to award the remedy. State 
128. /d. at 30. 
129. 115S.Ct.547. 
130. See id. at 549. 
131. A third constitutional provision that may itself require the states to entertain private damage 
actions against themselves may be the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I. In Nevada 
v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,426-27 (1979), the Court held that California was free to subject the state of Nevada 
to a private suit in the California courts and to apply its law to hold the state liable for an accident caused 
by a Nevada official on California roads. If the plaintiff in such an action recovers a judgment, does the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause require the courts of Nevada (or any other state in which Nevada has assets) 
to enforce the money judgment? The Court has not addressed the issue, but if the answer is yes, then this 
would be another example of a constitutional provision that obligates the states to pay money to individuals 
that would be enforceable in the state courts and, if the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment is correct, in the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal. If the immunity-from-liability interpretation 
is correct, then the Supreme Court would be powerless to enforce this obligation against a recalcitrant state. 
This, in my view, would be tantamount to holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not in fact 
require the states to enforce the money judgments entered against states by sister states on state law causes 
of action. 
132. See Reich, 115 S. Ct. at 549 (recognizing that Due Process Clause requires state to confer 
monetary relief to individuals, but noting that Eleventh Amendment "does generally bar tax refund claims 
from being brought [against the states in federal court]"); see also supra note 122. 
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law of sovereign immunity may not be interposed to bar such a claim. The 
Supreme Court through its appellate jurisdiction may monitor the state courts' 
compliance with their obligations under the Supremacy Clause. These cases 
thus support the conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment is merely a forum-
allocation principle. 
B. Cases Involving Statutes That Impose a Liability on States Without 
Abrogating Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
The cases recognizing that the federal Constitution in certain circumstances 
obligates the states to pay money damages to individuals could perhaps be 
regarded as a limited exception to an Eleventh Amendment interpretation that 
gives states an immunity from federal liability. On this theory, the states' 
immunity from liability and suit simply does not apply with respect to those 
few constitutional provisions that themselves make states liable in damages to 
individuals, but it does preclude Congress from subjecting the states to damage 
liability by statute. Whatever the theoretical plausibility of that position, 133 
it is flatly contradicted by recent pre-Seminole Tribe cases that interpret federal 
statutes to impose an obligation on states and to subject states to monetary 
liability to individuals aggrieved by violations of the obligation, but not to 
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
As discussed above, the Garcia decision held that the Tenth Amendment 
did not preclude Congress from making the FLSA applicable to the states. 
Congress expressly extended the substantive protections of that Act to certain 
state employees in 1966.134 In Employees of the Department of Public Health 
& Welfare v. Department of Public Health & Weifare, 135 the Court 
considered whether the 1966 amendments to the FLSA also subjected states 
that violate those provisions to suits for damages by their employees. The 
majority opinion by Justice Douglas left that question open,136 but Justice 
Marshall's opinion concurring in the result (joined by Justice Stewart) 
concluded that the amendments clearly contemplated private damage suits 
against the states. 137 Marshall went on to note, however, that the Eleventh 
Amendment protected the states from being sued in federal court. He wrote: 
133. As discussed in Part IV, the McKesson holding that a state is required to supply a damage remedy 
when it illegally deprives persons of liberty or property without a prior hearing is tantamount to a holding 
that Congress has the power to subject states to damage liability whenever it has the power to impose 
primary obligations on the states under Article I. 
134. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C) (1994). 
135. 411 U.S. 279 (1973). 
136. See id. at 287. The majority noted that even in the absence of private damage actions, the 
substantive provisions of the Act could be enforced against the states by the Secretary of Labor. See id. 
at 286. 
137. See id. at 297 n.l2 (Marshall, J ., concurring in result). 
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While constitutional limitations upon the federal judicial power bar a 
federal court action by these employees to enforce their rights, the 
courts of the State nevertheless have an independent constitutional 
obligation to entertain employee actions to enforce those rights .... 
Thus, since federal law stands as the supreme law of the land, the 
State's courts are obliged to enforce it, even if it conflicts with state 
policy.•3s 
Justice Marshall's reasoning became the basis for the majority's response 
in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon139 to a criticism raised (ironically) 
in a dissenting opinion in which Marshall concurred. At issue in Atascadero 
was whether Congress had abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity in enacting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973!40 In dissent, Justice 
Brennan stressed indications in the statutory text and legislative history that 
Congress had intended to make the substantive requirements of the 
Rehabilitation Act applicable to the states, and he described the majority's 
holding that the states were protected by the Eleventh Amendment as 
tantamount to "exempting the States from compliance with laws that bind 
every other legal actor in our Nation."141 Justice Powell's majority opinion 
accused the dissent of misperceiving the issue. Powell quoted Marshall's 
statement in Employees that "'the issue is not the general immunity of the 
States from private suit ... but merely the susceptibility of the States to suit 
before federal tribunals."'142 The majority went on to say that "[i]t denigrates 
the judges who serve on the state courts to suggest that they will not enforce 
the supreme law of the land."143 
In Employees and Atascadero, the language that supports the forum-
allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment appeared in concurring 
opinions or was dictum.144 That dictum became holding with the Court's 
138. ld. at 298 (Marshall, J., concurring in result) (citations omitted). 
139. 473 U.S. 234 (1985). 
140. Id. at 235. 
141. Id. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
142. Id. at 240 n.2 (quoting Employees, 411 U.S. at 293-94 (Marshall, J., concurring in result) 
(emphasis added)). 
143. ld. The Atascadero Court's conception of Eleventh Amendment immunity as an immunity from 
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is shown further by its insistence that a waiver of that immunity 
cannot be inferred merely from a state statute or constitutional provision in which the state consents to be 
sued by private individuals. To count as a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, the statute or 
constitutional provision must specify that the state consents to be sued in federal coun. A general consent 
to suit will be construed, the Court said, as a consent to be sued in state court. See id. at 241; see also Ford 
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 465 (1945); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 
47, 54 (1944); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441 (1900). These cases are not inconsistent with the 
immunity-from-liability interpretation, however. The immunity-from-liability interpretation maintains that 
the Eleventh Amendment is both an immunity from jurisdiction and an immunity from liability. If we apply 
a clear statement rule to both immunities, then it would be appropriate to hold that the states are suable in 
federal courts only if Congress has clearly made them suable in federal court. If the state is not amenable 
to suit in federal court, the question of its immunity from liability arises only in state court actions. 
144. The language from Atascadero may indeed not count as full-fledged support for the forum-
allocation interpretation. Justice Powell recognized that the state courts were obligated to enforce federal 
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recent decision in Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission. 145 
In that case, the Court reaffirmed on stare decisis grounds the holding of 
Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Department, 146 that the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) subjected the states to monetary 
liability to individuals. 147 In Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & 
Public Transportation, 148 however, the Court overruled Parden's additional 
holding that FELA abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 149 
The upshot is that FELA imposes a monetary liability on states which, because 
of the Eleventh Amendment, can be enforced only in state courts. The Court 
affirmed in Hilton that '"the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in the state 
courts,"'150 and that "when ... a federal statute does impose liability upon 
the States, the Supremacy Clause makes that statute the law in every State, 
fully enforceable in state court."151 
Ill. SEMINOLE TRIBE AND THE CASE FOR AN IMMUNITY-FROM-LIABILITY 
INTERPRETATION OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
Given the clarity with which the Court had appeared to embrace the 
forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, many observers 
were surprised to find indications in the Seminole Tribe majority opinion that 
laws, but he did not say that the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to review state court decisions in 
suits against states. The Atascadero footnote may therefore be consistent with a view of the Eleventh 
Amendment as pennitting Congress to impose liabilities on the states dependent for their efficacy on the 
state courts without Supreme Court review. (Such an interpretation would be consistent with Powell's 
expression of confidence in the state courts' ability and willingness to enforce federal law faithfully.) As 
noted above, however, someone who agrees with Chief Justice Marshall's more realistic appraisal in 
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), of state court willingness to enforce 
their own obligations without monitoring by a federal court would question whether such liabilities are in 
fact legal ones. Justice Marshall's opinion in Employees does not refer explicitly to the Supreme Court's 
power to review state court decisions denying a required federal remedy, but his citation of Testa v. Katt, 
330 U.S. 386 (1947), and General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908), suggests strongly that he 
assumed that such review would be available. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 298 (Marshall, J., concurring 
in result). 
145. 502 u.s. 197 (1991). 
146. 377 u.s. 184 (1964). 
147. See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 206-07. 
148. 483 u.s. 468 (1987). 
149. See id. at 478. The issue in Welch was whether the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity was 
abrogated by the Jones Act, but the Jones Act incorporates the remedial scheme of FELA and the Court 
in both Welch and Hilton assumed that the issue would be resolved the same way under both statutes. See 
Hilton, 502 U.S. at 204 n.2; Welch, 483 U.S. at 495 (White, J., concurring). 
150. 502 U.S. at 205 (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1989)). 
151. /d. at 207. The Court cited for this proposition Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367-68 (1990), 
thus indicating that state Jaw principles of sovereign immunity cannot bar such a state court action. Howlett 
was an action brought against a school board in the state courts under section 1983. The state court had 
dismissed the suit on sovereign immunity grounds, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a 
sovereign immunity defense is unavailable in a federal action to a defendant that is not immune from suit 
under state law in analogous state Jaw actions. See id. at 375. In Hilton, the Court appears to have read 
Howlett to establish the broader proposition that state law sovereign immunity defenses cannot be 
interposed to bar from the state courts validly imposed federal liabilities. 
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the Court embraces an immunity-from-liability construction of the Amendment. 
The indications are all the more surprising because of the importance the 
Court's principal holding gives to this issue. Whatever the nature of the 
immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment, the Court established in 
Seminole Tribe that it may not be abrogated by Congress pursuant to Article 
I. 
The statements in Seminole Tribe suggesting that the Court now rejects the 
forum-allocation view might perhaps be dismissed as dictum. Certainly, the 
points did not appear to be central to the Court's reasoning. Even if dictum, 
however, they are important because of what they tell us about how the 
Justices in the majority think about Eleventh Amendment issues. Moreover, as 
I shall explain, there is a sense in which the Court's entire treatment of the 
Eleventh Amendment might be regarded as dictum. 
The Seminole Tribe sued Florida and its Governor in federal court seeking 
an order requiring the State to negotiate in good faith with the Tribe over 
gaming rights, as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) required the State 
to do. 152 IGRA included an express statutory abrogation of the states' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the Court's principal holding in the case 
was that the suit against the State had to be dismissed because the abrogation 
of Eleventh Amendment was unconstitutional. 153 As noted earlier, the Court 
reaffirmed its holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity may be abrogated 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, but it reversed Union Gas's holding 
that such abrogation could be accomplished pursuant to "antecedent" 
constitutional provisions. 154 It is curious that this holding came in a case 
seeking only injunctive relief. Because prospective injunctive relief may be 
obtained under Ex parte Young in a suit against state officials without running 
afoul of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court's Eleventh Amendment holding 
came in a case in which the Amendment's impact was purely formal. An 
Eleventh Amendment holding that will have its primary substantive impact on 
suits seeking damages from the state was thus rendered in a case in which 
damages were not at stake. 
Because the Tribe had sued the Governor as well as the State, the Court 
had to do some fancy footwork even to reach the Union Gas issue. Had the 
Court sustained the suit against the Governor, the need to determine whether 
the suit against the State should be dismissed would have evaporated. The 
Court could perhaps have gone on to consider whether a suit against the state 
seeking the same relief could be maintained even after finding that the relief 
could be sought against the Governor, but reversing Union Gas where nothing 
at all turned on it would have seemed too much like an advisory opinion, even 
152. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1119 (1996). 
153. See id. 
154. See id. at 1127-28. 
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if technically it may not have been one. But dismissing the suit against the 
Governor required some doctrinal gymnastics. The Court held that the suit 
against the Governor could not be maintained because IGRA authorized only 
a suit against the State and placed certain limits on what the court could 
order. 155 The Court concluded that permitting the Tribe to obtain injunctive 
relief against the Governor would be incompatible with the finely-honed 
remedial scheme Congress had set up when it enacted IGRA.156 The 
principle the Court applied in dismissing the suit against the Governor-that 
an injunctive remedy against a state official is unavailable to enforce a statute 
if Congress in enacting the statute set up an enforcement mechanism that is 
incompatible with such a remedy-is unexceptionable. Indeed, the Court had 
established such a rule with respect to suits under section 1983,157 and it 
would have been extraordinary had the Court found an injunctive remedy to 
be available independently of section 1983 where the same remedy would be 
unavailable under section 1983 because incompatible with the statute 
establishing the right. What is difficult to understand is the Court's conclusion 
that the injunctive remedy the Tribe sought against the Governor would have 
been inconsistent with the remedial scheme established in IGRA. First, it is a 
stretch to say that IGRA contemplated only suits against the State.158 Even 
assuming it did, the Court struck this provision down because suits against the 
state violate the Eleventh Amendment. How can a suit against the Governor 
seeking the very same relief be said to be incompatible with the scheme 
Congress set up? The Court said it was incompatible because IGRA did not 
authorize a court order requiring compliance with the obligation to negotiate 
in good faith, but authorized only specific steps the court could take in 
response to the State's failure to comply.159 But the Tribe did not seek in the 
suit against the Governor anything more than it could have gotten in its suit 
against the State, 160 and the Court did not explain why permitting a suit 
seeking that limited form of relief to go forward would be incompatible with 
IGRA's remedial scheme. At any rate, the Court made it clear that the 
problem, such as it was, was statutory. It recognized that the Eleventh 
155. Specifically, the court could not require the State to negotiate in good faith; it could only refer 
the matter to a mediator if the State refused to negotiate, and if no agreement was reached after a certain 
period of time, the matter would be referred to the Secretary of the Interior. See id. at 1120. 
156. See id. at 1131-33. 
157. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clatnmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13-18 
(1981). 
158. The statute does not specifically provide that the suit must be brought against the state, as 
opposed to its officials. Its jurisdictional provision merely states that the district courts shall have 
jurisdiction over "any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter 
into negotiations with the Indian tribe .... " 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (1994). The Court's construction 
of this language as requiring that the suit be brought against the state, as opposed to its officials, appeared 
to contravene the well-known maxim that statutes are to be construed where possible so as to avoid 
constitutional problems. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1979). 
159. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1120. 
160. See Jackson, supra note 15. 
1997] Eleventh Amendment Immunity 1717 
Amendment would not prevent Congress from authorizing a suit against the 
Governor for the limited relief IGRA contemplated in a suit against the 
State.161 
The mess the Court made of Ex parte Young doctrine in Seminole Tribe 
is not the focus of this Article. 162 I have discussed it to the extent that I have 
to suggest that even the principal holding of the case shares an important 
feature of obiter dicta: It was rendered in a case whose facts did not squarely 
present the issue. At the very least, it was rendered in a case involving a form 
of relief that was unavailable in the case, at best, because of a gross drafting 
error on Congress's part. Relatedly, the Court's tortured reasoning in the Ex 
parte Young part of the opinion showed its eagerness to take liberties to 
accomplish quick doctrinal change in this area. For these reasons, technical 
distinctions between holding and dicta seem to be out of place in examining 
the Court's opinion. 163 
A. Indications in Seminole Tribe of a Shift to the Immunity-from-Liability 
Interpretation 
In summing up its holding overruling Union Gas, the Court in Seminole 
Tribe stated that "[e]ven when the Constitution vests in Congress complete 
lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents 
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting 
states."164 The Court's failure to limit that statement to suits in the federal 
courts, suggesting that Congress lacks the power to authorize suits against the 
states enforceable in state courts, may just have been an oversight. Yet there 
are further indications in the Seminole Tribe opinion that the majority in that 
case regarded Eleventh Amendment immunity as immunity from liability, not 
just from federal jurisdiction, and thus understood its holding as a holding that 
Congress may not subject states to liability to private individuals pursuant to 
Article I powers. Admittedly, the suggestions are subtle and may reflect 
nothing more than sloppy drafting or a failure to think through the issues. It 
161. See 116 S. Ct. at 1132-33. The Court did not decide whether the obligations IGRA imposed on 
the states comported with the constitutional limitations the Court enunciated in New York v. United States. 
Thus it is certainly not clear that a statute obligating the Governor to negotiate in good faith would be 
constitutional. See infra note 305 and accompanying text. But such a statute would not violate the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
162. On this subject, see Jackson, supra note 15. 
163. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens offers another, very different reason for regarding the 
majority's treatment of the Eleventh Amendment as dictum. The functions that IGRA requires the federal 
courts to perform, he maintains, are not "judicial" functions within the meaning of Article III, because the 
courts' "dispensible involvement [comes] in the intermediate stages of a procedure that begins and ends 
in the Executive Branch." Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1144-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also infra 
note 305 and accompanying text (discussing whether IGRA is unconstitutional, because it commandeers 
states in violation of New York v. United States). 
164. 116 S. Ct. at 1131. 
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is possible, however, that the evidence to which I shall point reflects a shift 
towards a conception of the Eleventh Amendment as an immunity from 
liability. 
1. The Seminole Tribe Court's Interpretation of Cohens 
As discussed above, the Court in McKesson said that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. This 
proposition is usually traced to the Court's decision in Cohens v. Virginia. 165 
Cohens was an action brought by the state of Virginia in its own courts against 
private individuals. The individuals lost in the state courts and appealed to the 
Supreme Court. The Court's Eleventh Amendment holding might be 
understood merely as a holding that a state waives its immunity when it 
initiates an action against an individual in state court, and that the Eleventh 
Amendment therefore does not bar an appeal to the Supreme Court from a 
judgment favoring the state. So construed, the Amendment could still bar an 
appeal to the Supreme Court in a case that was initiated in the state courts by 
the private party. The Court's opinion in Cohens appears to support such an 
interpretation. 166 In McKesson, however, the Court acknowledged this 
ambiguity in Cohens and went on to note that the decision had come to be 
understood for the broad proposition that the Eleventh Amendment simply does 
not limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.167 
In light of this history, it is interesting to note the Seminole Tribe Court's 
interpretation of Cohens. The Court described the case as standing for the 
proposition that "this Court is empowered to review a question of federal law 
arising from a state court decision where a State has consented to suit."168 
The Court's resurrection of the "consent" interpretation of Cohens casts doubt 
on the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. It suggests 
that if Congress subjects a state to monetary liability to individuals, a state 
may still interpose a state law defense of sovereign immunity to bar the action 
in state courts, and, if the state thus signals its lack of consent to the suit, the 
U.S. Supreme Court would lack the power to review any state court decision. 
Although in theory perhaps the state courts would remain bound by the 
Supremacy Clause to afford the federal remedy, in practice there would be no 
way for a federal court to intervene should the state violate that obligation. The 
result is that the states may effectively immunize themselves from federal 
liabilities. 
165. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
166. See generally Jackson, supra note I, at 19-25. 
167. See McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 4% U.S. 18, 27 (1990) 
(citing General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 233 (1908) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
168. 116 S. Ct. at 1131 n.14 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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As noted above, the "consent" language the Court employed in Seminole 
Tribe was also used by the Court in McKesson in describing its Eleventh 
Amendment holding. Yet as discussed above, McKesson itself holds that the 
Due Process Clause requires the states to provide a hearing and a damage 
remedy in certain circumstances, and this conflicts flatly with the idea that a 
state is free to interpose its own law of sovereign immunity to deny the 
required remedy. Reich v. Collins confirms that the state may not do so. 169 
It would certainly be odd to say that an unlawful invocation of sovereign 
immunity is nevertheless effective to defeat the Supreme Court's appellate 
jurisdiction. Such an interpretation of McKesson likewise would be inconsistent 
with the Court's holding in General Oil Co. v. Crain, 170 on which the 
McKesson Court also relied. In Crain, the state court had relied on the state's 
own law of sovereign immunity in refusing to entertain a suit seeking an 
injunction, 171 but the Supreme Court ruled that the state-law sovereign 
immunity did not deprive it of jurisdiction to review the case.172 
Given that the main thrust of the McKesson opinion was that the states 
were required to provide certain remedies, a reader might be forgiven for 
taking Justice Brennan's reference to the states' "assent" as a reference to 
some form of constructive assent. Perhaps Justice Brennan would say that a 
state "assents" to a suit against it by taking cognizance of the case even if the 
suit is dismissed at the outset on sovereign immunity grounds. If so, then a 
state effectively assents to Supreme Court review of cases against it by having 
a system of courts that allows the filing of claims by individuals. 173 (Justice 
Brennan argued forcefully in a number of cases that the states should be 
deemed to have waived their immunity from private claims in federal court by 
ratifying the Constitution. 174) Chief Justice Rehnquist's reference to 
"consent" as a condition of the Court's appellate jurisdiction over suits against 
the states is no doubt a reference to a more robust understanding of that 
169. See 115 S. Ct. 547, 549 (1994) (holding that state courts must give effect to federal statute 
imposing liability on state, notwithstanding "the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own 
courts"). 
170. 209 u.s. 211 (1908). 
171. See id. at 216. 
172. See id. at 228. 
173. Indeed, a state would probably be deemed to have assented to suits against it on this theory even 
if its court system did not permit the filing of claims by individuals. Vicki Jackson maintains that "[t]he 
mere existence of the state court of general jurisdiction to which a claim against the state might be 
presented, even absent the state's consent to be sued, has justified the Supreme Court's assertion of 
constitutional obligations to provide remedies against the state," Jackson, supra note I, at 38, but she goes 
on to recognize that "to the extent consent refers to the mere existence of a state court system, the concept 
no longer seems aptly captured by the word 'consent,"' id. at 39. For a discussion of the cases cited by 
Jackson for the first proposition, see infra note 390. 
174. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. I, 19-20 (1988) (arguing that states, by 
ratifying Constitution, relinquished immunity where Congress found it necessary under Commerce Clause 
to render them liable); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (same). 
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term. 175 As noted above, making the states' consent a condition of the 
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over suits against them would be 
tantamount to an adoption of the immunity-from-liability interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment. 
2. Seminole Tribe:s- Prescriptions for Antitrust, Bankruptcy, Copyright, 
and Patent Claims Against the States 
If the Court's interpretation of Cohens had been the only hint in Seminole 
Tribe that the Court regarded Eleventh Amendment immunity as an immunity 
from liability, I could perhaps be accused of making too much of what may 
simply have been a careless description of precedent. 176 Another portion of 
the Court's opinion, however, reinforces this interpretation. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens cited as a reason for rejecting the 
Court's abrogation holding the problems it would pose for the effective 
enforcement against the states of numerous federal statutes, including those 
relating to antitrust, patent, bankruptcy, and copyright. 177 Federal courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over suits to enforce those statutes. Thus, if Congress 
lacks the power to subject the states to private suits in federal court, no forum 
would exist for the enforcement of state obligations under these statutes.178 
The majority described Justice Stevens's fears as exaggerated,179 but the two 
reasons the majority gave for this characterization are telling. First, it noted 
that prospective relief may be obtained in the federal courts for violation of 
these statutes under Ex parte Young} 80 Second, it observed that the Court 
175. Chief Justice Rehnquist does, however, say plainly that a state's consent to being sued in its own 
courts will automatically give rise to Supreme Court jurisdiction. The state is thus not free to consent to 
suit in its own courts while avoiding possible Supreme Court review of the resulting state court decision. 
On the possible justifications for this rule, see infra note 468. The state's freedom to withhold consent to 
suit in its own courts may be limited in certain respects by federal law. McKnett v. St. Louis & San 
Francisco Railway, 292 U.S. 230 (1934), and related cases hold that the states' discretion to deny 
jurisdiction to their courts is limited by a nondiscrimination principle: States may not discriminate against 
rights based on federal law. See id. at 234. Scholars have argued that this principle means that states may 
not withhold their consent to be sued in their own courts under federal law if they have consented to be 
sued on analogous claims based on state law; at least one commentator has gone further and denied that 
states can withhold consent to be sued in their own courts in cases based on federal law if they have 
consented to be sued in their own courts in any type of case. See Massey, supra note 63, at 145-46. But 
see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 3-26, at 184 n.45 (2d ed. 1988); Fletcher, 
Historical interpretation, supra note 7, at 1095 & n.243. While the narrower limitation, prohibiting state 
refusals to consent if they have consented to similar suits under state law, may be plausible, the broader 
one cannot, I think, be reconciled with the statement in Seminole Tribe. Indeed, the proponent of this view 
uses this line of argument to argue that the forum-allocation view is correct. See Massey, supra note 63, 
at 146. 
176. That is, indeed, how I am inclined to take the similar statements of the Seminole Tribe dissenters 
and of Justice Kennedy in the Hess case. See infra text accompanying notes 220-26. 
177. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1134 & n.l (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
178. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
179. See id. at 1131 n.l6. 
180. See id. 
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has never held that the federal antitrust, copyright, or bankruptcy statutes 
authorize suits against the states.181 (The majority's second response ignored 
the problem its decision poses for patent laws, which Congress clearly has 
made applicable to the states and enforceable against them in private suits in 
federal court.182) What the majority glaringly omitted to say, however, is that 
Congress could easily alleviate the problem by giving the state courts 
jurisdiction over these suits. If it had viewed Eleventh Amendment immunity 
as an immunity from original federal jurisdiction only, the majority surely 
would have regarded state court suits under these statutes, subject to Supreme 
Court review, as an effective way to enforce these statutes insofar as they 
impose obligations on the states. Justice Stevens probably would not have 
regarded suits in the state courts as comparable to suits in the federal courts, 
but the Justices in the majority tend to have confidence in the state courts' 
ability and willingness to enforce federal law faithfully. That was indeed 
Justice Powell's point in Atascadero. It is true that with respect to these 
statutes, unlike the statute involved in Atascadero, Congress has made the 
judgment that only federal court enforcement will do. 183 If the Eleventh 
Amendment precludes Congress's preferred scheme (as the Court held in 
Seminole Tribe) then it is surely important that state court enforcement with 
Supreme Court review remains an option. 
The majority's failure to mention this option in responding in a footnote 
to a point made by a dissent is not, to be sure, weighty authority for the 
proposition that the Court now regards the Eleventh Amendment as 
establishing an immunity from liability. Certainly, someone litigating before 
the Court would not be well advised to cite this footnote for that proposition. 
But I do think that this omission is important for what it tells us about the 
majority's mindset when it comes to the Eleventh Amendment. A Justice who, 
in considering the Eleventh Amendment, thinks of the forum-allocation 
principle that some believe the Amendment to be-a Justice who regards the 
Eleventh Amendment as establishing nothing more than that someone who has 
a claim against a state must litigate that claim initially in state court and may 
seek a federal forum only on appeal-surely, the very first response such a 
Justice would have given to Justice Stevens's concern would have been that 
Congress could easily fix the problem by granting the state courts jurisdiction 
over claims against the states under those statutes (particularly if the Justice 
regarded state judges as equally willing and able as federal judges to enforce 
federal law). The majority's failure even to mention that possibility as a reason 
Justice Stevens's concerns were "exaggerated" shows, at the very least, that the 
181. See id. 
182. See infra Part IV.A. 
183. This judgment is implicit in Congress's decision to give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. 
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Justices in the majority have not internalized the forum-allocation interpretation 
of the Eleventh Amendment.184 
B. Pre-Seminole Tribe Support for the Immunity-from-Liability Interpretation 
"[F]ootnotes are a dangerous place to seek authoritative statements of law, 
particularly in a field as complex as [the Eleventh Amendment]."185 If the 
subtle hints in Seminole Tribe were the only support for the immunity-from-
liability interpretation, I would be the first to urge caution. Yet a fresh look at 
the pre-Seminole Tribe cases with the "immunity-from-liability versus forum-
allocation" question in mind shows that this is not just a conflict between clear 
Supreme Court holdings, some unanimous, supporting the forum-allocation 
interpretation and a few ambiguous footnotes supporting the immunity-from-
liability interpretation. The immunity-from-liability interpretation, indeed, finds 
significant support in authority dating back to Chisholm. 
1. The Framers' Intent 
To a remarkable degree, recent Eleventh Amendment scholarship has 
sought to ascertain the intent of the Framers of the Amendment, and of 
Article III as originally adopted. Diversity theorists in particular have sought 
to make the case that the Court in Hans got its history wrong. The doctrinal 
payoff for their historical scholarship has been small, and not just if measured 
by its success in the Supreme Court. In response to scholarly challenges to the 
theory, the most persistent of the diversity theorists who stress Framers' intent, 
William Fletcher, 186 has clarified the scope of his historical claims, and they 
appear to be quite modest. Although he claims that the Eleventh Amendment 
was not intended to withdraw "arising under'' jurisdiction over suits against the 
states, he concludes that it is not at all clear that the Framers of Article III 
intended to extend the federal judicial power to suits against the states based 
184. Scholars writing after Seminole Tribe have discussed Eleventh Amendment immunity as if it 
related to more than just the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Suing the State Gets Tough, 
LEGAL TIMES, July 29, 1996, at S41 (statement of Michael Masinter, Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern 
Univ.) (interpreting Seminole Tribe as adopting immunity-from-liability interpretation of Eleventh 
Amendment). But see Monaghan, supra note 34, at 125 (rejecting such an interpretation). 
185. Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 7, at 1097. 
186. I call Fletcher the most persistent because, after defending the diversity interpretation at some 
length in Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 7, he has twice responded in print to the theory's 
critics. See Correspondence, supra note 7; Fletcher, Diversity Explanation, supra note 7. The other diversity 
scholar who stresses Framers' intent is Gibbons, supra note 7. Although Amar, supra note 7, and Jackson, 
supra note I, make Framers' intent arguments, they give greater prominence to arguments based on 
constitutional structure and principle. Granted, these latter arguments are based in part on arguments about 
the general values and principles held by the Founders, but Fletcher and Gibbons place greater emphasis 
on the evidence (or lack of evidence) of what the Framers intended to accomplish when they adopted the 
Eleventh Amendment. 
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on federal law in the first place. This was, Fletcher writes, an "unsettled, and 
very difficult, question[] that [was] left to be answered as the meaning of the 
Constitution unfolded."187 Hans, of course, settled the question (at least for 
a time), but the answer the Court provided does not satisfy Professor Fletcher 
because: (1) the Court in Hans mistakenly relied on the Eleventh Amendment 
instead of Article III; and (2) the Court mistakenly believed that history 
provided an answer. The first objection seems purely terminological. 
Substantively, Fletcher is willing to concede that an interpretation of Article 
III's "arising under" slause that would protect states transsubstantively188 
from suits brought by individuals is not in conflict with the intent of Article 
III's Framers, and he expressly agrees that the Framers of the Eleventh 
Amendment did not mean to deny states that protection. As far as terminology 
is concerned, I am willing to stipulate that the term "Eleventh Amendment 
immunity" is shorthand for the protection that any part of the Constitution 
gives the states from the federal government's power to impose and enforce 
judicial remedies against them. The second objection is not an objection to 
Hans's conclusion, but rather to the way the Court arrived at it. The objection 
implicates profound issues of constitutional interpretation, as does the decision 
about how to respond to Hans's error, if such it be, after having lived with it 
and relied on it in many ways for just shy of a century. 189 In the end, the 
disagreement between diversity theorists and their critics is not so much about 
history as about the relative weight constitutional interpreters should give to 
other types of arguments, including arguments about stare decisis190 and 
about constitutional structure and principle. 191 
I do not propose to address those questions here. I instead make a modest 
claim about the Framers' intent: While there is conflicting evidence on whether 
the Framers of Article III and of the Eleventh Amendment intended to confer 
(or preserve) a right to sue states in federal courts for violating federal law, 
there appears to be no evidence that the Framers "intended" to establish the 
187. Correspondence, supra note 7, at 137. 
!88. By this I mean without regard to the particular provision of federal law sought to be enforced. 
Fletcher's willingness to entertain the possibility that Article ill might give states such transsubstantive 
protection appears at first to conflict with what I had taken to be his position: that whether states can be 
subjected to damage liability to individuals should tum on an interpretation of the particular provision of 
the Constitution that Congress claims to be exercising when it purports to subject the states to such liability. 
See Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 7, at 1108-09. But the positions are actually not in 
conflict. He apparently concedes that history does not preclude an interpretation of Article III that would 
give states such transsubstantive protection, but he offers nonhistorical arguments for treating the question 
as a matter of interpreting particular constitutional provisions giving Congress legislative powers. See id. 
at 1118-27. 
189. On this question, see Jackson, supra note I, at 7: and Sherry, supra note 42. 
190. See Marshall, supra note 7, at 1375 ("The ninety-nine years of jurisprudence built upon Hans 
creates a presumption in favor of the current interpretation of state immunity. Review of the historical 
evidence and arguments, in tum, establishes that the diversity theorists have not overcome the 
presumption."). 
191. See generally Amar, supra note 7 (relying heavily on arguments based on structure and principle); 
Jackson. supra note I (relying on arguments based on structure, principle, and judicial doctrine). 
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forum-allocation principle that some regard the Eleventh Amendment as 
embodying. Indeed, there is some evidence that the Framers did not intend that 
principle. More importantly, given what virtually all scholars appear to agree 
was one of the Framers' key concerns when they adopted the Eleventh 
Amendment, it is unreasonable to attribute to them the intent to establish the 
forum-allocation principle. Thus, while the historical evidence may well be 
indeterminate as to whether the Eleventh Amendment was or was not meant 
to apply to claims under federal law, it cuts decidedly against the claim that 
the states are required to entertain federal damage actions against themselves 
in their own courts, subject to appellate review in the federal courts. 
The critics of the diversity theory have made a convincing case that in 
adopting the Eleventh Amendment, "the framers clearly were motivated by a 
concern for the protection of state treasuries."192 Fletcher agrees that the 
"adopters" of the Amendment "wanted to protect state treasuries,"193 and 
other "diversity theorists do not deny" this. 194 As Fletcher describes it, the 
point of contention is this: While the diversity theory's critics maintain that the 
Framers meant to protect state treasuries from actions under federal law as 
well as state law, its defenders maintain that the desire to protect state 
treasuries 
did not necessarily prevail over all others. It prevailed when state 
treasuries were at risk from suits, like Chisholm, based on non-federal 
law brought under the state-citizen diversity clause, for there was little 
countervailing federal interest. But when violations of federal law 
were at issue, the relative strength of the claim of the state treasuries 
was diminished. 195 
Whether the Amendment in the end left open the possibility of suing the states 
on federal claims depends, Fletcher says, on whether Article III allowed it in 
the first place, and that question, he concludes, was "both unresolved and very 
192. Marshall, supra note 7, at 1383. 
193. See Correspondence, supra note 7, at 135-36, where Fletcher expresses agreement on this point 
with Calvin Massey, a critic of the diversity theory. 
194. Marshall, supra note 7, at 1386; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 401Hl7 
(1821); RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 327 (1969); Amar, supra note 7, at 1474 
n.202 (arguing that Framers of Eleventh Amendment were concerned with protecting states from debt 
actions); Alan D. Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Case of the White Knight's Green 
Whiskers, 5 Hous. L. REv. l, 7 (1967); Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional 
Federalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2213, 2240 
(1996) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment is "concerned with private actions compelling states to pay their 
war debts" and that focus of debate was between those who wanted to bar federal as well as nonfederal 
actions against states and those who wanted to bar only nonfederal actions); Jackson, supra note I, at 23; 
Nowak, supra note 58, at 1437-39. 
195. Correspondence, supra note 7, at 136; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 194, at 2240 (arguing 
importance of federal-law claims against states under Treaty of Paris in historical debate over scope of 
Eleventh Amendment). 
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difficult."196 Taking the view more congenial to the diversity theory, it 
appears that for some Framers, the desire to protect state treasuries prevailed 
over the "countervailing federal interests" and for others it did not. As the 
Amendment did not reflect a meeting of the minds on this issue, Fletcher 
maintains, its adoption cannot be said to have resolved the dispute. 
Perhaps not, but on one point we can attribute an agreement to the 
Framers: An arrangement under which the states courts would have been 
required to entertain suits seeking damages against states on the basis of 
federal law, subject to Supreme Court review, would not have satisfied anyone. 
The "countervailing federal interests" would have been sacrificed by such an 
arrangement, as enforcement of federal law would have been delayed. The 
states' interest in protecting their treasuries would not have been protected 
either if the states remained liable in damages under federal law and the 
Supreme Court remained available to enforce that obligation if the state courts 
did not.197 Even if the arrangement would have enabled the states to 
postpone the day of reckoning, the Supreme Court would presumably have had 
the power to award the federal rightholder interest to compensate for the delay. 
In any event, surely the Amendment was not designed to protect state 
treasuries by rewarding states' recalcitrance in complying with their federal 
obligations. In short, the forum-allocation interpretation is incompatible with 
any desire to protect state treasuries. 198 
That the Framers were not of the view that the states were required to 
entertain federal damage actions against themselves in their own courts is 
affirmatively suggested by the history of the Amendment's approval in the 
House. Among the versions of the Amendment that were rejected by the House 
was one that would have accomplished just that. This version would have 
limited the Amendment's application to suits against states '"where such State 
shall have previously made provision in their own courts, whereby such suit 
may be prosecuted to effect. "'199 This proposal was defeated overwhelmingly 
(77 votes to 8), and immediately thereafter the current version passed 81 to 
9?00 The most reasonable interpretation of this history is that whatever 
196. Correspondence, supra note 7, at 136. 
197. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction under section 25 of the Judiciary Act to review state court 
decisions denying federal rights was mandatory. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 492-93. 
198. At least some diversity theorists have expressed skepticism about the forum-allocation 
interpretation. See Amar, supra note 7, at 1477-78 nn.209 & 211; Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra 
note 7, at 1093-99; see also ORrn, supra note 42, at 11, 139, 151 (expressing skepticism); Tribe, supra 
note 58, at 692 (same). But cf Gibbons, supra note 7, at 1937 n.256 (considering forum-allocation view 
"reasonable"). Less surprisingly, the few defenders of Hans reject the forum-allocation view. See, e.g., 
DAVID CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 573 (1975) ("[D]o you really believe the storm over Chisholm v. 
Georgia was over so trivial a matter as the choice of forum?"). 
199. JACOBS, supra note 42, at 66-67 (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 476-77 (Mar. 4, 1794)). 
200. See id. 
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protection the Framers wanted to give the states was assumed to apply in state 
court as well as federal court.201 
2. The Continuing Doctrinal Connection Between the Eleventh 
Amendment and the Protection of State Treasuries 
The Justices in the majority in Seminole Tribe appeared distinctly, if 
uncharacteristically, uninterested in historical arguments.202 I am certainly not 
arguing that evidence of the Framers' intent should prevail in this area over 
such other indicia of constitutional meaning as evolved judicial doctrine. But, 
where the Framers' intent on a particular subject has been and continues to be 
relied on by the Court in resolving constitutional questions, the case for taking 
that intent seriously in resolving related questions is, in my view, strong. In 
this Section, I show that the Court continues to resolve questions in the 
Eleventh Amendment area by invoking the idea that the Amendment's purpose 
is to protect state treasuries-a purpose that, as noted already, is simply 
incompatible with the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment. This case law not only strengthens the argument for taking 
seriously the evidence that the Framers indeed had that purpose, it also 
supplies independently relevant doctrinal support for the immunity-from-
liability interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. 203 
201. My review of the secondary literature has uncovered no persuasive support for the idea that the 
Framers intended to establish a forum-allocation principle. Clyde Jacobs has noted that Spencer Roane, 
Marshall's political enemy on the Virginia Court of Appeals, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 
496, insisted in response to the decision in Cohens v. Virginia that the Eleventh Amendment was not 
adopted, as Marshall had suggested, "'on the sordid ground of unwillingness in the States to pay debts,"' 
but instead reflected an objection to requiring states to defend suits in the federal courts. See CHARLES G. 
HAINES, I THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1789-1835, 
at 441 (1960) (quoting Roane) cited in JACOBS, supra note 42, at 91-92. Roane's point, however, was 
decidedly not that state courts would entertain suits against the states at the behest of individuals, as he 
mentions in the same very discussion (approvingly) the resolution passed by the Virginia legislature in 
response to Chisholm to the effect that "a State cannot, under the Constitution of the United States, be 
made a defendant at the suit of any individual." HAINES, supra, at 441. He certainly would not have agreed 
that the Supreme Court could review a state court decision dismissing a suit against a state based on federal 
law. That position conflicts with the entire thrust of his comments in response to Cohens, as well as with 
his opinion for the Virginia Court of Appeals in Hunter v. Faiifax's Devisee, 15 Va. (I Munf.) 218, 223-32 
(1810), rev'd sub nom. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816), which denied the power 
of the Supreme Court to review the decisions on federal questions rendered by state courts even in suits 
involving only private parties. 
202. The majority denigrated Justice Souter's dissent, which relied extensively on historical scholarship 
concerning the intent of the Founders, as "a theory cobbled together from law review articles and its own 
version of historical events," and it described the dissent's "extralegal" explanation of the Hans decision 
as "a disservice to the Court's traditional method of adjudication." Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 
1114, 1129-30 (1996). 
203. It is arguable that reasons of doctrinal coherence would justify a court in continuing to rely on 
a supposed "intent" of the Framers if it has done so in the past, even if it could be shown that the Framers 
did not in fact have any such intent. If so, then the doctrine I shall discuss in the rest of this Part may 
supply sufficient reasons for rejecting the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment even 
if the evidence of Framers' intent I just discussed did not exist. Moreover, where, as here, there is doctrinal 
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a. The Edelman Line of Cases and the Prospective/Retrospective 
Distinction 
As noted, the Court has long drawn a distinction for Eleventh Amendment 
purposes between suits against the states and suits against state officials. The 
Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state officials who are alleged 
to be violating federal law, on the theory that because the states lack the power 
to authorize their officials to violate federal law, an official who does so is not, 
in contemplation of law, acting in the name of the state. Notwithstanding the 
notion that the official is not acting in the name of the state for Eleventh 
Amendment purposes, the Court has no trouble in this context concluding that 
the official's action is state action sufficient to make the Constitution's 
substantive prohibition applicable. The Ex parte Young "authority-stripping" 
rationale for escaping the Eleventh Amendment bar is now understood to rest 
on a "fiction,"204 a fiction the Court has considered necessary to "give[] life 
to the Supremacy Clause."205 Courts and scholars now recognize that the 
defendant in an Ex parte Young action is for all practical purposes the state 
support for conflicting interpretations, evidence that the Framers in fact did have such an intent may tilt 
the scales in favor of the one consistent with that intent. 
On the other hand, I am willing to discount evidence of Framers' intent that is based on conceptions 
that are no longer widely shared. On this score, I should address a possible objection to my reliance on the 
Framers' apparent assumption that state courts were not required to entertain in their own courts suits 
brought by individuals against them based on federal law. It may well be that this assumption was based 
on their broader assumption that state courts were under no obligation to entertain federal claims of any 
sort. See Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 
WIS. L. REv. 39 (defending latter position). As applied to federal suits against individuals, this broader 
assumption conflicts with a great deal of entrenched case law that recognizes an obligation of states under 
the Supremacy Clause to entertain federal law suits in their own courts, at least if those courts have 
jurisdiction over analogous suits based on state law. See generally id. at 166-70 (discussing Testa v. Katt, 
330 U.S. 386 (1947), and related cases). I regard the latter line of cases as well-settled and accept the 
principle they established as part of our constitutional landscape. Indeed, I substantially agree with those 
who have argued that the state courts would be under a constitutional obligation to entertain (at least) suits 
seeking injunctive relief from constitutional violations by state or federal officials, (at least) if Congress 
denied the federal courts jurisdiction over such suits. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note I 00, at 
373-79, 469. (It appears that Collins does not disagree with this, although he would prefer to say that such 
an action is a "state-law" action. See Collins, supra, at ]64-{)6 n.359 (discussing General Oil Co. v. Crain, 
209 U.S. 211 ( 1908)).) I do not regard the evidence that the Founders held a contrary assumption to be part 
of our usable past. It is nevertheless legitimate to rely on the Founders' narrower assumption that states 
were not required to entertain federal law suits for damages against themselves in their own courts, even 
if their narrower assumption was based on their broader assumption. The consequence of the broader 
assumption (as applied to suits involving only individuals) was simply to require Congress to create lower 
federal courts and endow them with jurisdiction over such suits, something that Congress has done and is 
unlikely to undo, particularly with respect to suits to enforce federal statutes. In light of the Eleventh 
Amendment, the consequence of the narrower assumption was to deny Congress the power to create any 
judicially enforceable liability against the states. The Founders' application of the broader principle to the 
specific context of suits against the states has a special relevance to what they understood would be 
accomplished by the Eleventh Amendment. Moreover, the Founders' views on this narrower issue continue 
to be invoked by the Court today, whereas their views on the broader question are rightly considered part 
of a "jurisdictional Stone Age." Collins, supra, at 170. 
204. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 114 n.25 (1984). 
205. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). 
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itself, 206 but the Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits even though 
they often will result in a judicial order requiring the significant expenditure 
of state resources.207 
In Edelman v. Jordan,208 the Court drew a distinction between suits 
seeking prospective relief from ongoing violations of federal law and suits 
seeking retrospective relief from past violations of federal law. The Eleventh 
Amendment does not apply to suits seeking prospective relief even though the 
costs will be borne by the state, but it does bar suits seeking retrospective 
relief if the damages are sought from the state.209 The Court has not had an 
easy time distinguishing prospective from retrospective relief. For present 
purposes, we need not examine where the line falls or how convincing or 
stable the Court's jurisprudence in this area has been. Edelman and succeeding 
cases are important to us because of what they show about how the Court 
conceives of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
The Court in Edelman did not explain the policies advanced by 
interpreting the Eleventh Amendment to permit suits seeking prospective relief, 
but not suits seeking retrospective relief. But a clue to the Court's thinking can 
be found in its response to Justice Douglas's claim that the effect on the state 
treasury is the same in both circumstances. The majority stated: 
This argument neglects the fact that where the State has a definable 
allocation to be used in the payment of public aid benefits . . . the 
subsequent ordering by a federal court of retroactive payments to 
correct delays in such processing will invariably mean there is less 
money available for payments for the continuing obligations of the 
public aid system.210 
Of course, an order of retroactive benefits by a state court would have 
precisely the same effect. The majority's response to Douglas was accordingly 
no response at all if it conceived of the Eleventh Amendment as merely a 
forum-allocation principle, reflecting, as Justice Powell indicated in 
Atascadero, a confidence that state courts would give effect to federal law 
faithfully, and subject in any event to review by the Supreme Court. The 
majority's response makes sense only if it viewed the Amendment as 
206. Although, as the Court in Seminole Tribe reminded us, the Eleventh Amendment still immunizes 
states from being sued by private parties by name, even for prospective relief. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. 
Ct. at 1122; see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 1073. 
207. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
208. 415 u.s. 651 (1974). 
209. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit seeking retrospective relief from the officer's own 
resources. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 1076. In this context, however, the officer will be 
protected by an "official immunity" that protects her from liability if her conduct did not violate "clearly 
established" federal law. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
210. 415 U.S. at 666 n.ll. 
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protecting state coffers, something that only the immunity-from-liability 
interpretation would do. 
Its subsequent decision in Quern v. Jordan211 confirmed that this is how 
the Court viewed the Amendment. After the Edelman case was remanded, the 
lower federal courts ordered the state official to send members of the plaintiff 
class a "'mere explanatory notice ... advising them that there is a state 
administrative procedure available if they desire to have the state determine 
whether or not they may be eligible for past benefits. "'212 The Court upheld 
this notice requirement as ancillary to the prospective injunctive relief the 
Court had upheld in Edelman. In explaining its decision, the Court stressed 
that under the notice, "whether or not the class member will receive retroactive 
benefits rests entirely with the State, its agencies, courts, and legislature, not 
with the federal court."213 In Green v. Mansour,214 the Court explained 
Quern as standing for the notion that "state agencies rather than federal courts 
would be the final arbiters of whether retroactive payments would be 
ordered."215 These statements are inconsistent with the forum-allocation 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. As discussed in Part I, if the 
Amendment relates only to the original jurisdiction of the federal courts, it tells 
us nothing about whether the states are under a federal obligation to provide 
retroactive payments to individuals. If a statute does require such payments, 
then the Supremacy Clause would require the state courts to award such relief, 
and if the state courts violate that obligation, the Supreme Court would have 
jurisdiction to reverse their judgments. Thus the availability of retrospective 
relief would not depend on action by the state "legislature," and state agencies 
would not be the "final arbiters of whether retroactive payments would be 
ordered." The Court's statements would be true only if there were no federal 
obligation to afford individuals monetary relief (or no Supreme Court power 
to enforce that obligation). However, if that is what the Court held in these 
Eleventh Amendment decisions, it understood the Amendment to bear on 
liability, not just the original jurisdiction of the federal courts.216 
211. 440 U.S. 332 (1979). 
212. /d. at 336 (quoting Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F.2d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1977) (en bane), aft'd, 440 
U.S. 332). 
213. /d. at 348. 
214. 474 u.s. 64 (1985). 
215. /d. at 71. 
216. Vicki Jackson has pointed out that the statute involved in Green expressly required the states, 
as a condition of receiving federal funds, to compensate individuals for benefits that had been wrongfully 
withheld, and that although the statute apparently did not require states to grant judicial review of decisions 
not to compensate, the state of Michigan (the relevant state in Green) had made judicial review available. 
Thus, the Court's statement that the state courts and state legislatures would be the "final arbiters" of 
whether individuals would receive payment would apparently have been wrong even if we assumed the 
correctness of the immunity-from-liability interpretation. The state undertook to provide retrospective relief 
in exchange for federal funds, thus incurring a federal obligation, and the state's voluntary decision to grant 
judicial review would appear to satisfy Seminole Tribe's "consent" condition for Supreme Court review of 
a Michigan court's erroneous decision to deny such relief. The Court in Green appears to have overlooked 
these propositions. But this does not detract from the conclusions reached above--that the Court's analysis 
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That the Court so viewed the Amendment is suggested further by the 
Court's explanation in Green and in Papasan v. Allain211 of the rationale for 
distinguishing between prospective and retrospective relief. The Court wrote 
in Green: 
Both prospective and retrospective relief implicate Eleventh 
Amendment concerns, but the availability of prospective relief of the 
sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause. 
Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are 
necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy 
of that law. But compensatory or deterrence interests are insufficient 
to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment. 218 
The Court here speaks of Eleventh Amendment immunity as if it determined 
the type of relief available for violations of federal law, not as merely 
specifying the initial forum in which such relief may be obtained. If the 
Amendment had been perceived as merely allocating the initial duty to enforce 
federal norms in certain circumstances to a nonfederal forum considered 
equally effective, the Court's rationale would not make much sense, for the 
interest in deterring and compensating in those instances would not be 
sacrificed in the state forum, nor would the interest in stopping ongoing 
violations of federal law be compromised by relegating that form of relief to 
state courts. The Court seems to be saying in these cases that prospective relief 
is all that is needed to give federal norms efficacy; deterrence and 
compensation are not necessary and are accordingly unavailable. 219 
in this case is in substantial tension with the forum-allocation interpretation. Indeed, Professor Jackson 
makes that point herself. See Jackson, supra note I, at 71-72 (referring to Green's "inconsistency with [the 
idea that the] Supreme Court [has the power to review] state cases involving federal questions"). 
217. 478 u.s. 265 (1986). 
218. 474 U.S. at 68 (citations omitted). In Papasan, the Court quoted the last two of these sentences 
and added that the Young doctrine applies to cases "in which the relief against the state official directly 
ends the violation of federal law as opposed to cases in which that relief is intended indirectly to encourage 
compliance with federal law through deterrence or directly to meet third-party interests such as 
compensation." 478 U.S. at 278. 
219. There is perhaps an explanation of the Court's differing treatment of prospective and retrospective 
relief that would be consistent with the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, but this 
explanation rests on an assumption that the defenders of Hans have been unwilling to make (at least 
publicly): that state courts can be expected to be less vigorous than federal courts in enforcing federal 
norms. If we make this assumption, then the different treatment of prospective relief and retrospective relief 
may be explained as being based on the conviction that the need to stop ongoing violations of federal law 
is more pressing than the need to compensate victims of past violations or the need to deter future 
violations by punishing past violations. Litigants seeking the less pressing forms of relief may be relegated 
to the more burdensome process of suing in state courts with a possible appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Where the violation of federal Jaw is already in the past, respect for the dignity of the states outweighs the 
need for quick relief. The premise of this argument may not be true; for example, someone who illegally 
has been denied public benefits can be expected to have an exceedingly pressing need for those benefits. 
Indeed, the need for wrongly withheld past due benefits is likely to be more pressing than the need for not 
yet due benefits (the payment of which federal courts have the power to order under Edelman and Hutto). 
If one accepts this premise, the distinction may make some sense. On this theory, Congress validly may 
determine that deterrence and compensation are important enough to warrant subjecting states to liability, 
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b. Hess and the Question of What Counts as the State 
That at least one of the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment is to protect 
state coffers plays a prominent role as well in the case law concerning which 
entities count as the "state" for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. As 
noted, the general rule is that the Amendment protects statewide agencies but 
not local government agencies.220 Occasionally, the courts are confronted 
with an agency that does not clearly fall into either category. The Court 
confronted such a question most recently in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-
Hudson Corp.,221 which involved an entity created by interstate compact. In 
reaching its decision that the Eleventh Amendment did not protect the entity 
from a suit in federal court under FELA, the Court stressed that ''the 
vulnerability of the State's purse [is] the most salient factor in Eleventh 
Amendment determinations"222 and said that "'[o]ne of the most important 
goals of the immunity of the Eleventh Amendment is to shield states' 
treasuries. "'223 
As noted above, if the Eleventh Amendment merely protects the states 
from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, it does not shield the states' 
treasuries.224 Justice Powell in Atascadero was confident that the state courts 
would comply with their duty to enforce federallaw,225 but the state treasury 
would not be a beneficiary of a forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh 
but the Eleventh Amendment reflects a constitutional judgment that such remedies are not so important that 
they require immediate access to the lower federal courts. The Supreme Court has not articulated this 
rationale for the Amendment, however. Indeed, its current approach appears to be based on the assumption 
that state courts faithfully will enforce the states' federal liabilities. See infra text accompanying notes 
438-40. 
The suggestion in these cases that retrospective relief is unnecessary to secure the efficacy of federal 
law is, to be sure, in tension with the rule-of-law ideal. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. As 
discussed in Part VI, the availability of retrospective relief against state officials alleviates this difficulty 
substantially. In addition to the other mistakes the Court made in Green, see supra note 216, we may add 
its overlooking the fact that Edelman left open the possibility of obtaining damages payable by state 
officials personally. 
220. See supra note 100. 
221. 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994). 
222. ld. at 404. 
223. ld. at 405 (quoting Jacintoport Corp. v. Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm'n, 762 F.2d 435, 440 
(5th Cir. 1985)); see also id. ('"[T]he state treasury factor is the most important factor to be considered ... 
and, in practice, ... [is] generally accorded ... dispositive weight.'") (quoting Brief for the States of New 
Jersey, New York, et al. as Amici Curiae at 18-19, Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 
(1994) (No. 93-1197)). That protecting state treasuries is one of the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment 
appears to have been the view of all of the Justices in Hess. The four dissenting Justices would have 
regarded an impact on the state treasury to be a sufficient condition for applying the Eleventh Amendment, 
but criticized the majority for apparently making it a necessary condition. See id. at 410 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). Whether a threat to the state treasury is indeed a necessary condition will be addressed by the 
Supreme Court in reviewing Doe v. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which relied heavily in 
concluding that the agency was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on the United States 
government's agreement to reimburse a state agency for any damages assessed against it. See 65 F.3d 771 
(9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (1996). 
224. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89. 
225. See supra text accompanying note 143. 
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Amendment even if we made more realistic assumptions about state court 
judges, for under the forum-allocation interpretation, the Court would retain the 
power to monitor state compliance with federal obligations. Requiring litigants 
to pursue their claims against the states through several levels of (by 
hypothesis) hostile state courts before reaching a federal tribunal might result 
in some marginal gain to state treasuries if litigants decided that the cost of 
litigation was not worth the potential gain, 226 but surely the Court did not 
mean in Hess that the point of the Eleventh Amendment was to enable the 
states to save money by engaging in scorched-earth tactics. The Court's 
endorsement in Hess of the idea that the Eleventh Amendment was designed 
to protect state treasuries is, in short, irreconcilable with the forum-allocation 
interpretation. 
3. Additional Support in the Case Law for the Immunity-from-Liability 
Interpretation 
That one of the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment is to protect state 
treasuries is a thread stretching from the Founding to the Supreme Court's 
1994 Term, and, for the reasons discussed above, this thread is inconsistent 
with the forum-allocation interpretation. But there is more support in the case 
law for the immunity-from-liability view. I shall not attempt to quote all of the 
statements in Supreme Court opinions that support the immunity-from-liability 
view by describing the immunity conferred by the Amendment as an immunity 
from unconsented "suits" without going on to specify that the protection 
applies only in state courts. 227 Nor shall I refer to other statements in 
Supreme Court opinions supporting the immunity-from-liability view if those 
statements were not central to the Court's analysis of the issues before it.228 
I shall limit myself to what I regard as the major cases, or lines of cases, that 
tend to support the immunity-from-liability interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
226. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 64 n.262. 
227. See, e.g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934) ("There is also the postulate that 
States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, witlwut their 
consent, save where there has been 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention."') (quoting 
The Federalist No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hatnilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)) (emphasis added); Ex 
pane New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) ("That a state may not be sued without its consent is a 
fundamental rule of jurisprudence .... "). 
228. For example, the Court stated in Kiefer & Kiefer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381 
(1939), a case involving the immunity of a federally chartered corporation, that "[a]s to the States, legal 
irresponsibility was written into the Eleventh Amendment," id. at 388. I am not counting as support for the 
immunity-from-liability interpretation statements in dissenting opinions by Justices who adhere to the 
diversity interpretation and/or regard the immunity as subject to abrogation by Congress under any of its 
powers. For an example of one such statement, see supra text accompanying note 141. Cf Hess v. Port 
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994); infra text accompanying notes 255-58 (discussing Hess 
majority opinion in which Justices who regard immunity as subject to plenary congressional abrogation 
make statements that support immunity-from-liability interpretation of Eleventh Amendment). 
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a. Hans 
If Seminole Tribe resurrects the Hans interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment, then it makes sense to ask just how the Court in Hans conceived 
of the immunity it conferred. Many scholars have pointed out the flaws in the 
Hans Court's analysis. My purpose is not to defend the decision but to 
understand it. Examination of the Hans decision shows that the Court clearly 
did not embrace the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment. Such an examination of the Hans opinion also supplies additional 
pre-Hans support for the immunity-from-liability view. 
The Court in Hans concluded that the Eleventh Amendment applied to 
cases brought by individuals against their own state, even though the 
Amendment does not by its terms apply to such cases, because the 
Amendment's Framers intended to constitutionalize the common law sovereign 
immunity of the states, which the Chisholm Court had mistakenly interpreted 
Article ill to have withdrawn. The common law immunity constitutionalized 
by the Amendment appears to have been an immunity from liability. The Court 
in Hans, for example, relied on statements of Alexander Hamilton in The 
Federalist No. 81 to the effect that the states retained their sovereign 
immunity.229 What Hamilton said was that "[t]he contracts between a nation 
and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have 
no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action 
independent of the sovereign will.'7230 The Court similarly relied on a 
229. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 12-14. 
230. THE F'EDERAUST No. 81, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis 
added); see also Hans, 134 U.S. at 16 (relying on statement of Daniel Webster that "[t]he security for state 
loans is the plighted faith of the State as a political community. It rests on ... the good faith of the 
government making the loan, and its ability to fulfill its engagements."). It is true that Hamilton and 
Webster referred only to liability under the common law, so they arguably would not have extended this 
reasoning to federal norms. Indeed, there is a strong argument to be made that the analysis of Hamilton 
and Webster should have led the Court in Hans to adopt the diversity interpretation. The starting point of 
Hamilton's analysis was the idea that there can be no right of action, no judicial remedy, against the states 
as sovereigns. He deduced from that premise the conclusion that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over 
suits against the states, but he deduced from the same premise the conclusion that the states were under 
no primary legal obligation to comply with their contracts in the first place. Hamilton's reasoning reflects 
what I have elsewhere called a sanctionist view of law, under which a legal duty is said to exist only if its 
violation subjects the violator to a judicially enforceable sanction. This is a view of law to which I am 
sympathetic, and, indeed, it is a view of law that has resonated powerfully in the American legal culture 
since its inception. See generally Vazquez, supra note 80. What is important for present purposes is that, 
at first blush anyway, it seems to require a holding different from the one the Court arrived at in Hans. If 
a duty that is not judicially enforceable is not a legal duty, then it would seem to follow from the fact that 
the Constitution itself imposes duties on the states and declares those duties to be the "law of the land" that 
the Eleventh Amendment cannot protect states from suits to enforce those duties. If so, then perhaps the 
Hans Court could have cited Hamilton for the proposition that while the states cannot be sued in the federal 
courts under the common law, they can be sued in federal court to enforce the duties imposed on them by 
the supreme law of the land. Because the Court rejected that interpretation, it must have understood 
Hamilton's statements differently. In light of Hans, perhaps we should take him to be making a point about 
contractual obligations that is not necessarily true about the other obligations of the state. Because 
traditionally the exclusive way to enforce contracts judicially has been for one party to sue the other in 
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statement by James Madison that "'[i]t is not in the power of individuals to 
call any State into court, "'231 as well as on a statement by John Marshall that 
"'[i]t is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged 
before a court. "'232 Neither statement is consistent with the idea that the 
states are required to entertain suits against themselves in their own courts. The 
Court also cited Justice Miller's discussion in Cunningham v. Macon & 
Brunswick Railroad: 
"It may be accepted as a point of departure unquestioned, that neither 
a State nor the United States can be sued as defendant in any court 
in this country without their consent, except in the limited class of 
cases in which a State may be made a party in the Supreme Court of 
the United States by virtue of the original jurisdiction conferred on 
this court by the Constitution."233 
The Court relied further on Chief Justice Taney's statement for the Court in 
Beers v. Arkansas that "'[i]t is an established principle of jurisprudence in all 
civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any 
other, without its consent and permission."'234 The Court described Justice 
Iredell's opinion in Chisholm, with approval, as "contend[ing] that it was not 
the intention [of the Founders] to create new and unheard of remedies, by 
subjecting sovereign States to actions at the suit of individuals.'m5 
The immunity-from-liability interpretation is supported further by the Hans 
Court's alternative holding that the general federal question statute as it then 
existed did not confer jurisdiction over damage actions brought by individuals 
against states. The Court relied on the language in the statute conferring 
court, Hamilton was perhaps justified in concluding that a contract that cannot be enforced in court by one 
party does not really impose legal obligations on the other party. The federal constitutional obligations of 
the states, however, can be enforced in court in ways other than through suits for damages by private 
individuals. See supra Section I.C; infra Part VI. Thus, denying individuals the right to obtain damages 
from the states for their violations of federal law does not leave those obligations entirely without a 
judicially enforceable sanction. If this is how the Court took Hamilton, then we are left with: (I) Hamilton's 
statement that individuals can possess no right of action for damages against the states; and (2) the Hans 
Court's holding that this lack of remedy extended to suits to enforce federal obligations. These propositions 
add up to the conclusion that individuals can possess no right of action for damages against the states under 
federal law. 
231. 134 U.S. at 14 (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 TOGETHER WITH THE JOURNAL OF THE fEDERAL CONVENTION, LUTHER MARTIN'S 
LETTER, YATES'S MINUTES, CONGRESSIONAL OPINIONS, VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF '98-99 
AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 533 (reprint 1987) (Jonathan Elliot ed., New York, Burt 
Franklin 1888) [hereinafter DEBATES] (statement of James Madison)). 
232. 134 U.S. at 14 (quoting 3 DEBATES, supra note 231, at 555 (statement of John Marshall)). 
233. !d. at 17 (quoting Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883)) 
(emphasis added). 
234. ld. (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857)) (emphasis added). 
235. ld. at 12 (emphasis added). The Court in Hans also saidthat suits against the states "are not 
subjects of judicial cognizance," id. at 15, again without limiting itself to the federal judiciary. 
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jurisdiction on the federal courts "concurrent with the courts of the several 
states."236 The Court said: 
Does not this qualification show that Congress, in legislating to carry 
the Constitution into effect, did not intend to invest its courts with any 
new and strange jurisdictions? The state courts have no power to 
entertain suits by individuals against a State without its consent. Then 
how does the Circuit Court, having only concurrent jurisdiction, 
acquire any such power?237 
The Court thus assumed that states were free to close their courts to claims 
against them based on federallaw.238 Like the other statements quoted above, 
this one conflicts with the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment, which posits that though the Amendment protects the states from 
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, it does not protect them from being 
subjected to liability to individuals, and if federal law imposes such a liability, 
they must entertain suits against themselves in their own courts, subject to 
Supreme Court review.239 
b. Poindexter 
Another Supreme Court decision that appears to conflict with the forum-
allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is Poindexter v. 
Greenhow.240 It is perhaps surprising to find Poindexter among the cases that 
support a broad interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, for that case is best 
known for its strong affirmation of the importance of federal remedies and 
federal jurisdiction for the enforcement of federal constitutional rights, as well 
236. ld. at 18. 
237. ld. 
238. A similar argument appears in Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 436-40 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting). There is perhaps another available reading of 
this part of Hans. The Court here held that the general federal question statute did not confer jurisdiction 
over suits against states. Because this was an alternative holding, perhaps we should understand this part 
of the Court's opinion as proceeding from the assumption that Congress does have the power to subject 
the states to suit in federal court. Thus, it might be argued that the Court contemplated that states would 
be able to close their doors to federal claims against them only because (it was assuming) Congress would 
have the power to open the federal doors to such claims if it should find it desirable to do so. The Court's 
discussion does not seem susceptible to such a reading, however. The Court had just held that the Eleventh 
Amendment protected states from being subjected to suit in federal court. It is true that the statutory 
interpretation issue would arise only if that holding were rejected (that is the nature of alternative holdings), 
but it is nevertheless noteworthy that the Court nowhere suggested that the states' power to close their 
doors to federal claims against them would exist only if its alternative holding were rejected. 
239. The Court itself has read Hans as recognizing an immunity of states from suit in state as well 
as federal court. See Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U.S. 32, 34 (1918) ("The right of individuals to sue a State, in 
either a federal or a state court, cannot be derived from the Constitution or laws of the United States. It 
can come only from the consent of the State.") (citing, inter alia, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (1890)). 
240. 114 U.S. 270 (1885). 
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as for its articulation of the reason the Eleventh Amendment did not stand in 
the way of the remedy being sought in the case. The remedy being sought in 
that case, however, was a remedy against a state official, not a remedy against 
the state. The official forcefully argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred 
the suit anyway, as he was being sued for action he took in his official 
capacity, but the Court rejected the argument for the now familiar reason, 
today most closely associated with the later decision in Ex parte Young, 241 
that a state official who violates federal law cannot be acting within the scope 
of his authority, for federal law, being the supreme law of the land, limits his 
authority. Because of the Supremacy Clause, the Court held in Poindexter, the 
state is without power to authorize his violation of federal law, and the official 
is accordingly subjected in his person to liability for the injuries he caused.242 
What is significant for our purposes is that the Court's lengthy affirmation 
of this principle came in a case that was brought in the state courts. There are 
two possible reasons why the Court thought it necessary to discuss the 
Eleventh Amendment in this case, and both are inconsistent with the forum-
allocation interpretation. First, the Court may have believed that the 
Amendment applied in state court because it conferred an immunity from 
liability, not just from federal jurisdiction. Second, the Court may have 
believed that the Amendment, when it applies, limits the Court's appellate 
jurisdiction. I suggested above that these two reasons are actually one and the 
same, for a liability against the states that is not enforceable in the federal 
courts is, as a practical matter, no liability at all. That the Court in Poindexter 
engaged in an extended discussion of the Eleventh Amendment in a case 
brought in the state courts without bothering to say why the Amendment was 
relevant suggests that the Court, too, regarded the reasons as identical. 
c. Abrogation Cases 
In Section II.B, I discussed some abrogation cases that support the forum-
allocation interpretation of the Amendment, cases recognizing that failure to 
find an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity does not mean that the 
states are free of monetary liability to individuals. Other abrogation cases, 
however, support the immunity-from-liability interpretation. 
In Atascadero, Justice Powell's majority opinion insisted that a state 
statute generally consenting to suit does not amount to a waiver of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. A waiver will be found only where the state's intent 
to submit to lawsuits in federal court is so clear that no other inference may 
be drawn?43 The Court adopted the same clear statement rule for purposes 
241. 209 u.s. 123 (1908). 
242. See Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 285-89. 
243. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1985). 
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of finding a congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity.244 
Yet in recent cases, the Court has been willing to find a congressional 
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity if the statute makes it clear that 
Congress intended to subject states to monetary liability to private individuals, 
even if the statute does not go on to make it clear that Congress intended that 
this liability be enforceable in federal court. Perhaps the most noteworthy of 
these cases is Union Gas. There, all of the Justices, in examining the 
abrogation issue, looked for evidence that Congress intended to hold states 
liable to private individuals, but none looked for evidence that Congress 
intended this liability to be enforceable in federal court. The Justices who 
dissented on this issue did so because the majority, in their view, failed to 
produce sufficient textual evidence to rebut the possibility that Congress 
contemplated that the primary obligations imposed on the states by the statute 
be enforceable only at the behest of the federal govemment.245 Vicki Jackson 
has provided a convincing explanation of why the Justices were justified in 
focusing solely on the liability issue, notwithstanding Atascadero: The federal 
courts were given exclusive jurisdiction over the statute involved in Union 
Gas.246 It is at least curious that none of the opinions mentioned this point. 
This silence suggests that at least some of the Justices understood the 
Amendment to bear on the liability issue, not just the jurisdictional question. 
Similar suggestions appear in other opinions. Those of Justice Scalia are 
perhaps the most revealing. In Union Gas, he explained his concurrence in 
Justice Brennan's abrogation holding as being based on Brennan's showing 
that the statute involved "clearly renders States liable for money damages in 
private suits."247 He made no mention of federal courts. Scalia made clear 
in his brief concurring opinion in Dellmuth v. Muth248 that, in his view, an 
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity should be found in "statutory 
text that clearly subjects States to suit for monetary damages."249 If this had 
been written by another Justice, one might think that he had merely overlooked 
the need for a clear statement of the state's amenability to suit in federal court. 
One does not expect such technicalities to be overlooked by Justice Scalia 
when they serve to insulate states from federal power. A likely explanation is 
that Justice Scalia views the states' immunity under the Eleventh Amendment 
as an immunity from liability, not just from federal court jurisdiction. 
244. See id. at 240; see also id. at 253 n.S (Brennan, J ., dissenting) ('The ... test that the Court 
applies to purported state waivers of sovereign immunity is a mirror image of the test it applies to 
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity."). 
245. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. I, 55-56 (1989) (White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
246. See Vicki C. Jackson, One Hundred Years of Folly: The Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 Term, 
64 S. CAL. L. REv. 51, 85-86 n.150 (1990). 
247. 491 U.S. at 29 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
248. 491 u.s. 223 (1989). 
249. /d. at 233 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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Combining that position with his argument in Union Gas/50 later accepted 
by a majority in Seminole Tribe/51 that Congress lacks the power to abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment immunity under its Article I powers, we arrive at a 
position that is overall more protective of state sovereignty: Not only does 
Congress lack the power to subject the states to private suits in federal court, 
it lacks the power even to subject states to liability to private individuals 
except under the Fourteenth Amendment.252 
That Justice Scalia views the Eleventh Amendment as bearing on more 
than just jurisdiction is further shown by his discussion of the abrogation issue 
in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak. 253 Here, writing for a majority, 
Scalia chided the dissenting Justices for treating the Eleventh Amendment as 
if it were merely a matter of jurisdiction: "The fact that Congress grants 
jurisdiction to hear a claim does not suffice to show Congress has abrogated 
all defenses to that claim. The issues are wholly distinct."254 The Court's 
characterization of Eleventh Amendment immunity as a nonjurisdictional 
defense is, of course, in tension with the forum-allocation interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment. 
d. Hess Again 
The Court's reliance on the idea that a purpose of the Eleventh 
Amendment is to protect state treasuries is not the only aspect of the Hess 
opinion that conflicts with the forum-allocation view. There is, in addition, 
dictum in the opinion that directly contradicts that interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment. Although I have eschewed any reliance on dicta so far, 
I have made an exception for the Hess dictum because it is so recent and 
because it reflects the views of the Justices who dissented in Seminole Tribe. 
The Court in Hess began its discussion of the Eleventh Amendment by 
noting that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment largely shields States from suit in 
federal court without their consent, leaving parties with claims against a State 
to present them, if the State permits, in the State's own tribunals."255 Read 
literally, this sentence supports the immunity-from-liability interpretation even 
more directly than does the "assent" language in McKesson or the "consent" 
250. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 36-45 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
251. 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131-32 (1996). 
252. Even if we attributed the foregoing views to him, Justice Scalia would still arguably have been 
guilty of overlooking a technicality favoring the states. As explained below, if Eleventh Amendment 
immunity is both an immunity from lower federal court jurisdiction and an immunity from liability, then 
Scalia could have taken the position that a clear statement of an intent to abrogate the latter immunity 
should not enable an individual to bring suit in federal court unless Congress also clearly stated its intent 
to abrogate the former immunity. See infra notes 270 & 272. 
253. 501 u.s. 775 (1996). 
254. Id. at 786-87 n.4. 
255. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394, 400 (1994) (emphasis added). 
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language in Seminole Tribe. These latter cases suggest that the states' consent 
to suit is a condition of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, but they do 
not intimate that states are free to refuse to entertain damage claims against 
themselves in their own courts.256 If the Eleventh Amendment did not protect 
the states from federal liability, and if Congress were to make states liable, 
then under the Supremacy Clause, the states would be required to enforce that 
liability.257 Hess's statement that states are free not to permit suits under 
federal law to proceed against themselves in their own courts258 is for this 
reason inconsistent with the forum-allocation interpretation. The statement 
would be true only if some legal principle protected the states from liability 
under federal law, not just from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. 
The Justices in the Hess majority appear to have regarded the Eleventh 
Amendment as embodying such a principle. 
In evaluating the latter statement in Hess, however, it is important to keep 
in mind that the opinion was written during the reign of Union Gas by a 
Justice who later dissented from the Court's overruling of that decision.259 
Indeed, only Justice Kennedy was in the majority in both Hess and Seminole 
Tribe. 260 With the possible exception of Justice Kennedy, therefore, the 
Justices who expressed the belief in Hess that the Amendment protected the 
states from federal liability also believed that Congress had the power to 
subject the states to both federal liability and lower federal court jurisdiction. 
In other words, they viewed the protection afforded the states by the Eleventh 
Amendment as presumptive only. Given the Seminole Tribe majority's 
recasting of the Eleventh Amendment as a limitation on congressional power, 
it is open to question whether the members of the Hess majority (except 
perhaps Justice Kennedy) would feel bound to adhere to what was after all 
only dictum in that case,261 and by all appearances ill-considered dictum to 
256. I maintain that the assent language in both McKesson and Seminole Tribe supports the immunity-
from-liability interpretation because, in the absence of Supreme Court review, any federal liability of states 
would be illusory or at least ineffectual. My point here is that Hess supports the immunity-from-liability 
interpretation even more directly because it denies the obligation of states to entertain such cases even in 
their own courts. 
257. The Court made this point in both Reich and Hilton, as did Justice Marshall in Employees. See 
supra Part II. 
258. I am assuming that the Court's statement applies to suits based on federal law, as the Hess action 
was itself a suit under federal law. See 115 S. Ct. at 397. I am also assuming that the adverb "largely" does 
not qualify the part of the sentence that indicates that the state is free not to permit a suit against itself to 
proceed in the state courts. 
259. Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion, which Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined. 
See Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 397. 
260. There is nothing in the dissenting opinion in Hess indicating that the dissenting Justices either 
agreed or disagreed with the statement that the states are free to close their courts to suits seeking damages 
under federal law. 
261. I am characterizing as dictum the statement that states can be sued in state court only "if the State 
permits." Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400. The statement that the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment was to 
protect state treasuries was not dictum. Given the Justices' conception of the Eleventh Amendment as 
subject to plenary congressional abrogation, however, the majority's statements in that regard could be 
recast as a statement about the factors that determine which entities qualify as the state for purposes of the 
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boot.262 For this reason, I do not regard the Hess dictum to be nearly as 
probative of whether the current Court regards Eleventh Amendment immunity 
as immunity from liability as the statements in Seminole Tribe discussed 
above, statements by Justices who (except for Justice Kennedy) criticized the 
Hess majority for "underprotecting ... state sovereignty."263 But the dictum 
does show, at the least, that even the Justices least enamored of the Eleventh 
Amendment have not fully internalized the forum-allocation interpretation. 
4. Will 
One might read the Court's recent opinion in Will v. Michigan Department 
of State Police264 as a recognition that states enjoy two sorts of immunity 
from federal power, an immunity from the original jurisdiction of the lower 
federal courts and a separate immunity from liability. Yet the Court in Will 
clearly treated the states' immunity from liability as subject to abrogation by 
Congress. Will thus suggests the possibility that while the states enjoy an 
immunity from the original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts that is 
irrepealable by Congress under Article I, they enjoy only a presumptive 
immunity from liability under federal law. This would represent only a minor 
inroad on the forum-allocation interpretation. Will also offers a possible post 
hoc explanation of the decisions discussed in Section B: Might their references 
to the protection of state treasuries be understood as references to the 
rebuttable immunity from liability recognized in Will as opposed to a 
hypothetically irrepealable immunity from liability under the Eleventh 
Amendment? I conclude that this possible way to reconcile these cases with 
the forum-allocation interpretation is unconvincing. 
Will was a suit brought against the state in the state courts under section 
1983.265 The Court acknowledged that the Eleventh Amendment did not 
apply because the suit had been brought in the state courts.266 The issue was 
whether section 1983 made states liable in damages to private individuals. The 
Court held that whether a statute makes states liable in damages to individuals 
should be decided through the application of a clear statement rule identical in 
immunity from liability recognized in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). 
See infra Subsection lll.B.4. With respect to the particular statute involved in Hess, however, the Court had 
already held (in Hilton) that the Will immunity from liability had been abrogated by Congress. See Hilton 
v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1991) (affirming on stare decisis grounds that 
obligations imposed by FELA apply to states). 
262. That the dictum was ill-considered is suggested by the fact that two of the Justices who concurred 
in the opinion (Stevens and Kennedy) had indicated just a few terms before that the states were required 
by the Supremacy Clause to entertain suits under FELA in their own courts. See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 207. 
263. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 410 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
264. 491 U.S. 58 (1989). 
265. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 
266. See Will, 491 U.S. at 63-64. 
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substance to the one that detennines whether the Eleventh Amendment has 
been abrogated.267 The Court held that although the clear statement rule is 
not, strictly speaking, required by the Eleventh Amendment, it is supported by 
the Amendment and by the constitutional principles of federalism it 
exemplifies.268 The Court's decision in Will might be understood as a 
recognition of a quasi-constitutional immunity of states from liability to 
individuals, an immunity emanating in part from the Eleventh Amendment but 
based more broadly on constitutional principles of federalism, 269 but an 
"immunity" subject to plenary congressional abrogation. 
The Will holding may help reconcile some of the decisions discussed in 
this Part with the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. 
The statements in Edelman and its progeny-suggesting that because of the 
Eleventh Amendment, the states would remain free to decide whether or not 
to provide retrospective monetary relief-make sense if one assumes that the 
Court was referring here to the immunity from liability discussed in Will rather 
than a jurisdictional immunity.270 We might similarly try to reconcile the 
Court's statement in Hess that the purpose of Eleventh Amendment immunity 
is to protect state treasuries with the forum-allocation interpretation by 
recasting it as a statement about the purpose of the immunity from liability 
recognized in Will. The Will case may also provide a retrospective explanation 
267. See id. at 65. 
268. See id.; see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.l5 (1996) (requiring 
application of "clear statement" rule based on "principles of federalism"); Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. 
Ry. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 209 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The [Will] clear statement rule is not 
a mere canon of statutory interpretation. Instead, it derives from the Constitution itself."). 
269. Some may quarrel with calling the protection Will gave the states an "immunity" if it is subject 
to plenary abrogation by Congress. I share this semantic concern. Nevertheless, during Union Gas's brief 
reign, the Eleventh Amendment was said to give the states an "immunity" even though the protection it 
provided had the force of a mere presumption. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394, 
400 ( 1994 ). The Court also refers to the protection afforded by the Eleventh Amendment as an "immunity" 
even in contexts in which it is clearly subject to abrogation. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 
U.S. 234, 240 (1985) (requiring for finding of abrogation "an unequivocal expression of congressional 
intent to overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several states") (citations omitted). I shall 
accordingly refer to the Wili decision as recognizing an "immunity" from liability, with the understanding 
that such "immunity" may be nothing more than a presumption that Congress has not created a liability. 
270. Other parts of the Edelman opinion, however, make sense only if the Court was referring to a 
jurisdictional immunity. For example, the Court said that the immunity "sufficiently partakes of the nature 
of a jurisdictional bar" that states can invoke it for the first time on appeal without waiving it. See Edelman 
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,678 (1974). Of course, Will is consistent with the idea that the states possess both 
forms of immunity. The waiver issue discussed in Edelman presented the Court with one of the few 
situations in which an immunity from federal jurisdiction would retain any relevance when accompanied 
by a coextensive immunity from liability. Another area would be appealability. The Court in Puerto Rico 
Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147 (1993), held that the denial of an 
Eleventh Amendment claim is immediately appealable, a holding that rests on a view of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity as an immunity from suit in federal court as opposed to an immunity from liability. 
The Court's express statements that Eleventh Amendment immunity is an immunity from suit do not 
contradict the claim that it is also an immunity from liability. Cf Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 
853 F.2d 445, 449-51 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that denial of foreign sovereign immunity claim is 
immediately appealable (consistent only with conclusion that foreign sovereign immunity is immunity from 
suit) and that privatization of defendant company does not deprive company of its entitlement to immunity 
(consistent only with conclusion that foreign sovereign immunity is immunity from liability)). 
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of the abrogation decisions in which the Court sought evidence of a 
congressional intent to make states liable to private parties. Under Will, 
abrogation of immunity from liability is governed by the same clear statement 
rule as abrogation of immunity from federal jurisdiction, and, of course, if 
there is no liability, the suit must be dismissed. The Court thus could have 
properly dismissed the claim in Dellmuth v. Muth211 on the ground that 
Congress had not abrogated the states' immunity from liability. 272 
But there is little in these opinions to support such a reading. The states' 
obligation to provide the retrospective relief at issue in the Edelman line of 
cases had clearly been made a condition of the states' receipt of federal funds 
by the time Green was decided, so under the forum-allocation view (even as 
modified in Will) the state courts would have been required to provide a forum 
in which to recover that relief. Yet the Court treated the absence of original 
federal jurisdiction as the equivalent of denying the states' obligation to afford 
such relief. Congress's power to condition the receipt of federal funds on the 
undertaking to provide retrospective relief was (and is) not in doubt. Congress 
could clearly have made submission to suit in federal court a condition as well. 
The Court's apparent assumption that the state court was nevertheless under 
no enforceable federal obligation to afford the relief sought is inconsistent with 
the forum-allocation view. It is possible, I suppose, that the Green Court 
overlooked the fact that the statute and regulations at issue imposed on the 
states an obligation to afford retrospective relief. The fact remains that the 
Court equated the lack of original federal jurisdiction with the freedom of 
states to deny retrospective relief, and this form of analysis is simply 
inconsistent with the forum-allocation view.273 
It is even more difficult to explain Hess as a decision about the immunity 
from liability involved in Will. First, Will preceded Hess, yet the Court did not 
frame the issue in Will terms. Second, the Court had already held in Hilton 
that states were liable in damages to individuals for violations of FELA. 
Indeed, the holding of Hilton, one of the trio of cases supporting the forum-
allocation view, only serves to heighten the conflict between the forum-
allocation position and the Hess Court's statements that the Eleventh 
271. 491 U.S. 223 (1989). 
272. The reverse, however, is not necessarily true: If there are two immunities, then abrogation of the 
immunity from liability does not mean that immunity from lower federal court jurisdiction has been 
abrogated. Thus, Will does not explain the Court's exclusive focus in Union Gas on Congress's intent to 
impose liability on the states. 
273. See supra note 216. That there was no question about Congress's power to require the states to 
pay retrospective relief as a condition of receiving federal funds suggests that those cases may be even 
more at odds with the forum-allocation view than I suggested above. Perhaps the decisions should be taken 
as holding that state courts cannot be obliged to entertain suits against themselves in their own courts even 
where Congress concededly has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal court 
jurisdiction. If so, then Congress's only option to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment in any meaningful 
way would be to subject the states to suit in federal court. Congress would not have the option of 
subjecting states to liability and obligating the state courts to enforce that liability. 
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Amendment seeks to protect state treasuries and that states are free to deny a 
state forum. 
At any rate, this explanation of Hess and the Edelman line of cases 
reconciles them with the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment only by recognizing an immunity from liability that has its source 
outside the Eleventh Amendment. The reconciliation is semantic only and is, 
in any event, problematic because: ( 1) "Eleventh Amendment immunity" does 
not really have its source in the Eleventh Amendment;274 and (2) the 
immunity from liability recognized in Will rests to some extent on the Eleventh 
Amendment.275 Saying that there are two immunities, one from liability and 
one from jurisdiction, does not much advance the analysis. The question is 
whether there is any meaningful difference between the immunity from liability 
recognized in Will and the immunity from liability arguably recognized in 
Seminole Tribe, and this question, in turn, depends on the scope of Congress's 
power to abrogate the Will immunity. 
The Court in Will treated the states' immunity from liability as subject to 
plenary abrogation by Congress. Under the then-prevailing Union Gas regime, 
Eleventh Amendment immunity was subject to abrogation by Congress 
pursuant to any of its legislative powers. Thus, under Union Gas, the two 
immunities were in substance identical as far as congressional power was 
concerned: Both amounted only to a rule of clear statement. Seminole Tribe 
holds that Eleventh Amendment immunity may be abrogated by Congress only 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 276 This holding would not have 
produced any difference between the two immunities as applied to the facts of 
the Will case, as the plaintiff in that case sought to enforce an obligation 
imposed on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment and relied on a statute 
enacted by Congress pursuant to that Amendment. 277 With respect to statutes 
not enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the issue arises whether 
the two immunities continue to be identical. In other words, does the Court's 
holding in Seminole Tribe that the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity may 
not be abrogated under Article I extend to the quasi-constitutional immunity 
from liability recognized in Will? Or does the latter immunity continue to be 
merely presumptive, subject to abrogation by Congress pursuant to any of its 
274. See supra note 6. 
275. See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
276. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1124-25 (1996). 
277. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 554 n.l3 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Section 1983 was 
enacted in 1871 as one of the statutes intended to implement the Fourteenth Amendment."). The Court held 
in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I (1980), that section 1983 supplies a remedy as well against state officials 
who violate federal statutes not relating to civil rights. See 448 U.S. at I 0-11. With respect to claims 
brought under section 1983 to enforce obligations of the state under statutes enacted under Article I, 
Congress's power to abrogate the immunity from liability would be broader than its power to abrogate 
immunity from lower federal court jurisdiction, if one interpreted Eleventh Amendment immunity as merely 
the latter type of immunity. 
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legislative powers? Put otherwise, did the Court in Seminole Tribe recognize 
an immunity of the states from liability that may not be abrogated by Congress 
under Article I? If the Court was serious in Seminole Tribe that the Supreme 
Court's jurisdiction over state court suits again.st states depends on the state's 
consent to the suit, then the Court has denied Congress the power effectively 
to abrogate the Will immunity from liability under Article I. 
IV. THE ABROGATION REDUCTIO AND MCKESSON'S UNRAVELING 
Examination of another conundrum posed by Seminole Tribe will help 
point the way to a resolution of the conflict between Seminole Tribe and 
McKesson concerning the nature of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Although 
there may at first seem to be little connection between the problem examined 
in this Part and the one discussed in the prior sections, our discussion will 
show the two to be closely linked. 
In Seminole Tribe, the Court held that Congress has the power to abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to its power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but not under its Article I legislative power. The Fourteenth 
Amendment, however, includes a clause prohibiting states from depriving 
persons of property without due process of law. Can Congress pass a statute 
giving individuals a property right vis-a-vis the states and then, to "enforce" 
the Due Process Clause, abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity 
with respect to suits to enforce that right? An affirmative answer to this 
question threatens to reduce Seminole Tribe's abrogation holding to nothing. 
I call this the abrogation reductio. 
Section A of this Part elaborates on the abrogation reductio and shows its 
surface plausibility. Section B considers and rejects possible doctrinal 
modifications the Court might adopt to avoid the reductio. Section C continues 
the search for an escape from the reductio by pressing into service the Court's 
procedural due process jurisprudence, of which McKesson forms an integral 
part. This analysis shows three things: First, the conflict between McKesson 
and the immunity-from-liability interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is 
much deeper than it appeared in Part I. Second, the Court's procedural due 
process doctrine offers a rationale for escaping the abrogation reductio. This 
escape may depend on the Court's rejection of some of its broader precedents 
concerning the scope of Congress's Section 5 enforcement power, or its 
willingness to find such precedents inapplicable where the right being 
"enforced" is a procedural one, but one or both of these possibilities seems 
likely. Because this rationale for escaping the reductio (relying as it does on 
McKesson) succeeds only if the forum-allocation interpretation is right, the 
prospect of escaping the reductio thus offers a substantial reason for preferring 
that interpretation. But, at the same time (and this is the third point), our 
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analysis also exposes significant doctrinal problems with the Court's 
procedural due process jurisprudence and with McKesson in particular. These 
doctrinal problems cast considerable doubt on the plausibility of the traditional 
reading of the McKesson decision, and as a consequence they leave the forum-
allocation interpretation on significantly weaker ground. 
A. The Abrogation Reductio 
The complex and highly problematic relationship between McKesson and 
Seminole Tribe's abrogation holding is best understood by giving further 
consideration to Congress's post-Seminole Tribe power to give patent holders 
a right to obtain damages in federal court from states that infringe. After the 
Court's Atascadero decision, Congress amended the patent laws to make clear: 
(1) that the primary obligations that the patent laws impose do apply to state 
governments; (2) that states that infringe patents are liable in damages to the 
patent holders; and (3) that patent holders may obtain those damages in federal 
court. 278 The Senate Report accompanying the Patent and Plant Variety 
Protection Remedy Clarification Act indicates that Congress believed that it 
had the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under 
Article 1.279 But, perhaps anticipating the Seminole Tribe decision, the Report 
covered its bases and relied further on the idea that Congress has the power 
to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in patent cases under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.280 The Report indicates that patents 
are property and thus implicate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause.281 The reasoning appears to be that the existence of a "property" 
278. See Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271,296 (1994). 
Congress passed similar laws relating to trademarks and copyrights. See Trademark Remedy Qarification 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1122, 1125, 1127 (1994); Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, 17 U.S.C. § 511 (1994). 
279. SeeS. REP. No. 102-280, at 7-8 (1992). 
280. See id. (expressly relying on ''the Patent Clause, the Commerce Qause, and the enforcement 
provision of the fourteenth amendment"). 
281. See id. at 8 & n.55. The Report cited the district court decision in Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 
F. Supp. 708 (N.D. lll. 1974), for the proposition that patents are property. In that case, the court suggested 
that patents were property for purposes of the Takings Clause and that, accordingly, a right to compensation 
exists under that Clause if states infringe. See Leme/son, 372 F. Supp. at 710-13. This suggestion is 
problematic. Although the Court has interpreted the term "property" in the Takings Clause more narrowly 
than the same term in the Due Process Clause, it may be conceded that patents may constitute property for 
purposes of the Takings Clause. Cf Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984) (finding 
that trade secrets are property for purposes of Takings Clause). But the Court's takings cases would appear 
to require the conclusion that a state's infringement of a patent is not a ''taking," as it does not "virtually 
destroy" the property's value. See TRIBE, supra note 175, § 9-3, at 593. Patent infringement is akin to the 
tort of unfair competition, and the Court has distinguished takings from ordinary tons. See Pruneyard 
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980) ('"[N]ot every destruction or injury to property by 
governmental action has been held to be a 'taking' in the constitutional sense."') (quoting Armstrong v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 40,48 (1960)); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508 (1923) 
("[D]estruction of, or injury to, property is frequently accomplished without a 'taking' in the constitutional 
sense."); National By-Prods., Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1256, 1275 (Ct. Cl. 1969) ("[T]he 
Government's foreknowledge will not convert an otherwise insufficient injury into a taking. At most it 
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right under the Due Process Clause gives rise to a congressional power to 
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to that 
property. 282 
If this reasoning were to hold, then Congress's power to abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity would appear to be coextensive with its power to 
legislate under Article I, and, if so, Seminole Tribe's holding that Congress 
lacks the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under Article I 
would be eviscerated. This would be so whether we regarded the Eleventh 
Amendment as a forum-allocation principle or as conferring an immunity from 
liability. Suppose that the Amendment is a forum-allocation principle. By 
hypothesis, Congress would have the power to: (1) prohibit states from 
infringing patents; and (2) require them to pay damages to the patent holder 
if they do infringe. It seems clear that the patent holder's right to damages is 
a "property" right for purposes of the Due Process Clause. There is no doubt 
could strengthen the plaintiff's case in a tort action."). As discussed below, the term "property" in the Due 
Process Clause has been construed by the Court in such a way as to encompass any statutory entitlement 
vis-a-vis the state, and a state "deprives" persons of that property whenever it injures the property interest 
intentionally. Cf Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-36 (1986) (holding that negligent conduct cannot 
give rise to "deprivation" of property for purposes of Due Process Clause). The Senate Report does not cite 
the Takings Clause; it relies only on the Due Process Clause. 
282. Two courts have considered the validity of this abrogation. In College Savings Bank v. Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, No. 95-4516, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18817 (D.N.J. Dec. 
13, 1996), the plaintiff raised a patent infringement claim under the Patent Act and a false advertising claim 
under the Lanham Act against a state agency. The court upheld Congress's abrogation of the states' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Patent Act, but not under the Lanham Act. With respect to the 
patent infringement claim, the court wrote that "if rights protected by the Patent Act are correctly 
considered 'property,' legislation making the states liable in federal court for violating that statute would 
'plainly' be 'appropriate' for enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 76. The court went on to 
conclude that patents are indeed property, relying primarily on cases stating that they are. See id. at 77-79. 
On the other hand, the court found that the right to be free from competition based on false advertising was 
not a property right, relying on the absence of cases calling such a right a property right. See id. at 88-95. 
On this latter conclusion, see infra note 289. 
In Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the University of California, 939 F. Supp. 639, 643 (S.D. Ind. 1996), 
mandamus granted on other grounds sub nom. In re Regents of University of California, Misc. No. 471, 
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30617 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 1996), the court relied on the above-quoted passage from 
the Senate Report and, in dictum, accepted the Fourteenth Amendment/due process abrogation theory. The 
court held that although Congress could on this theory validly abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from patent infringement claims by holders of federal patents, it could not subject states that hold 
federal patents to declaratory judgment actions by individuals seeking a declaration of the patent's 
invalidity. The patent holder has "a protectable property right and to permit the State to infringe that 
property right without redress for the patent owner would deprive that owner of property without due 
process of law." ld. But someone seeking a declaration that a patent is invalid, the court said, "has no 
protectable property right of which it ... has been deprived without due process of law." ld. That is 
because that person "is free to manufacture said substances until [the patent holder] not only lodges an 
infringement action, but also secures either injunctive relief or final judgment in its favor [, and,] [i]n either 
event, [it] will have gotten due process of law before a deprivation occurs." !d. at 643-44. That may be 
true, but, as discussed below, a patent holder does not necessarily suffer a deprivation of property without 
due process of law just because his patent has been infringed by the state. If the infringement was "random 
and unauthorized," the state would satisfy due process simply by making a postdeprivation state remedy 
available. See infra text accompanying notes 321-39. It is accordingly not as clear as the court seemed to 
think that the patent holder and the person claiming that the patent is invalid stand in different positions 
with respect to Congress's abrogation power. Both arguably have property interests that Congress may (or 
may not) have the power to protect by abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
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that "property" can be created by federal statute for purposes of that 
Clause.283 The Court has found that the right to continue receiving an 
uninterrupted stream of money payable in the future triggers due process 
protection.284 If so, then there can be little doubt that the right to receive 
money presently owing (which is by definition what the right to damages is) 
is also a property right. On the Senate's reasoning, the existence of this 
property right brings the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause into the 
picture and gives rise to a congressional power to abrogate the states' Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, which (as we are assuming the correctness of the 
forum-allocation interpretation) means that Congress can give the lower federal 
courts jurisdiction to entertain suits seeking such damages from the states. If 
the power to abrogate this immunity hinges only on the existence of a right to 
damages, and if Congress's power to subject states to damage liability is 
coextensive with its power to impose obligations on them (a tenet of the 
forum-allocation theory), then Congress's power to abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity is coextensive with its power to legislate under Article 
I as delineated in such decisions as New York v. United States.285 
The problem does not go away if we assume that the Eleventh Amendment 
immunizes the states from damage liability to individuals. On the Senate's 
reasoning, this immunity can be abrogated as long as individuals have a 
property right vis-a-vis the states. The Senate Report states that a patent is a 
property right for purposes of the Due Process Clause, and it concludes that 
the existence of this right gives Congress the power to abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.286 If we assume that Eleventh Amendment immunity 
is immunity from liability, then Congress's creation of a property right in a 
patent, on the Senate's reasoning, gives rise to a congressional power to 
subject states that infringe to liability in damages to patent holders. Again, this 
proves too much. The Senate is probably correct in concluding that a patent 
is property for purposes of the Due Process Clause. Under the Court's current 
approach to this subject, whether a statute establishes a property right turns on 
whether the statute ·places mandatory limits on a state's discretion to act 
283. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (involving property interest in continued 
receipt of disability benefits under Social Security Act); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (involving 
property interest in continued employment with federal agency, an interest created by federal statute); 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (involving property interest in continued receipt of financial aid 
under Aid to Families with Dependent Children program); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" 
and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 435 n.194 (1977). 
284. In Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262, and Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332, the Court found a property right 
in the continued receipt of money not yet due. 
285. 505 u.s. 144 (1992). 
286. If the Senate had adhered to the forum-allocation view, it would not have had to hang its hat on 
the idea that a patent is property for due process purposes. The fact that it did may suggest that it 
understood the Eleventh Amendment to protect the states from damage liability; that is, it believed its 
power to abrogate was a power to subject states to damage liability. 
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towards the putative property holder.287 So if Congress prohibits states from 
infringing patents, then patent holders have a property right in states' not 
infringing their patents. The problem, of course, is that Congress's power to 
place mandatory obligations on the states is coextensive with its power under 
Article I to make its laws applicable to the states. If Congress has the power 
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity whenever it has the power to place 
mandatory obligations on states towards individuals,288 then Congress's 
power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity has, again, been made 
coextensive with its power to legislate substantively with respect to the states 
under Article I, as construed in such cases as New York and Garcia. If so, 
Seminole Tribe's abrogation holding has been reduced to nothing.289 
287. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudennill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985). In Sandin v. 
Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2297-99 (1995), the Court described this as the approach adopted by its recent 
decisions concerning "liberty" interests, but then proceeded to depart from it in the context of prisoners' 
rights. The Court recognized, however, that the prevailing approach "may be entirely sensible in the 
ordinary task of construing a statute defining rights and remedies available to the general public." ld. at 
2299. In any event, the Court did not purport to alter its approach to finding property interests. 
288. That the obligation be an obligation toward individuals is a potentially significant qualification. 
Clearly an obligation not to infringe someone's patent satisfies it, as does the obligation to pay the person 
damages. It is possible that the state's obligation not to pollute the water or air does not give anyone a 
"property" right. Perhaps it would. The requirement that the obligation be toward individuals would appear 
to make relevant much of the Court's standing jurisprudence. It may be the case that Congress's power to 
give individuals a "property" right is coextensive with its power to give individuals standing to seek 
injunctive relief. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Whats Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and 
Article Ill, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 234 (1992) (suggesting that Congress might confer citizen standing to 
enforce environmental obligations by providing by statute that "all Americans have a kind of property 
right-a tenancy in common-in some environmental asset"). 
289. The abrogation reductio was perceptively noted by the district court in College Savings Bank v. 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, No. 95-4516, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18817 
(D.N.J. Dec. 13, 1996). The court there ruled that Congress's abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity 
in the Lanham Act was not a valid exercise of its Section 5 power, at least as applied to a false advertising 
claim. (The court noted that false advertising claims are separate and distinct from trademark infringement 
claims. See id. at *88 n.25.) The court reasoned as follows: 
[W]e are unaware of any authority suggesting that Congress may, by simple fiat, abruptly 
declare that a simple statutory cause of action, which traditionally has not been understood to 
involve any kind of property, now encompasses a "property right" to which the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies. Indeed, if Congress has such power, it could easily "reverse" the outcome 
in Seminole Tribe by inserting into some staff report a reference regarding the importance of 
using the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the "right" to have a state negotiate over a gaming 
compact. To quote Justice Scalia, "If state sovereign immunity has any reality, it must mean 
more than this." 
ld. at *93-94 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 44 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)). The court nevertheless found that the abrogation of immunity in the Patent Act was 
valid under Section 5 because patents are property. The court based these divergent results on the existence 
of statements in prior decisions recognizing that the right to be free of infringement of patents is a property 
right, and the absence of statements in prior decisions recognizing that the right to be free of competition 
based on false advertising is a property right. The court, however, did not discuss the cases that set forth 
the test for defining "property" under the Due Process Clause. Although the court's concern that a contrary 
holding would reduce Seminole Tribe's abrogation holding to nothing is consonant with the concerns raised 
by this Article, the reasons the court gave for distinguishing patent infringement claims from false 
advertising claims are not entirely satisfying. 
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B. Avoiding the Reductio by Adjusting Constitutional Doctrine 
As the Senate's conclusion cannot coexist with Seminole Tribe's holding 
that Congress lacks the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity 
under its Article I powers, something has got to give. This Section considers 
possible doctrinal adjustments the Court could make to avoid the reductio 
without rejecting Seminole Tribe's abrogation holding. It turns out that 
avoiding the reductio in this fashion either would require adjustments too 
dramatic to contemplate or would be inconsistent with other parts of Seminole 
Tribe. 
First, and most dramatically, the Court could reverse its holding in 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer90 that Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's 
reasoning in Fitzpatrick, in fact, seems inconsistent with the Seminole Tribe 
result, as Justice Brennan pointed out in Union Gas,291 and as diversity 
theorists have noted as well.292 The Fitzpatrick reasoning should have led the 
Court to recognize an abrogation power under Article I for the same reason 
that Hamilton's reasoning in the Federalist Papers should arguably have led 
the Court in Hans to adopt the diversity interpretation.293 The rather skeletal 
analysis in Fitzpatrick stressed that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed 
significant obligations on the states, and the Court concluded from that premise 
that the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to subject states to 
damage actions in federal court if Congress regards such actions as necessary 
to enforce those obligations.294 The Court thus appears to have reasoned that 
the existence of a constitutional obligation of the states, combined with a 
congressional power to "enforce" those obligations by legislation, adds up to 
a congressional power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. This 
analytical jump from the existence of a primary obligation to a congressional 
power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity would, of course, produce 
the very same result under provisions of the Constitution antedating the 
Fourteenth Amendment. For example, the Constitution as originally adopted 
included a Contracts Clause,295 which, as interpreted in Fletcher v. Peck,296 
forbids the states from impairing the obligation of its own contracts with 
individuals.297 The Court's analysis in Fitzpatrick would support the 
290. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
291. See 491 U.S. I, 17-18 (1989) (arguing that reasoning of Scalia's dissenting opinion in Union 
Gas, which was ultimately embraced in Seminole Tribe, would be inconsistent with Court's holding in 
Fitzpatrick). 
292. See Field, Congressional Imposition, supra note 58, at 1230. 
293. See supra note 230. 
294. See 427 U.S. at 456. 
295. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I. 
296. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
297. See id. at 136-39. 
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conclusion that the Contracts Clause, perhaps as supplemented by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause/98 empowers Congress to subject states to both 
damage liability and federal court jurisdiction in order to enforce that 
obligation. The same analysis would support the conclusion that Congress has 
the power to subject the states to damage liability and federal court jurisdiction 
whenever it has the power to impose primary obligations on the states. 
Because the Court declined to recognize such a power in Seminole Tribe, the 
latter decision appears to be a rejection of the Fitzpatrick analysis. 
The Court in Seminole Tribe took pains not to call into question the 
Fitzpatrick result. There probably are rationales for sustaining a congressional 
power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Fourteenth 
Amendment that do not support the same abrogation power under antecedent 
constitutional provisions. Such a rationale would no doubt have to rely heavily 
on the idea that federal-state relations were fundamentally altered by the Civil 
War Amendments, something the Court emphasized in Fitzpatrick.299 But, 
while this basic alteration may be necessary to support the Seminole Tribe 
holding, it is not sufficient. First, it does not supply us with a basis for 
concluding that one of the alterations made was the establishment of a 
congressional power to make states liable to individuals and to subject states 
to suit in federal courts.300 Second, even if we had a basis for such a 
conclusion, we would still lack a reason for denying that the Fourteenth 
Amendment authorizes the exercise of this power for the purpose of enforcing 
the primary obligations imposed on the states by Congress under its Article I 
powers. Just as the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has been 
construed to incorporate much of the Bill of Rights,301 the same Clause 
might reasonably have been construed to incorporate Congress's Article I 
powers for abrogation purposes.302 It is conceivable that the Court will so 
hold when confronted with the abrogation reductio, but this would mean 
rejecting Seminole Tribe's holding that Congress may not abrogate under 
Article I. If we take seriously Seminole Tribe's abrogation holding and the 
Court's indication that it does not mean to reject Fitzpatrick insofar as it held 
that Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment, we will have to look elsewhere for an escape from the 
abrogation reductio. 
The Court could try to avoid the reductio by reversing what remains of 
Garcia. By taking away Congress's power to place primary obligations on the 
states under Article I, the Court would deny Congress the power to create 
298. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
299. 427 U.S. at 455-56. 
300. See Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 7, at 1115-16. 
301. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 804-13 (3d ed. 1996). 
302. See JACOBS, supra note 42, at 163-64 (suggesting that Due Process Clause of Fourteenth 
Amendment is "potential basis for renouncing [Eleventh Amendment] doctrine"). 
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correlative property rights, and hence, it would cut the reductio off at its 
inception. The Court has already begun cutting back on Garcia, but as noted, 
New York left Congress the power to impose obligations on the states so long 
as the obligations are imposed on nonstate actors as well.303 Denying 
Congress all power to impose obligations on the states would limit Congress's 
powers vis-a-vis the states even more drastically than the pre-Garcia cases did, 
for those cases conceded Congress the power to impose obligations on the 
states in areas not traditionally regulated by the states.304 Patent, copyright, 
and bankruptcy would probably fall into this category. Resurrecting the 
National League of Cities standard may indeed strike the Court as an attractive 
way to avoid the reductio, as it would permit Congress to subject the states to 
liability and suit in federal court at the behest of patent holders without 
sweeping in all of Congress's Article I powers. The statute at issue in Seminole 
Tribe, however, could probably have been voided on the merits for failing even 
the New York test.305 The statute imposed on the states and no one else the 
duty to negotiate in good faith with Indian tribes concerning gambling. 306 It 
thus singled out states for regulation in a way that New York appeared to 
prohibit. The Court in Seminole Tribe nevertheless pointedly reserved the 
question of the statute's substantive validity?07 It may well be that the 
Justices in the Seminole Tribe majority would like to place additional limits on 
Congress's power to place substantive obligations on the states. This would 
certainly be the cleanest way to avoid the reductio, but given the Court's 
reservation of this issue, its decision to strengthen the Eleventh Amendment 
is not explained by its desire to scale Garcia back further. 
Third, the Court could reconsider the test for defining "property" for 
purposes of the Due Process Clause. The Court has recently shown a 
willingness to redefine liberty,308 and it could well do the same for property, 
but avoiding the reductio in this way would require dramatic doctrinal changes. 
303. See supra text accompanying note 99. 
304. See supra text accompanying note 96. 
305. See Monaghan, supra note 34, at 119-20. It might perhaps be contended that IGRA is valid under 
New York on the theory that it gives the states a choice between: (I) negotiating in good faith with Tribes, 
and (2) subjecting themselves to preemptive federal legislation. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 173-74 (1992) (upholding federal law giving states choice between complying with federal directive 
or "having state law pre-empted by federal regulation"). If this had been a possible ground for upholding 
the federally imposed obligation to negotiate, then it is not clear why it would not also have been a basis 
for upholding the jurisdiction of the federal court. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal 
jurisdiction over states that consent. If the fact that states remained free to refuse to negotiate and to accept 
instead a preemptive federal law means that states were not being "commandeered," but only "encouraged," 
to negotiate with the Tribe, then it is not clear why the existence of this option did not also mean that the 
state was merely being "encouraged" to consent to federal jurisdiction. The Court appears to have read the 
statute as imposing federal jurisdiction on the states, and if so, then the statute similarly must be read as 
imposing the duty to negotiate. Such commandeering of states would appear to be prima facie invalid under 
New York. 
306. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1119 (1996). 
307. See id. at 1126 n.lO. 
308. See supra note 287. 
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Recall that if the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment 
were right, Congress would have the power not only to prohibit the states from 
infringing patents but also to obligate them to pay damages to the patent 
holder. The right to damages is among the least controversial of property rights 
under the Due Process Clause.309 It is difficult to conceive of a redefinition 
of "property" that would exclude this right from the scope of the Due Process 
Clause without wreaking great havoc on due process doctrine. 
If the immunity-from-liability interpretation were right, then Congress 
would have the power to place mandatory obligations on the states (so long as 
they are also placed on nonstate actors carrying out the same activities), but 
not to subject states to damage liability to individuals. The reductio on this 
assumption would rest on a definition of property that turned on the existence 
of mandatory state obligations towards individuals. It is not inconceivable that 
the Court would shift gears in this area and define property in such a way as 
not to include every mandatory state obligation towards individuals. Perhaps 
it could define the concept of property for due process purposes as it does in 
the context of the Takings Clause, so that it includes only legal rights closely 
analogous to common law property rights-interests, for example, that are 
broadly alienable at the option of the property holder.310 Such an approach 
may, indeed, allow the Court to accept a congressional power to abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment immunity in patent cases without sweeping in all of 
Congress's other Article I powers. Exactly what this alternative doctrinal 
universe would look like is pure speculation at this point, but it would 
certainly require the rejection of a great deal of precedent, for it would have 
to exclude from the scope of "property" such statutorily conferred and not-
freely-alienable rights as the right to continued receipt of welfare payments and 
the right to continued employment if specified conditions are met.311 Whether 
the Court would go to such lengths just to save Seminole Tribe's abrogation 
holding is certainly subject to question. 
As noted, this escape from the reductio would work only if the Court also 
rejected the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. In this 
respect, therefore, our search for an escape from the reductio supplies us with 
some slight additional support for the immunity-from-liability interpretation. 
But this escape from the reductio is ultimately unsatisfying. To adjust the 
constitutional definition of property to the extent required to accommodate 
309. See supra note 284 and accompanying text. 
310. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); United States 
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (describing property rights in physical thing as 
"denot[ing) ... the right to possess, use and dispose of it"). See generally TRIBE, supra note 175 § 9-7, 
at 607-13 (discussing Court's "deference to common-law conceptions of property" in takings area). 
311. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (recognizing right to receive Social Security 
disability payments); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-52 (1974) (recognizing right to continued Civil 
Service employment); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970) (recognizing right to receive 
welfare payments not yet due). 
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Seminole Tribe's abrogation holding would surely be to let the tail wag the 
dog. If doctrinal adjustments are required, the definition of property in the Due 
Process Clause seems like a poor choice. Although the Court's definition of 
property cannot be said to be universally admired, adjusting it in the direction 
that would be required to avoid the reductio would move the doctrine in this 
area in exactly the wrong direction.312 
C. McKesson and the Abrogation Reductio 
McKesson and related procedural due process cases offer a more promising 
escape from the abrogation reductio. Examination of McKesson's relation to 
this issue allows us, in addition, to appreciate that the conflict between 
McKesson and the immunity-from-liability interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment runs far deeper than it at first appeared. Unsurprisingly, given the 
deep incompatibility of McKesson with the immunity-from-liability 
interpretation, escaping the reductio by relying on McKesson requires the 
rejection of the immunity-from-liability interpretation. But, at the same time, 
this analysis reveals problems with the conventional understanding of 
McKesson's holding that cast doubt on its plausibility. In the next Part, I will 
suggest a possible reinterpretation of McKesson that would save what I regard 
as its key insight. This reinterpretation, however, removes McKesson and Reich 
from the ranks of the cases supporting the forum-allocation interpretation, thus 
weakening significantly the doctrinal case for the forum-allocation 
interpretation. 
1. Avoiding the Reductio by Relying on McKesson and Related 
Procedural Due Process Cases 
McKesson is of course relevant to the abrogation reductio because, in 
addition to interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, the Court rendered an 
important due process holding. As discussed in Part II, McKesson's due 
process holding provides an important a link in the chain of reasoning 
underlying the forum-allocation interpretation. The Court in McKesson held 
that, when the state does not give a taxpayer an opportunity to challenge a 
tax's conformity with law before paying the tax, the Due Process Clause 
requires the state to offer a postpayment opportunity to challenge the tax's 
validity, and, if the tax turns out to have been invalid, a remedy sufficient to 
cure the violation.313 Often, the constitutionally required remedy will be a 
312. The Court"s previous attempts to avoid undesired results by narrowing the definition of "liberty" 
and "property"' have not been well received. See Monaghan, supra note 283, at 423-34, 439-44. 
313. See McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 22 (1990). 
If a state deprives a person of property or liberty without due process, but the deprivation turns out to have 
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refund,314 a prototypically retrospective remedy for Eleventh Amendment 
purposes. Because of the Eleventh Amendment, an action for a refund may not 
be maintained against the states in the lower federal courts, but the state must 
make the remedy available in its own courts. It may not rely on its law of 
sovereign immunity to bar the remedy, 315 and, if it fails to provide the 
required remedy, the Supreme Court may exercise its appellate jurisdiction and 
reverse.316 The Court appeared to consider its holding an uncontroversial 
application of principles it had articulated in procedural due process cases such 
as Mathews v. Eldridge,311 in which the Court had held that, while the Due 
Process Clause does not always require a predeprivation hearing to challenge 
state deprivations of liberty or property, it does require an effective opportunity 
to challenge the state's decision at some point.318 The McKesson Court 
stressed that the hearing must come "at a meaningful time," which it 
interpreted to mean that the hearing must at least come before the deprivation 
becomes final.319 The Court appears to have concluded that a deprivation of 
property is not final if an opportunity to obtain a postdeprivation remedy 
exists. It accordingly held that the Due Process Clause requires that a 
deprivation of liberty or property by the state be accompanied by an 
opportunity to obtain a retrospective remedy from the state if no predeprivation 
opportunity to test the deprivation's conformity with law was available and if 
no other remedy would cure the violation of law. 
Our discussion of the abrogation reductio in Section A of this Part allows 
us to appreciate the depth of McKesson's conflict with the immunity-from-
liability interpretation. Under that interpretation, Congress lacks the power to 
subject states to damage liability under its Article I powers. But as we saw, 
Congress has the power under Article I to create "property" rights for purposes 
of the Due Process Clause simply by placing mandatory obligations on the 
states.320 Under McKesson, Congress's creation of a property right against 
the states automatically gives rise to an obligation on the state's part to pay 
damages to the property holder if the state has deprived that person of her 
property without affording a predeprivation hearing (and no other remedy 
would cure the violation). Thus, under McKesson, not only is the state not 
been consistent with substantive law, the person is nevertheless entitled to compensation under section 1983 
for injuries suffered as a result of a violation of procedural rights. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 
254-57 (1978). McKesson is understood to stand for the proposition that if the deprivation turns out to have 
been in violation of substantive law, the person is also entitled under the Due Process Clause to a remedy 
sufficient to cure the violation. 
314. But cf supra note 123 (noting that if tax is unconstitutional because discriminatory, refund may 
not be required). 
315. See Reich v. Collins, 115 S. Ct. 547, 549 (1994). 
316. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 27. 
317. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
318. See id. at 348-49. 
319. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 38-39. 
320. See supra note 287 and accompanying text. 
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immune from congressional power to subject it to damage liability, the state 
is constitutionally obligated to pay individuals damages whenever it has 
violated a mandatory obligation imposed on it by Congress vis-a-vis 
individuals, even if Congress did not expressly create a damage remedy. 
McKesson, so interpreted, is thus fundamentally incompatible with the 
immunity-from-liability interpretation. 
If so, then McKesson seems to entrench the abrogation reductio. This 
would indeed be the case if the immunity-from-liability interpretation were 
correct. As discussed above, under the immunity-from-liability view, Congress 
would have the power to abrogate that immunity whenever it has the power 
to legislate substantively. McKesson tells us that Congress would be 
"abrogating" this immunity by legislating substantively. There would be no 
need for an additional act of "abrogation" to render the states liable in 
damages. Thus, if we assumed the correctness of the immunity-from-liability 
view, McKesson would make the abrogation reductio more of a problem, not 
less. 
If the forum-allocation interpretation were correct, however, McKesson and 
related procedural due process cases would offer a rationale for avoiding the 
abrogation reductio. By hypothesis, Congress would have the power to subject 
the states to damage liability to individuals; Eleventh Amendment immunity 
would simply be an immunity from the original jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. Suppose Congress has made states liable in damages to individuals for 
patent infringement. As we saw, the individual would then have a property 
interest in receiving damages from the state.321 Under McKesson, the state 
violates the Due Process Clause if it does not pay the individual the damages. 
But, by the same token, the state would satisfy its obligations under the Due 
Process Clause (with respect to the patent holder's property interest in 
damages)322 by making available a damage remedy in its own courts. If a 
state enacted a law giving individuals a right to obtain damages for patent 
infringement against the state in state courts, then Congress would be hard 
pressed to justify an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity (meaning 
here immunity from lower federal court jurisdiction) under the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause. If the state did not subject itself to damage 
liability in its own courts, then Congress would be justified in abrogating the 
immunity (thus making the state suable for damages in federal court). But the 
abrogation reductio would be avoided because Congress's power to abrogate 
would not be coextensive with its power to legislate; it would depend as well 
on the state's failure to open its courts up to patent claims against itself and 
321. See supra text accompanying note 284. 
322. The discussion in this paragraph assumes that the only relevant property right is the right to 
damages. Below, I consider the analytical modifications required by the recognition that there is also a 
property right in noninfringement. 
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its agencies. Notice that the price the state must pay to avoid Congress's power 
to subject it to federal jurisdiction would be its agreement to waive its 
immunity from the jurisdiction of its own courts. The resulting scheme would 
be precisely the one that would be produced by the Eleventh Amendment if 
interpreted as a forum-allocation principle. Defenders of this interpretation 
regard the Amendment as a sort of abstention doctrine,323 a doctrine that 
entrusts the enforcement of the states' federal liabilities to individuals to state 
courts that have indicated some willingness to enforce those liabilities 
faithfully, but reserves a congressional power to confer jurisdiction on the 
federal courts if the state courts seem unwilling. The proposed rationale for 
avoiding the reductio, based in part on McKesson, thus seems neatly to "prove" 
the correctness of the forum-allocation view. Indeed, the resulting scheme 
would closely resemble the scheme that would have been set up by the 
proposed substitute for the Eleventh Amendment that was rejected by the 
Framers immediately before the current version was passed: Congress would 
lack the power to create a federal forum for the vindication of federal rights 
only if the states make provision for enforcing those rights in the state 
courts.324 
But escaping the reductio is not so easy. Recall that the right to damages 
is not the only property right involved in patent cases. The patent holder also 
has a property right in the state's "noninfringement" of the patent.325 Does 
a state satisfy its due process obligations with respect to this property right 
merely by enacting a law permitting patent holders to obtain damages in state 
court against the state? Answering this question requires a closer look at the 
Court's procedural due process jurisprudence, a quagmire into which I venture 
with some trepidation. 
As noted, the Court treated McKesson as merely an application of the 
Mathews v. Eldridge approach to procedural due process. The Court in 
Mathews held that the Due Process Clause does not always require a 
predeprivation hearing; sometimes a postdeprivation hearing will suffice.326 
323. See Jackson, supra note I, at 7; see also id. at 99 n.394 (stating that under analysis proposed by 
author, "whether monetary relief is available in federal district court against states may come to depend, 
in part, on the adequacy of the remedies available in the state courts"). Because Jackson espouses not only 
the forum-allocation view, but also the diversity view (under which Eleventh Amendment immunity could 
freely be withdrawn by Congress under any of its powers), a decision by Congress that the state courts are 
inadequate would be binding on the courts. Under the version of the forum-allocation view described here, 
on the other hand, Congress would have the power to remove cases from the state to the federal courts only 
if the states fail to set up procedures that comply with the requirements of the Due Process Clause, as 
interpreted by the courts. 
324. See supra text accompanying notes 199-200. It is not clear that under this proposal the Supreme 
Court would have retained jurisdiction to review state court decisions denying the federal right. Perhaps 
that rejected version of the Eleventh Amendment would have been interpreted to permit the Supreme Court 
to determine in each case whether, in retrospect, adequate provision had been made for the enforcement 
in state court of the federal right at issue in the case. 
325. See supra note 287 and accompanying text. 
326. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976). 
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McKesson tells us that when a postdeprivation hearing suffices, the Due 
Process Clause requires the state to make available a damage remedy against 
itself sufficient to compensate the property holder for losses suffered as a 
consequence of the legal violation. Now we must consider the cases that tell 
us when a postdeprivation hearing suffices. The most pertinent line of cases 
is the one that begins with Parratt v. Taylor321 and culminates in Zinermon 
v. Burch.328 These cases are, like McKesson, simply applications of the 
general principles set forth in Mathews.329 They establish that where a person 
has been deprived of liberty or property330 by the state, but a postdeprivation 
remedy would satisfy due process, the property holder may not maintain a 
damage action against the responsible state officials under section 1983 if state 
law makes available an adequate postdeprivation remedy. 331 More important 
for present purposes, however, is what these cases tell us about when a 
postdeprivation remedy suffices for due process purposes. Parratt and its 
progeny establish that postdeprivation remedies suffice when state officials 
deprive persons of property in a "random and unauthorized" way.332 
Parratt's specific holding that a negligent destruction of property is random 
and unauthorized for this purpose is no longer relevant, as the Court 
subsequently held that negligent conduct does not amount to a "deprivation" 
for due process purposes. 333 But the more general principle that "random and 
unauthorized" injury to property does not violate the Due Process Clause if the 
state makes available a postdeprivation remedy survives. The combination of 
Parratt and McKesson appears to mean that if a state infringes a patent in a 
random and unauthorized way, it satisfies its obligations under the Due Process 
Clause as long as it makes available a postdeprivation damage action against 
itself in its own courts. But the state violates the Due Process Clause without 
regard to the existence of a postdeprivation remedy if the infringement was not 
327. 451 u.s. 527 (1981). 
328. 494 u.s. 113 (1990). 
329. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540-41 & n.5; Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127. 
330. This analysis would apply only to property rights defined by state law. If a person has suffered 
the deprivation of a property right defined by federal law, then he or she would be able to sue the relevant 
state official immediately in federal court under section 1983 as defined in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 
1 (1980). (Subsequent cases, including Seminole Tribe itself, may require qualification of this statement at 
the margins.) 
331. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128. This rule is curious in that the availability of a federal forum 
turns on the absence of positive state law recognizing an obligation that the Due Process Clause directly 
imposes on the states. If the Due Process Clause requires a postdeprivation remedy, then state courts are 
required to make one available, even if the state's written law (be it statutory or judge-made) does not so 
recognize. The Court accordingly might have said that someone who suffers a deprivation of property in 
circumstances where a postderivation remedy suffices must pursue the postdeprivation remedy in state 
courts, which under Testa v. Kan, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), are required to provide the remedy. Instead, the 
Court held that because of the absence of state positive law recognizing the due process obligation to 
provide a postdeprivation remedy, the property holder gets immediate access to a federal forum in which 
to seek the postdeprivation remedy. Access to the federal court thus depends on the states' failure to enact 
what would otherwise be a redundant law. 
332. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 138-39. 
333. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). 
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"random and unauthorized." 
The meaning of this term was elaborated in Zinermon. The resulting 
standard is far from transparent, but it seems fair to say that a deprivation of 
property would not be random and unauthorized under Zinermon if the 
possibility that a deprivation would occur was predictable, and if the likelihood 
of the deprivation occurring could feasibly have been reduced if the state had 
set up more or better procedures to be followed by the relevant state 
officials. 334 In such circumstances, the state is obligated by the Due Process 
Clause to set up those procedures,335 and if it does not, then any deprivation 
that occurs is a violation of due process without regard to the existence of 
postdeprivation remedies. This standard is certainly rather fuzzy around the 
edges, but, as applied to our patent hypothetical, it seems to lead to the 
conclusion that the state is required under the Due Process Clause not only to 
make it clear that its officials may not infringe patents, but also to set up some 
sort of preclearance procedure to be used by any state official who is likely to 
be using patented technology. Such procedures might have to include notice 
to potentially interested patent holders and an opportunity to adjudicate such 
issues as patent validity. If such procedures were "feasible" under Zinermon 
and the state did not establish them, then any infringement that occurs violates 
the Due Process Clause. If the state does set up such procedures and an 
infringement occurs because a state official did not comply with them, then the 
deprivation was "random and unauthorized."336 In such circumstances, the 
state satisfies its due process obligations by making available a postdeprivation 
hearing, which, under McKesson, must include a right to damages against the 
state. If the state sets up the required predeprivation procedures and an 
infringement occurs even though the procedures were followed, apparently the 
334. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 137-38; see also id. at 139 (commenting that Parratt is a "special 
instance of the Mathews due process analysis where postdeprivation process is all that is due because no 
predeprivation safeguards would be of use in preventing the kind of deprivation alleged"); Cleveland Bd. 
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (I 985) ('"[T]he root requirement' of the Due Process Clause" 
is '"that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant 
property interest."') (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). 
335. There is some ambiguity in the Zinermon opinion about whether the Court was holding that the 
state of Florida was obliged under the Due Process Clause to provide greater predeprivation procedural 
safeguards. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 117 (noting that plaintiff "disavowed any challenge to the [Florida] 
statutes themselves"). However, the Court's repeated statements that Parratt represents "a special case of 
the general Mathews v. Eldridge analysis," 494 U.S. at 128; see also id. at 129 (stating that Parratt "is not 
an exception to the Mathews balancing test, but rather an application of [it]"), indicate that the Court held 
that the state of Florida (either its legislature or the executive official to whom the legislature had delegated 
the authority to confine mentally ill people) was required by the Due Process Clause to provide greater 
predeprivation procedural safeguards. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, 
Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 347 n.219 (1993). 
336. This is the clear implication of the Court's conclusion in Zinermon that the state official's conduct 
was authorized and not random because the state had delegated to him "broad ... , uncircumscribed power 
to effect the deprivation at issue." Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 136. Thus, if the state had circumscribed the 
power by establishing procedural safeguards but the officer had violated those procedures, the deprivation 
would have been random and unauthorized for Parratt purposes and postdeprivation remedies would have 
sufficed to satisfy the Due Process Clause. 
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deprivation does not violate due process and the state is not required to provide 
a postdeprivation hearing or damage remedy.337 (Apparently, the 
predeprivation hearing was all the patent holder was entitled to. Of course, if 
the forum-allocation interpretation were correct, an appeal to the Supreme 
Court would be possible from an adverse predeprivation decision of an 
adjudicatory nature, even if the state provided no "judicial" review.)338 
If the Due Process Clause does indeed require such preclearance 
procedures, then this line of cases merely adds to what the state must do to 
avoid susceptibility to federal jurisdiction. If a state sets up the required 
preclearance procedures and provides further that a damage remedy is available 
against the state in state court if the procedures are not followed and a 
deprivation results, then it will have done all that it was required to do under 
the Due Process Clause. Congress would therefore be hard pressed to justify 
the abrogation of such a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. If abrogation 
is not possible under those circumstances, then we will have avoided the 
abrogation reductio, for it would be fully within the state's power to avoid 
being made suable by private individuals in federal court (and, as we are 
assuming the correctness of the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment, the states are not immune from federal liability). Under the 
resulting scheme, a state may be subjected to suit in federal court if it has not 
established the provisions for pre- and postdeprivation procedures required by 
the Due Process Clause, but, if it has established those procedures, the property 
holder's substantive federal entitlement would have to be litigated in the state 
courts (or administrative agencies), either before or after the deprivation. Once 
again, we will have escaped the reductio in a way consistent with the forum-
allocation interpretation. The role of the Eleventh Amendment under such a 
scheme would be to channel the adjudication of federal claims against states 
into the state courts, subject to possible review in the Supreme Court.339 
2. The Scope of Congress~ Section 5 Enforcement Power 
There is, however, an obstacle to this escape from the abrogation reductio 
that we have not yet considered. The line of reasoning just described would 
337. This assumes that Congress has not made states liable in damages-in other words, that the only 
·"property" interest involved is the right to noninfringement. If Congress did subject states to damage 
liability (something it would have the power to do only if the forum-allocation interpretation were correct), 
then, as discussed above, the patent holder would have an additional property interest in being paid the 
damages and the states would have to provide a forum for the recovery of those damages. 
338. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. I, 7 (1986) (allowing review of 
commission determination where California Supreme Court had denied discretionary review); HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 643 & n.12. If the Due Process Clause does not require the predeprivation 
hearing to be "adjudicatory" in nature (with notice to the property holder), then presumably it would require 
the state to make available a postdeprivation hearing of an adjudicatory nature. 
339. See supra note 338 and accompanying text. 
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succeed at avoiding the reductio only if Congress's Section 5 power to 
"enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment were limited to providing additional 
remedies for the states' completed violations of the first four sections of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as the Supreme Court has interpreted them. But there 
is significant support for the proposition that Congress's power under Section 
5 is broader than that. This issue is currently before the Supreme Court. 340 
Whether McKesson and Parratt in fact offer an escape from the reductio 
consistent with the forum-allocation interpretation may in the end depend on 
the Court's rejection of some of the broader interpretations of Section 5, or, 
alternatively, on the Court's willingness to carve out some sort of "procedural 
due process" exception to Section 5. I conclude that this is not a significant 
obstacle because one or the other is likely. 
Existing precedents appear to recognize that Congress's power under 
Section 5 extends beyond providing additional remedies for completed 
violations of the other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, and 
most controversially, there is some support for the proposition that Section 5 
gives Congress some power to interpret the other provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to impose broader requirements on the states than the Court has 
found them to impose. 341 If so, then perhaps Congress has the power to 
determine that a deprivation of a property right by the state violates due 
process without regard to the existence of postdeprivation remedies, and 
whether or not the state had in place predeprivation procedural safeguards. The 
broad understanding of Section 5 as giving Congress the power to construe the 
other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide broader protections 
than the Court has read those provisions to afford was limited somewhat in 
Oregon v. Mitchell.342 The deciding vote in that case was Justice Black's, 
and he expressed the view that Congress's independent power under Section 
5 to determine what the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment 
require should be confined to the area of race discrimination. However, he 
would have limited Congress's power to that extent only where Congress was 
legislating in an area exclusively reserved to the states by the Constitution.343 
In other areas, Congress's "enforcement power need not be tied so closely to 
the goal of eliminating discrimination on account of race."344 The scope of 
Black's exception is difficult to pinpoint, since it would seem that whenever 
Congress exercises a power granted it by Article I, it has not acted in an area 
"exclusively reserved to the states." One possibility would be to distinguish 
340. The Supreme Court will address the issue in reviewing Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 
(5th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996). 
341. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966). See generally STONE, supra note 301, 
at 253-ti6. 
342. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
343. See id. at 130. 
344. /d. 
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legislative powers that the Constitution allocates to Congress with some 
precision and specificity, as to which the Constitution clearly and specifically 
negates state exclusivity, from the broader and less specific congressional 
powers. If such a line were drawn, then a Section 5 power to interpret the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause with respect to property rights created 
under specific clauses of Article I, such as that relating to patents, would 
arguably survive Oregon v. Mitchell. This would partially avoid the reductio, 
for there would still be an Article I legislative power under which Congress 
would lack the power to abrogate, but it is difficult to come up with a federal 
legislative power that would be "broad and unspecific" for these purposes other 
than the power to regulate interstate commerce. Adopting this line would thus 
reduce Seminole Tribe to a holding that Congress may not abrogate under the 
Commerce Clause. More importantly, this line seems inconsistent with the 
specific holding in Seminole Tribe itself, for Congress there had exercised its 
power over Indian commerce, a subject that has never been exclusively 
regulated by the states. 345 
Avoiding the reductio may require an adjustment (or clarification) of 
Section 5 doctrine in other respects as well. First, there is authority for the 
proposition that where the existence of a violation of the self-executing 
portions of the Fourteenth Amendment turns on matters of fact, the courts will 
defer to Congress's reasonable assessment of those facts. 346 If so, then 
perhaps the Court would defer to a congressional finding that certain property 
rights against the states would not be adequately protected by the state courts 
even with Supreme Court review.347 Second, even the Justices most eager to 
345. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985). 
346. See generally Katzenbach, 384 U.S. 641; Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 
106-07 (1966). Even the petitioners in the City of Boerne case, currently before the Supreme Court, read 
the Court's past Section 5 cases to uphold Congress's "exercise of superior factfinding skills in the context 
of applying the Court's designated standard for constitutional violations," and they do not ask the Court 
to reject those holdings. Brief for Petitioner at 35, City of Boerne (No. 95-2074). 
347. Of course, if the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment were correct, then 
the Amendment might be said to reflect a constitutional judgment that state courts are as good as federal 
courts in protecting these rights, and a contrary congressional judgment might accordingly be out of bounds. 
On the other hand, if Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, then presumably 
it has the power to conclude otherwise. Perhaps the Court would say that Congress is free to determine that 
state courts are not adequate in protecting rights conferred by the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but not rights conferred under Article I. This would come close to a stipulation that the 
abrogation power simply does not extend to "procedural due process" rights. As discussed below, such a 
stipulation may, in the end, be the only way to avoid the reductio. See infra note 355 and accompanying 
text. 
There is another, related objection to the congressional "factfinding" described in the text. If a state 
has done everything the Due Process Clause requires it to do, then it seems that Congress is not responding 
to the states' failure to enforce adequately the Due Process Clause, but rather the states' failure to enforce 
adequately the laws Congress enacted under Article I. In other words, if a state has set up the procedures 
the Due Process Clause requires and Congress is still not satisfied, then Congress is saying, essentially, that 
protecting the "property" right it created requires better procedures than what the Due Process Clause 
requires. In these circumstances, Congress's objections have nothing to do with the Fourteenth Amendment 
and everything to do with the laws Congress enacted under Article I. If so, then it seems difficult to justify 
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read Section 5 narrowly appear willing to accept that Congress has the power 
to create remedies where a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (as the 
Court would interpret it) "lurks."348 In other words, "Congress has the power 
to forestall the occurrence of acts that would violate rights that the courts have 
found or would find protected by the [Fourteenth Amendment]."349 While 
Parratt may establish that there is no completed violation of the Due Process 
Clause if the state sets up adequate predeprivation procedures and makes 
available adequate postdeprivation remedies, perhaps the state's infringement 
of a patent would be regarded as evidence of a "budding," "sprouting," 
"incipient," or "nascent" violation of the Due Process Clause350 that would 
justify a congressional decision under Section 5 to subject the state to suit in 
federal court for damages on the theory that state court procedures are unlikely 
to be effective enough at remedying such infringements.351 
In the end, though, Section 5 doctrine does not pose a very significant 
obstacle to the proffered Parratt- and McKesson-based rationales for escaping 
the abrogation reductio. The arguments for upholding an abrogation on 
"factfinding" or "prophylaxis" grounds seem question-begging or weak.352 
The case for a congressional power to abrogate based on a substantive 
congressional power to interpret the requirements of the Due Process Clause 
more broadly than the Court does seems stronger,353 but this broader 
the abrogation as necessary to "enforce" the Due Process Oause. 
348. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 260 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
349. STONE, supra note 301, at 259. The petitioners in City of Boerne also appear to accept this 
"prophylactic" use of Congress's Section 5 power. See Brief for Petitioner at 33, City of Boerne (No. 95-
2074). 
350. The Fifth Circuit used these adjectives to describe the types of uncompleted violations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that would justify congressional exercises of Section 5 power. See Flores v. City 
of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1359, 1360, 1361 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996). 
351. This argument raises some of the same problems as the "factfinding" argument discussed above. 
See supra note 347. It also is in tension with my conclusion above (albeit a tentative one) that a patent 
infringement by the state would not in fact violate the Due Process Clause if the state provided 
predeprivation procedures and postdeprivation remedies in the event those procedures were violated. See 
supra text accompanying note 337. 
352. See supra notes 347, 351. Henry Monaghan has argued that, under the reasoning of the Parratt 
line of cases, Congress would lack the power to provide a federal forum for state deprivations of liberty 
or property that do not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation. See Henry Paul Monaghan, 
State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Founeenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 979, 997-98 
(1986). He offers this conclusion as a reason for abandoning Parratt, a decision that he regards as "most 
puzzling" and inconsistent with "long-embedded understandings of when a denial of due process occurs 
for fourteenth amendment purposes." /d. at 979. Of course, if the Parratt line of cases is incoherent, then 
relying on it to avoid the abrogation reductio is problematic, for extending the Parratt analysis to new 
fields only aggravates the conflict with the "long-embedded understandings" to which Monaghan refers. 
I do not offer this as a reason for rejecting this possible escape from the reductio, however, because (1) 
the Court has not taken up Monaghan's call for Parrott's abandonment; and (2) Parratt and McKesson are 
closely related offshoots of Mathews, and accordingly rejecting Parratt would come close to rejecting 
McKesson, something this Section of the Article strives to avoid. Since this effort is not entirely successful 
for other reasons, I will offer a reinterpretation of McKesson below. 
353. This argument still leaves one wondering why Congress should have the power to open up the 
federal courts to suits against the states even if states are willing to take the additional procedural steps that 
Congress thinks the Due Process Clause requires. Arguably, Congress's power to abrogate under the Due 
Process Clause should always be contingent on the states' unwillingness to provide procedures the Due 
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interpretation of Section 5 may not long survive. Even if it does, the Court 
could in the end avoid the abrogation reductio by stipulation: It could simply 
hold that whatever the scope of Congress's power to abrogate under Section 
5 to "enforce" the "substantive" provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, that 
power does not extend to "procedural" provisions such as the procedural Due 
Process Clause. Such an "exception" would not be entirely without theoretical 
grounding354 or support in the case law.355 It may, in the end, be the only 
way to avoid the abrogation reductio. 
3. The Untenability of the Conventional Reading of McKesson 
Although this analysis of McKesson and related due process cases may 
help avoid the reductio while preserving the forum-allocation interpretation of 
the Eleventh Amendment, our analysis has at the same time exposed the 
implausibility of the conventional understanding of McKesson's due process 
holding. When we began this discussion we were concerned that the Due 
Process Clause gave Congress too much power: that it gave Congress the 
power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under Article I, whereas the 
Seminole Tribe decision denied Congress that power. Now it has become clear 
that McKesson as conventionally understood is implausible because it would 
unduly limit Congress's powers. 
As explained above, the procedural due process cases, including 
McKesson, actually deny Congress the flexibility to choose how to give 
efficacy to the obligations it places on the states.356 Even though Congress 
chose to rely on postdeprivation damage actions as the principal means of 
giving efficacy to the patent laws, Zinermon would apparently require the 
states to set up some sort of preclearance procedure. Because such procedures 
would be required by the Constitution, presumably a state that has not set them 
up could be ordered to do so by a federal court.357 Perhaps this result accords 
with the Eleventh Amendment's preference for prospective relief over 
Process Clause requires, whether those requirements are determined by the Court or by Congress. If so, 
then any valid exercise of the abrogation power premised on the Due Process Clause must always be 
phrased in conditional form-for example, "Federal courts shall have jurisdiction over suits to enforce 
[property right X) against states that do not enact [procedure Y) to protect such right." 
354. See supra note 337. 
355. The Court has, for example, been willing to distinguish procedural due process claims from other 
constitutional claims for purposes of section 1983. On this distinction, see Monaghan, supra note 352. 
356. See supra Subsection IV.C.l. 
357. Assuming, of course, someone with standing seeks such relief. If the states had the choice 
between setting up such procedures and submitting to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, then this 
interpretation of Zinermon might actually help advance Congress's goal of having patent claims litigated 
in the federal courts, for states may well prefer to submit to federal court suits against themselves than to 
incur the cost of setting up the procedures Zinermon would appear to require. But, if the Due Process 
Clause requires the predeprivation procedures, the states presumably do not have the option of declining 
to set them up. 
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retrospective relief. (Although the states remain liable in damages if 
infringements occur, presumably fewer infringements will occur if the state 
offers a hearing before the deprivation.) But it does seem odd, to say the least, 
to interpret the Due Process Clause in such a way as to require the conclusion 
that a federal statute that can be constitutionally applied to the states only 
because it also applies to private individuals358 places substantial burdens on 
states that Congress has not opted to place on anyone. That no one has ever 
suggested that states are required to set up preclearance procedures to avoid 
patent violations casts doubt on the conclusion that the Due Process Clause 
requires this strange result. 
More important for our purposes, McKesson appears to require a damage 
remedy from the state for every violation of mandatory obligations imposed 
on the state by federal statute for the benefit of individuals, even if Congress 
has chosen not to provide a damage remedy.359 McKesson thus denies 
Congress the power to place mandatory obligations on states for the benefit of 
individuals but to rely for their enforcement exclusively on mechanisms other 
than private damage actions.360 There is an argument to be made that 
individuals who have been given "rights" against the states by federal statutes 
that impose obligations on states for their benefit should always be entitled to 
a damage remedy if the state violates that obligation and causes them 
injury.361 But the claim that our Constitution establishes such a regime is 
inconsistent with too many Supreme Court decisions to be plausible. For this 
reason, an interpretation of McKesson that would require that conclusion is 
implausible too. 
As Justice Brennan, McKesson's author, wrote in Davis v. Passman,362 
"statutory rights and obligations are established by Congress, and it is entirely 
appropriate for Congress, in creating these right and obligations, to determine 
in addition who may enforce them and in what manner."363 Other cases make 
358. See supra text accompanying note 99. 
359. If Congress has not expressly created a damage remedy, the Zinermon/McKesson analysis leads 
to the conclusion that the Due Process Clause requires a damage remedy if: (1) the state has not set up the 
required predeprivation procedures and a wrongful deprivation occurs; and (2) if the state has set up such 
procedures and a wrongful deprivation occurs because the procedures were not followed. 
360. It would remain open to Congress to phrase the statute in such a way as to make the state's 
conduct nonmandatory. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. I, 18-25 (1981). 
But presumably, if the state's obligation were not mandatory, no one would have the power to obtain 
prospective relief. McKesson, as construed above, would appear to require a private damage remedy under 
the Due Process Qause whenever the state has violated a federally imposed obligation if the obligation is 
mandatory in the sense that prospective enforcement would be appropriate, and the obligation is towards 
individuals such that the individual could be said to have a correlative "property" right. On this latter 
requirement, see supra note 288. 
361. See supra note 21. 
362. 442 u.s. 228 (1979). 
363. !d. at 241. It might be objected that Justice Brennan's statement is inapposite because he was 
speaking about statutory rights imposing obligations on private individuals, not states. (Violation of 
statutory obligations by private individuals does not, of course, produce violations of the Due Process 
Clause.) However, Brennan does not confine his statement to statutes that impose obligations on private 
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it clear that one of the choices Congress might make when imposing an 
obligation on a state would be to permit individuals to maintain an action for 
prospective relief only. That Congress made such a choice appears to have 
been the Court's assumption, for example, in the Edelman case,364 where 
there was no question that the claimants had "property" interests against the 
state.365 The Will case not only denied a damage remedy against the state 
under section 1983, but established a strong presumption that no such remedy 
exists unless Congress clearly says otherwise.366 Likewise, the Sea Clammers 
line of section 1983 cases clearly recognized that Congress may impose 
obligations on states yet preclude damage claims against the state or its 
officials.367 The reasoning of the Sea Clammers line of cases was endorsed 
and indeed extended to a new context in Seminole Tribe itself. 368 If so, then 
individuals, and the Davis case itself involved a claim against a government official. 
364. This is the interpretation that is most congenial to the forum-allocation view. Cf supra note 273. 
365. The benefits were not distinguishable in this respect from those involved in Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254 (1970), or Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See supra note 311. 
366. See supra Subsection ID.C.4. Section 1983 entitles individuals to a remedy only if federal law 
gives them a "right[], privilege[], or immunit[y)." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The Court in Pennhurst had 
already interpreted this requirement as not authorizing relief if the relevant federal law did not impose 
mandatory obligations on the states. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hasp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 27-28 
(1981). And in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989), the Court wrote 
that the availability of a remedy under section 1983 to enforce a federal statute "turns on whether the 
statute, by its terms or as interpreted, creates obligations 'sufficiently specific and definite' to be within 'the 
competence of the judiciary to enforce,' is intended to benefit the putative plaintiff, and is not foreclosed 
'by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself."' !d. at 108 (quoting Wright v. 
Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987)). The first two requirements suggest 
that anyone who would have standing to enforce a statute under section 1983 would have a property right 
in the state's compliance with the statutory obligation. See supra note 287 and accompanying text 
(discussing definition of "property" for purposes of Due Process Clause). Thus, Will's denial of a damage 
remedy against states was relevant only where persons would otherwise apparently have possessed a 
property right vis-a-vis the states under federal law. See Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 
U.S. 581 (1989). The third Golden State requirement, see 493 U.S. at 108, is, of course, a recognition that 
Congress may "foreclose" private damage actions for persons who would otherwise possess a "property" 
right, something that is inconsistent with McKesson's holding that the Due Process Clause requires such 
damages, see McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 22 (1990). 
367. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I (1981). See 
generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 1134-36 (discussing Sea Clammers and subsequent 
decisions). This case and its successors hold that where Congress has imposed an obligation on states by 
statute but has established an exclusive enforcement scheme, the section 1983 remedy is unavailable. This 
is so even if the exclusive enforcement scheme does not make a damage remedy available. See id. at 1134. 
The Court in these cases held that a damage remedy was unavailable under section 1983; it did not consider 
whether the Due Process Clause independently required a damage remedy, but its whole analysis is 
inconsistent with such a conclusion. The Sea Clammers line of cases denies the existence of a damage 
remedy against state officers. See id. The Will case establishes that a damage remedy against the state itself 
is unavailable in these cases. See supra note 366. 
368. The Seminole Tribe Court relied on the reasoning of Sea Clammers in denying the Tribe's right 
to maintain an Ex parte Young action against the Governor of Florida. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 
S. Ct. 1114, 1132-33 (1996). Although the Court inexplicably did not cite Sea Clammers, it reasoned in 
a strikingly similar manner. The Court found the Ex parte Young remedy unavailable because Congress had 
established a liability scheme that, in the Court's view, was incompatible with the existence of such a 
remedy. I agree with the criticisms raised by scholars about the Court's application of this principle in the 
Seminole Tribe case itself. See generally Jackson, supra note 15. However, I do not find the principle that 
an Ex parte Young remedy should not be available to enforce a statutory right where Congress has 
established an alternative enforcement scheme that is incompatible with such remedy any more 
objectionable than the decision in Sea Clammers. 
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McKesson is in conflict with Seminole Tribe in yet another way. Given the 
many decisions affirming Congress's power to impose mandatory obligations 
on states without subjecting them or their officials to damage liability,369 an 
interpretation of McKesson that would disable Congress from doing so must 
be wrong. 
V. REINTERPRETING MCKESSON 
In this Part, I shall suggest two possible ways to reinterpret McKesson 
without abandoning its key holding that a retrospective remedy was required 
in that case. The first reinterpretation responds directly to the problem just 
discussed: that McKesson's due process holding, as conventionally understood, 
would deny Congress the power to place mandatory obligations on states 
without subjecting them to damage liability. This first reinterpretation retains 
the holding that Florida was required to provide a retrospective remedy against 
itself in its own courts, but regards the source of that obligation not to be the 
Due Process Clause, but the substantive provision of federal law that Florida 
violated, the dormant Commerce Clause. This first reinterpretation has the 
virtue of squaring McKesson with the cases recognizing that Congress may 
impose obligations on states without subjecting them to damage liability. But 
there are problems with this interpretation, the principal one being that the 
decision offers no basis for distinguishing the dormant Commerce Clause from 
any other constitutional or statutory provision. Indeed, the Court's reliance on 
the Due Process Clause indicates that it regarded the remedial principle it 
articulated as a generally applicable one. 
My second proposed reinterpretation helps address this problem. This 
reinterpretation reads McKesson to establish a generally applicable right to 
damages for the violation by the states of federal laws, but it reads the case to 
establish a right to damages from responsible state officials rather than the 
governments for which they work. Even if not combined with the first 
reinterpretation-that is, even if the right to damages were regarded as having 
Like the Sea Clammers decision itself, this aspect of Seminole Tribe appears to be in conflict with 
the McKesson!Parratt/Zinennon cases as well as another line of procedural due process cases, the 
Amett/Loudermillline discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 375-81. If McKesson stands for 
the proposition that a state must provide a postdeprivation hearing and a damage remedy if the deprivation 
turns out to have been invalid, it must also require the availability of injunctive relief if the deprivation is 
a continuing one. If so, it is in tension with the Court's holding in Seminole Tribe that no such relief was 
available even in a suit against the Governor. But cf. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1025 (11th 
Cir. 1994) (holding that IGRA gave Tribes no property interest). This may be yet another fundamental 
conflict between McKesson (as conventionally understood) and Seminole Tribe. 
369. In addition to the other decisions cited in this Subsection, see Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 
277, 282 (1980) (assuming that individuals have property interest in state wrongful death actions and that 
state law of sovereign immunity "deprives" people of such property insofar as it immunizes state officials 
from wrongful death liability, but finding nevertheless that immunity is constitutional because "the State's 
interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible federal interest"). 
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its source in the Due Process Clause-the second reinterpretation would have 
the virtue of reconciling McKesson with doctrine in related areas. But this 
interpretation would not avoid the problems with McKesson just identified. To 
do the latter, we must combine the two reinterpretations of McKesson. 
But, if the source of the obligation to award damages is not the Due 
Process Clause, how can it nevertheless be a generally applicable one? The 
answer is suggested by the close affinity that becomes apparent, when we 
construe McKesson as an officer liability case, between McKesson and such 
other officer liability cases as Ex parte Young, Bivens,370 and Poindexter. All 
of these cases, I maintain, are best understood as establishing that the 
Constitution itself requires effective remedies, both prospective and 
retrospective, whenever the Constitution is violated, but that the remedies the 
Constitution contemplates are remedies against officials rather than the 
governments for which they work. I locate this constitutional principle in the 
Supremacy Clause. Unlike the Due Process Clause, the Supremacy Clause is 
flexible enough to accommodate an exception for statutory claims where 
Congress in enacting the statute provided for alternative remedies or precluded 
private remedies altogether. 
A. Reinterpreting McKesson as to the Source of the Obligation to Afford 
Relief 
As just noted, an interpretation of McKesson that would read it to disable 
Congress from placing obligations on states without subjecting them to private 
damage liability cannot be right. The most straightforward way to avoid this 
problem without calling into question the Court's holding that the state was 
required to pay damages to the plaintiff would be to reject what the opinion 
suggests about the source of the state's obligation to pay damages. As 
discussed, the McKesson Court relied on the Due Process Clause, and the case 
is naturally understood to stand for the proposition that the source of the 
state's obligation to pay damages is the Due Process Clause.371 An 
alternative interpretation that would avoid this problem would regard the state's 
obligation to pay damages as having its source not in the Due Process Clause, 
but in whatever law imposed the obligation that was violated. The claim in 
McKesson was that the state tax was invalid because it discriminated against 
interstate commerce and thus violated the dormant feature of the Commerce 
Clause. The proposed alternative interpretation of McKesson would read the 
370. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing federal right of action 
for damages against federal officials who violate Fourth Amendment). 
371. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 852 (commenting that McKesson Court treated 
remedial obligation as arising not from constitutional provision that was violated (dormant Commerce 
Clause) but from Due Process Clause). 
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case as establishing that the damage remedy that Florida was under an 
obligation to provide was required by the Commerce Clause itself, not the Due 
Process Clause. On this reading, a state is obligated to provide a damage 
remedy for violation of a federal norm if the federal norm that imposes the 
obligation on the state (or some other federal norm) makes the state liable in 
damages.372 The Due Process Clause would not be the source of the right to 
damages. Arguably, the Due Process Clause would require the state to make 
available a forum in which to seek a damage remedy made available by some 
other law if some other law makes a damage remedy available,373 but the 
more appropriate source of this obligation would in my view be the Supremacy 
Clause, which by its terms requires state courts to give effect to federal 
law.374 
There are, however, problems with this alternative interpretation of 
McKesson. First, the proposed interpretation of the Due Process Clause as not 
requiring any greater remedies than what the substantive law makes available 
comes close to adopting the view of that Clause that was forcefully espoused 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Arnett v. Kennedj375 but has been decisively 
rejected by the Court. Rehnquist's well-known "bitter with the sweet" approach 
to statutorily created property interests insists that if the legislature establishes 
a mandatory state obligation but at the same time establishes a streamlined 
procedure for enforcing the obligation or correcting violations, then the 
procedural limitations necessarily qualify the "property" right at issue.376 In 
such circumstances, the process that is due is only the process the legislature 
provided for in the statute.377 Whatever the theoretical appeal of Rehnquist's 
reasoning, a majority of the Court rejected it in Amett,378 and again in 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill:379 
372. I do not mean, by phrasing the rule in this way, to suggest that there should be a presumption 
that damages are not available unless specifically authorized. Rather, I mean merely that the availability 
of damages should be a matter of interpreting the legal provision that imposes the obligation, or 
conceivably another legal provision, such as section 1983, intended to establish supplementary remedies. 
The presumptions that should apply in this interpretive enterprise are another question entirely. In another 
piece, I argue that the Supremacy Clause should be read to establish that prospective and retrospective relief 
are presumptively available for the violation of any federal legal norm. See Vazquez, supra note 80, at 74. 
373. The Due Process Clause would perhaps also give the state the option of replacing the damage 
remedy with an adequate predeprivation opportunity to test the legal obligation. See Ward v. Board of 
County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920) (recognizing that Due Process Clause would not have been violated 
if plaintiffs' decision to forgo predeprivation procedures had truly been voluntary). 
374. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 6 ("This Constitution ... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land"); 
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 ( 1947). 
375. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). 
376. See id. at 153-55. 
377. See id. at 177-78 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
378. See id. at 166 (Powell, J., concurring in part); id. at 177-78 (White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); id. at 211 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[A] majority of the Court rejects Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist's argument .... "). 
379. 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
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The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that 
certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and property-cannot be 
deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. The 
categories of substance and procedure are distinct. Were the rule 
otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology. . . . 
"While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest . . . , 
it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an 
interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural 
safeguards. "380 
In short, in determining the scope of a "property" right created by statute, one 
looks at the substantive obligations the statute imposes, but not to the 
procedures the statute sets up to enforce those obligations. Once the property 
right has been defined, the Due Process Clause kicks in and tells us what 
procedures the state must offer for its enforcement. The legislature presumably 
has the power to require more or better procedures than what the Due Process 
Clause would require, but it cannot offer less. This reasoning appears to 
require the conclusion that the procedures the state must afford to protect 
property rights created by federal statute, such as the right to be free from 
patent infringement, are not just those defined by Congress, but also those 
required by the Due Process Clause. 
Admittedly, the tension between my reinterpretation of McKesson and 
Arnett and Loudermill is significant. Yet if we do not reinterpret McKesson, 
we will be stuck with a substantial conflict between that decision and the cases 
that indicate that Congress may create a primary obligation but withhold a 
damage remedy. This shows that the real conflict is not between 
Arnett/Loudermill and our reinterpreted McKesson, but between 
Arnett/Loudermill on the one hand and the cases recognizing congressional 
discretion to create a substantive obligation but withhold a damage remedy on 
the other. While Arnett seems to require a separation between the legislature's 
power to impose primary obligations and its discretion to determine the 
methods of enforcing it, Sea Clammers and the other cases discussed above 
appear to say that the availability of remedies for the violation of statutorily 
created obligations is entirely up to the legislature to determine. This conflict 
will have to be resolved somehow, and I am confident that it will not be 
resolved by denying Congress the discretion to withhold a damage remedy. It 
may be possible to resolve this conflict within the analytical framework 
established in Loudermill. Perhaps damage remedies could be conceptualized 
as "substantive" for due process purposes.381 This is not the place to 
380. !d. at 541 (quoting Arnett, 416 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring in part)). 
381. This would be inconsistent with McKesson's holding that the Due Process Clause requires the 
damage remedy, see McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 22 
(1990), but this is precisely the aspect of McKesson that our first reinterpretation rejects. It is true that 
Parratt and Zinermon seem to hold that a damage remedy is required by the Due Process Clause in certain 
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elaborate possible resolutions of this problem beyond noting that Congress's 
power to establish obligations but withhold a damage remedy is far better 
established than the due process obligation of a state to pay damages to 
individuals, and so the former would likely prevail in a head-to-head conflict. 
A second problem with this proposed reinterpretation is that the Court's 
opinion in McKesson makes it quite clear that it is resting the obligation to 
award a damage remedy on the Due Process Clause. The Court's reliance on 
the Due Process Clause indicates that the Court was making a general point 
about the importance of and need for retrospective remedies. The Court says 
nothing in the opinion to distinguish the remedial imperatives of the dormant 
Commerce Clause from those of any other constitutional provision, or indeed 
any other provision of law. In short, the McKesson opinion resists being 
recharacterized as a decision about the remedies required by the dormant 
Commerce Clause. 
On the other hand, as we have seen, the due process interpretation 
produces a sharp conflict with cases that have not generally been regarded as 
constitutionally problematic. Doctrinal coherence demands that this conflict be 
resolved. Reinterpreting McKesson as a holding about the remedies required 
by the dormant Commerce Clause resolves the conflict without rejecting the 
narrow holding that Florida was required to pay damages in that case, and this 
sort of resolution is preferable to an outright overruling of McKesson. 381 
Nevertheless, a resolution that pays greater regard to the Court's evident intent 
to make a more general point about remedies would be preferable. On this 
score, the second reinterpretation I suggest below, when combined with the 
first, comes out ahead. 
B. Reinterpreting McKesson as to the Subject of the Duty to Pay Damages 
A second possible reinterpretation of the McKesson decision would view 
it as establishing that individuals injured by a state's violation of mandatory 
federal obligations have a right to damages not from the state itself, but from 
state officials. I will discuss in Section C how this second proposed 
reinterpretation helps address some of the problems of the first. The appeal of 
the second reinterpretation, however, does not depend on acceptance of the 
circumstances. Yet as discussed below, these cases do not in fact hold that the damages must come from 
the state itself. To the extent that these cases hold that the Due Process Clause requires a damage remedy 
against state officials for violations of duties imposed by statute even if the legislature that created the 
obligation specifically withheld a damage remedy, these decisions are in conflict with Sea Clammers and 
might have to be rethought. But I am not alone in calling for a reconsideration of these cases. See, e.g., 
Fallon, supra note 335; Monaghan, supra note 352; Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due 
Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REv. 201 (1984). 
382. Compare the majority's treatment of precedent in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), 
in which the Court purported not to disturb the actual results in such prior cases as Wickard v. Filbum, 317 
U.S. Ill (1942), even though it clearly (though not explicitly) rejected the tests applied in those cases. 
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first reinterpretation. We would derive some doctrinal benefits from adopting 
the second proposed reinterpretation of McKesson even if we rejected the first 
reinterpretation and assumed that the individual's right to damages is grounded 
in the Due Process Clause. These benefits include greater cohesion between 
McKesson and the Parratt line of cases, Will and other cases denying damage 
relief against the states in state court, and, most importantly, Seminole Tribe. 
Indeed, this second proposed reinterpretation adds internal consistency to the 
McKesson opinion itself by providing an explanation of the Court's "assent" 
language. By doing so, however, it withdraws McKesson from the ranks of the 
cases supporting the forum-allocation interpretation and places it among those 
supporting the immunity-from-liability interpretation. 
The defendant in McKesson was a state agency, which for Eleventh 
Amendment purposes is treated as the state itself. 383 It was against the state 
agency that, under state law, the plaintiff was to bring an action for a refund 
of the taxes it claimed had been unlawfully exacted. The state courts agreed 
that the taxes were unlawful, but they denied a refund for a variety of 
reasons.384 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the reasons cited by the 
state court could not override the due process requirement of a remedy. The 
Court held that the Due Process Clause required a remedy against the state 
itself,385 but to the extent that the Court suggested the refund must as a 
constitutional matter come from the state, the Court's language was dictum. 
The state itself had designated the state agency as the relevant defendant. With 
relatively little massaging, the opinion could be read to establish that the Due 
Process Clause requires a retrospective monetary remedy sufficient to cure the 
violation of law, but that the remedy as a constitutional matter need be 
available only from the responsible state official. It can come from a state 
agency if the state designates such an agency as the proper defendant, but in 
the absence of such a designation, the Due Process Clause requires only that 
a damage action be available against the official. 
This interpretation of McKesson helps harmonize this decision with 
Supreme Court precedents in a number of related areas. First, it helps reconcile 
McKesson with the Parratt line of cases. In all of those cases, after all, the 
defendant was a state official, not the state itself. The Court held in these cases 
that no violation of due process occurs when a state official deprives an 
individual of property in a random and unauthorized way so long as the state 
makes available a postdeprivation tort remedy against the official.386 It is true 
383. See supra note 100. 
384. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 22. 
385. See id. at 31; see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 866. 
386. Although the postdeprivation remedy in Parratt itself was a remedy against the state, see Parratt 
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), in subsequent cases the Court has found postdeprivation remedies against 
the official to satisfy due process, see, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 115 (1990) (holding that 
"postdeprivation tort remedy" suffices under Due Process Clause when conduct causing deprivation is 
random and unauthorized; such tort remedies are usually against officials rather than government itself); 
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that these cases were brought under section 1983, and the Court has held that 
section 1983 does not authorize damages suits against the states 
themselves.387 This explains why the defendants in these cases were 
individuals rather than the state. But, if the Court had believed that the Due 
Process Clause required a damage remedy against the state itself, it would 
presumably have found the individual liable for the deprivation of property so 
long as the state did not make available a damage remedy against itself in state 
court. Yet the Court has found the availability of damages against officials 
personally to be sufficient to negate a due process violation. 
This interpretation of McKesson also reconciles it with Will. The issue in 
that case was whether damages could be recovered in state court against the 
state itself under section 1983, where the state had injured the plaintiff in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.388 The 
Court decided that Congress had not clearly manifested an intent to render 
states liable under section 1983, and thus no damages were available even in 
state court. The substantive violation in that case was a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause, so Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity with respect to the claim-if it wishes to do so--even 
after Seminole Tribe. But, if state deprivations of property or liberty interests 
without due process render the states themselves liable in damages, then 
plaintiffs would be constitutionally entitled to maintain such a suit in state 
court even without relying on section 1983.389 
Most importantly, the second reinterpretation helps make sense of the 
McKesson Court's reference to the state's "assent," and thus lends the opinion 
internal consistency that it would lack under the prevailing interpretation. I 
earlier dismissed the McKesson Court's reference to the need for the state's 
"assent" primarily because it conflicted with the Court's due process 
holding.390 If the Due Process Clause's requirement of a remedy flows from 
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 520 n.l (1984); see also Fallon, supra note 335, at 349 (suggesting that 
Parratt requires federal courts "to develop constitutional standards defining the scope of various 
officials' ... liabilities") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See generally infra Section V.C. 
387. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 68-69 (1989). 
388. See id. at 66. 
389. As noted above, persons who have a "right, privilege, or immunity" for purposes of section 1983 
also likely have "property" rights for purposes of the Due Process Clause. See supra note 366. 
390. See supra text accompanying note 169. I also relied above on the Court's citation of General Oil 
Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908), a case in which the state used its own law of sovereign immunity to 
deny relief and the Court exercised appellate jurisdiction anyway, ruling that an injunction was required 
by the Constitution. The defendant in Crain, however, was a state official. Our reinterpretation of 
McKesson allows us to explain Crain as establishing both that the Constitution requires that an injunction 
be available for ongoing violations of the Constitution and that a suit seeking an injunction against a state 
official is not a suit against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. This is, of course, how I 
have read Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Crain is thus entirely in accord with this Article's thesis. 
Indeed, the Crain Court relied heavily on the same cases I rely on here, such as Poindexter. See 209 U.S. 
at 225-27 (citing Poindexter v. Greenhow, ll4 U.S. 270 (1885)); see also infra Section V.C (explaining 
Poindexter's bearing on the proposed reinterpretation of McKesson). 
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the requirement of a hearing at a meaningful time, then clearly the remedy 
cannot be dependent on the state's consent to provide the hearing. This must 
mean, I concluded, that states are not free to deny a hearing on the basis of 
their own law of sovereign immunity. But, if we reinterpret McKesson as 
establishing a due process right to a hearing and a remedy against the 
responsible state official, but not the state, McKesson's assent language begins 
to make sense. Although the Due Process Clause does not require a remedy 
payable by the state itself, the state is free to substitute itself as the proper 
defendant, as it had done in McKesson. If it does so, it is (by hypothesis) 
voluntarily consenting to suit against itself. The reinterpretation of McKesson's 
due process holding thus makes it possible to understand McKesson's Eleventh 
Amendment holding as stating that the state consents to suit by voluntarily 
substituting itself for the official as the defendant, and that if it does so, the 
Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction. If the state does not agree to do so, 
then the official would remain personally liable, and, if the state court does not 
enforce that liability, the Supreme Court can do so through its appellate 
jurisdiction. Where the state has not agreed to substitute itself as the defendant, 
the Supreme Court would have no appellate jurisdiction over a suit against the 
state itself, and the state would not be subject to liability under the Due 
Process Clause. Because this reinterpretation makes sense of the Court's 
"assent" language, it reads the opinion in its best light.391 Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, the new understanding of both aspects of McKesson 
helps reconcile the case with the language in Seminole Tribe to the effect that 
the Supreme Court possesses appellate jurisdiction over cases brought against 
the states in state courts only where the states consent to the lawsuit. 
As noted above, Vicki Jackson, in defending the forum-allocation interpretation, has asserted that 
"[t]he mere existence of the state court of general jurisdiction to which a claim against the state might be 
presented, even absent the state's consent to be sued, has justified the Supreme Court's assertion of 
constitutional obligations to provide remedies against the state." Jackson, supra note 1, at 38. But the cases 
she cites for this statement are consistent with the suggested reinterpretation of McKesson. All but two are 
suits against state officials or local governments, which are not regarded as the state for Eleventh 
Amendment purposes. Of the other two, McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102 (1898), appears to be a case 
in which the state did not invoke sovereign immunity in the state courts. Iowa-Des Moines National Bank 
v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931 ), is more difficult to square with a requirement of consent to suit in the 
state courts. The state there defended the case on the ground that the acts of the state's officials in 
unconstitutionally collecting a tax were in violation of state statutes and thus not acts attributable to the 
state. See id. at 243-44. The Supreme Court reversed, and, relying on such cases as Home Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), held that the unconstitutional acts were attributable 
to the state. See Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank, 284 U.S. at 246-47. While admittedly a close question, the 
case might be reconciled with the requirement of consent on the theory that the state was not denying 
consent to suit, but merely denying (erroneously) that there was any state action for purposes of the 
Constitution. 
391. This reading is also consistent with all of the cases on which the Court relied in McKesson. See 
McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 4% U.S. 18, 27 n.8 (1990). In none 
of the cases relied on by the Court which were brought against a state or state agency (as opposed to a state 
official or a local government) seeking a refund of back taxes was there any indication that the state had 
asserted sovereign immunity as a defense to the state court action. See id. 
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The suggestion that revenue officers are personally liable to taxpayers if 
the taxes were collected pursuant to laws that turned out to have been invalid 
might strike some readers as odd, but from our earliest days, the mechanism 
for challenging the legality of taxes was a suit against the tax collector for 
money had and received.392 Granted, our tax collection system today, both 
state and federal, differs in significant respects from the system that prevailed 
in those early days, and these differences make the officer-liability regime 
appear inapt. Then, taxes were collected by a revenue officer whose relation 
to the state was closer to that of an independent contractor than to that of an 
employee. The collector was entitled to retain the funds, if paid under protest, 
pending a judicial decision on their legality. 393 Today, there is no longer a 
particular government official to whom one pays a tax, and against whom one 
might proceed personally to recover amounts paid under duress; we are instead 
required, under pain of significant penalties, to pay our taxes at a specified 
time directly to the treasury. Under the current scheme, we would be hard 
pressed to identify the state official to hold personally responsible for an 
invalid tax law, and, beyond that, it seems unfair to hold any individual 
functionary personally liable for the unconstitutionality of the tax laws she 
enforces. 
These changes, however, can be fully accommodated by the interpretation 
of McKesson advocated here. McKesson, construed as an official liability case, 
insists that the Constitution requires that there be a state official against whom 
someone who is unlawfully deprived of liberty or property may recover 
damages when the victim had no predeprivation opportunity to test the 
deprivation's legality, but it goes on to recognize that the state may consent to 
substitute itself as the defendant. By recognizing a constitutional right to 
damage relief against an officer, McKesson insists that the state's power to 
immunize its officials is contingent on the state's agreement to take on the 
whole of the officials' constitutionally imposed liability. Aorida made such 
provision by establishing a procedure for challenging the legality of a tax in 
a suit against the state agency responsible for collecting the tax, an agency that 
would otherwise have been immune under the Eleventh Amendment. 
McKesson, construed to recognize a constitutional right of action against the 
officer, makes this waiver of sovereign immunity a necessary condition of the 
withdrawal of the right of action against the officer.394 
392. See, e.g., Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836); see also Louis Jaffe, Suits Against 
Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REv. 209, 227-28 (1963) (discussing common 
law suits against tax collectors). 
393. See generally Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845); Jaffe, supra note 392. 
394. Henry Hart anticipated this interpretation of McKesson in his Dialogue, where he wrote: 
Wherever the applicable substantive law allows [a personal action against an official who 
commits a wrong in the name of the Government], the Government may be forced to protect 
its officers by providing a remedy against itself. The validity of any protection it tries to give 
may depend on its providing such a remedy .... Consider, for example, the possibility that 
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Does this mean that a state would be free to set limits on its consent to be 
sued and tell taxpayers that if they do not approve, they are free to pursue their 
constitutional right of action against the state official?395 In theory, yes. 
However, a state court's construction of a general consent to suit for a refund 
as in fact permitting less relief than what the Constitution would require in a 
suit against the officer would rightly be held by the Supreme Court to be 
novel, unforeseen, and thus inadequate to bar relief against the state when the 
tax had been paid before the novel construction was announced. 3% More 
importantly, the Court would rightly regard the changes that have occurred in 
the state's tax collection procedures, such as the requirement that taxes be paid 
directly to the treasury rather than to any particular state official, as placing an 
undue burden on the constitutional right of action against the officer. It might 
accordingly require any state that wishes to return to that regime to do such 
things as specify clearly which officers are to be liable. This would, among 
other things, enable the responsible official to take steps to prepare for such 
liability, such as procuring an indemnity agreement from the state or insurance. 
As any sane officer faced with the prospect of personal liability in these 
circumstances would insist on some such arrangement, the state will wind up 
bearing the cost indirectly anyway. For this reason, the likelihood that the state 
will go through the trouble of reviving the long-dead official-liability regime 
in the tax area is extremely low. 
Doctrinally, it might be objected that the construction of McKesson 
defended here comes close to adopting the position of Justice Story, dissenting 
in Cary v. Curtis. 391 Cary involved a federal statute enacted to deal with a 
problem that had arisen under the traditional tax collection scheme. As noted 
above, the tax collectors traditionally retained any funds paid under protest 
pending adjudication of the legality of the tax. This practice delayed 
significantly the government's access to the collected funds, and so Congress 
passed a law requiring tax collectors immediately to tum over the funds to the 
summary collection of taxes might be invalid if the Government did not waive its immunity to 
a suit for refund. 
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in 
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1370 (1953). McKesson as interpreted here, would fortify Hart's 
premise, for it would establish that the Constitution itself requires the availability of a remedy against the 
officer in certain circumstances. (Although Hart did not expressly so state, this may in fact have been his 
position, for it is not clear what else could have led him to the conclusion that the government's refusal 
to consent to a refund action might be "invalid.") 
395. Cf McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 49 n.34 
(1990) (raising similar argument that state's waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply when taxpayer 
had passed on burden of tax; argument was rejected by Supreme Court as misdescription of state law). 
396. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The Court in Reich v. Collins, 
115 S. Ct. 547, 55! (1994), invoked this line of cases in rejecting the Georgia Supreme Court's holding, 
unsupported by prior decisional law, that the exclusive avenue for challenging a tax's legality was a 
predeprivation action. Presumably, however, the Georgia court's interpretation of Georgia law must be 
regarded as binding in future cases. 
397. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 236. 
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Treasury. The law went on to provide that if the Secretary of the Treasury 
determined that the tax was not in fact legally owing, he had a duty to refund 
the amount overpaid. The issue in Cary was whether this statute did away with 
the taxpayer's right to recover against the collector for money had and 
received. The majority held that it did,398 but Justice Story strenuously 
objected. Story had constitutional concerns about reading the statute to deny 
the taxpayer any judicial remedy, leaving him totally at the mercy of the 
Secretary of the Treasury, and to avoid this problem Story would have 
construed the statute not to withdraw the common law remedy. Far from 
undermining the proposed interpretation of McKesson, Justice Story's opinion 
supports it. Story recognized that the taxpayer did not have a right of action 
against the sovereign because such relief was barred by sovereign 
immunity.399 Thus, Justice Story's position resembles that of our revised 
understanding of McKesson both in his insistence on the availability of 
remedies and in his recognition that in the absence of the government's waiver 
of sovereign immunity, the remedies are available only against state officials. 
That Story was in dissent in the case does not undermine the proposed 
interpretation of McKesson because the majority recognized neither the 
common law action for money had and received nor a remedy against the 
government itself. If the majority's position conflicts with the reading of 
McKesson proposed here, it conflicts even more with the conventional reading 
of McKesson as requiring relief against the state.400 The most relevant aspect 
of Cary for our purposes, then, is that even the Justices who believed most 
strongly in the importance of remedies and the rule of law did not assert the 
availability of a damage remedy against the state itself. 
An official liability interpretation of McKesson is supported further by the 
decisions on which the Court in McKesson relied. After declaring that its due 
process decision was "rooted firmly in precedent dating back to at least early 
this century,"401 the first case the Court discussed was Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. O'Connor.402 In that case, the Court upheld the 
availability of relief against the Secretary of State personally. It noted, to be 
sure, that it would be "inconceivable" that the state would refuse to reimburse 
him for the amounts awarded, pointing to a state statute that appeared to 
398. After the Cary decision, Congress restored the right of action against the collector. See HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 376. 
399. See Cary, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 255 (Story, J., dissenting). 
400. The majority's holding can in the end be squared with both interpretations of McKesson, however, 
if the Court is understood to be relying on the availability of a predeprivation remedy. That is how Henry 
Hart understood the majority's holding in Cary. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 378 (quoting 
Henry Hart's Dialogue, supra note 394, at 1370). 
401. McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 32 (1990). 
402. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 32, 39, 51 (citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. 
O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912)). 
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contemplate such reimbursement,403 but the remedy the Court recognized was 
one against the officer.404 
It is similarly inconceivable, for reasons already discussed, that a state 
today would opt to revise its laws to relegate taxpayers to suits against revenue 
officers. Consequently, the distinction between officer liability and government 
liability in the tax context is one that may safely be overlooked, as the Court 
did in McKesson, without altering substantive results. But the distinction is still 
important analytically because it helps explain what the Court meant when it 
suggested that the state's consent to suit was relevant to the Supreme Court's 
appellate jurisdiction. Even more important, the recognition that a state is 
required by the Constitution to make available a retrospective remedy against 
its officials tells us exactly the price the states must pay for withholding their 
consent to suit, and thus to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Finally, 
as discussed below, the official liability interpretation of McKesson has 
significant implications outside the tax area. 
Unless combined with the first reinterpretation, however, this second 
reinterpretation of McKesson leaves us with the doctrinal problems that 
originally led us to search for a different interpretation. The two proposed 
reinterpretations address different doctrinal problems caused by McKesson, so 
adopting both of them produces twice as much doctrinal coherence as adopting 
one alone. But the value of the combined reinterpretations exceeds the sum of 
its parts. That is because the second reinterpretation helps solve what we 
regarded as the principal shortcoming of the first: its failure to take seriously 
the McKesson Court's apparent intent to establish a generally applicable 
remedial rule. 
C. McKesson as a Supremacy Clause Case 
The first reinterpretation of McKesson solved the most serious doctrinal 
problems posed by the decision, but it did so by interpreting the case as a 
decision about the remedies required by the dormant Commerce Clause. The 
problem with this reading of the case is that the opinion says nothing that 
distinguishes the dormant Commerce Clause from any other constitutional 
provision, or indeed any other provision of law. The Court's reliance on the 
Due Process Clause indicates that the Court meant its holding to have 
relevance beyond dormant Commerce Clause cases. But relying on the Due 
403. See 223 U.S. at 287. 
404. See also American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987) (suit against 
Pennsylvania's Secretary of Department of Revenue); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) 
(suit against Hawaii's Director of Taxation); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930) (suit against 
Oklahoma's State Auditor); Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Shannon, 223 U.S. 468 (1912) (suit against Texas's 
Secretary of State); Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907) (suit against Georgia's 
Comptroller General). 
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Process Clause produces the doctrinal problems described above. To solve both 
sets of problems, we might try to find a constitutional home other than the Due 
Process Clause for the supposed right to damages from the states, a 
constitutional provision that would allow us to apply McKesson's remedial 
holding more broadly than just to dormant Commerce Clause cases. But the 
argument that any provision of the Constitution establishes a general rule that 
states are constitutionally obligated to pay damages to individuals injured by 
their violations of law faces a significant embarrassment: Leaving aside 
McKesson and related due process cases, the only Supreme Court decisions to 
recognize that states are under a constitutional requirement to pay damages to 
individuals are the takings cases discussed in Section I.A, and they rely on 
textual support that does not apply to other constitutional provisions: the 
Takings Clause's express reference to "compensation." Can it be that the 
courts for QVer two centuries have overlooked a more general constitutional 
requirement that states pay damages? The Eleventh Amendment cases 
involving the Contracts Clause, including not just Hans but many others as 
well,405 would appear to rule out any such conclusion.406 
Our second proposed reinterpretation points the way to a solution. 
McKesson can be understood to establish that governmental violations of the 
Constitution give rise, as a constitutional matter, to a right of action against 
responsible state officials. Recharacterizing the decision as an affirmation of 
the constitutional availability of a damage remedy against state officials who 
violate the Constitution transforms McKesson from a constitutional oddity into 
one of a long line of cases throughout our history awarding such damages. 
McKesson, so interpreted, would be of a piece with such landmark cases as 
Poindexter, Ex parte Young, and Bivens.401 These cases are best understood 
as recognizing that the constitutional remedy for governmental violations of the 
Constitution is a remedy against the officials who violated the Constitution, not 
the governments for whom they work.408 
If this constitutional right to damages does not have its source in the Due 
Process Clause, what is its source? The now evident connection between 
McKesson, Poindexter, and Ex parte Young helps answer this question. These 
cases make it clear that the Supremacy Clause is both the doctrinal linchpin for 
405. See A etcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 7, at 1123 n.338. 
406. Even diversity theorists such as William Fletcher concede that the intent of the Framers of the 
Eleventh Amendment and the Supreme Court's decisions rule out the conclusion that damages against the 
states are available under the Contracts Clause. See id. at 1122-24. But cf. Wolcher, supra note 28 (arguing 
that courts should allow damage remedy against states for constitutional violations that are enforceable in 
state court with Supreme Court review). 
407. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing federal right of action 
for damages against federal officials who violate Fourth Amendment); see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 
4 71 ( 1994) (declining to recognize federal right of action for damages against federal agencies that violate 
Constitution). 
408. This interpretation of Poindexter, Ex parte Young, and Bivens is defended at greater length in 
Vazquez, supra note 80. 
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the availability of relief against state officials and the source of the policy 
driving the result. 
Doctrinally, the Supremacy Clause nullifies any state laws that might be 
read to authorize the challenged conduct and removes any defense of official 
authority or sovereign immunity, thus leaving the official subject to common 
law remedies.409 These early cases suggest that the Supremacy Clause merely 
withdraws a defense, leaving the common law as the affirmative source of the 
remedy against the official, but this understates the role the Supremacy Clause 
played in these cases.410 The cases make it clear that the Supremacy Clause 
requires the states to make available against state officials whatever remedies 
would have been available under the common law against private parties who 
caused a similar sort of injury. It is for this reason that state officials are liable 
even if state law provided them with some sort of immunity from liability.411 
In a very real sense, therefore, the source of the remedy against the state 
official in these cases is the Supremacy Clause.412 
As to the constitutional policy being advanced by such remedies, the 
Poindexter Court had this to say: 
Of what avail are written constitutions whose bills of right for the 
security of individual liberty have been written, too often, with the 
blood of martyrs shed upon the battle-field and the scaffold, if their 
limitations and restraints upon the power may be overpassed with 
impunity by the very agencies created and appointed to guard, defend, 
and enforce them . . . ? And how else can these principles of 
individual liberty and right be maintained, if, when violated, the 
judicial tribunals are forbidden to visit penalties upon individual 
offenders, who are the instruments of wrong, whenever they interpose 
the shield of the State? The doctrine is not to be tolerated. The whole 
frame and scheme of the political institutions of this country, State 
and Federal, protest against it. . . . [The Constitution] creates a 
government in fact, as well as in name, because its Constitution is the 
409. See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 290 (1885) ("'That which ... is unlawful because 
made so by the supreme law, the Constitution of the United States, is not the word or deed of the State, 
but is the mere wrong and trespass of those individual persons who falsely speak and act in its name."); 
id. at 288 (holding that because of constitutional violation, state official "stands ... stripped of his official 
character; and, confessing a personal violation of the plaintiff's rights for which he must personally answer, 
he is without defence"). Similar language was used in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). 
410. It is also misleading to say that the contours of the remedy were at this time not considered to 
be a matter of federal law, for during the reign of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842), the distinction 
between the common law and federal law was not as clear as it is now. 
411. See, e.g., Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 305 n.l7 (1952); General Oil 
Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908). See generally Vazquez, supra note 80, at 120-26. 
412. Gradually, "[b]y almost imperceptible steps," the Court abandoned this common-law model and 
"[came] to treat the remedy of injunction as conferred directly by federal law for abuse of state authority 
which in the view of federal law ought to be remediable." Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State 
and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 524 (1954). The Bivens decision reflects the completion of this 
transformation with respect to the damage remedy. I examine the transformation in greater depth in 
Vazquez, supra note 80, at 121-42, 178-84. 
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supreme law of the land ... and its authority is enforced by its power 
to regulate and govern the conduct of individuals, even where its 
prohibitions are laid only upon the States themselves. The mandate of 
the state affords no justification for the invasion of rights secured by 
the Constitution of the United States; otherwise that Constitution 
would not be the supreme law of the land.413 
The heart of the proposed reinterpretation of McKesson is well encapsulated 
in the Court's powerful affirmation of the need for retrospective remedies to 
give efficacy to constitutional norms: The need is great, to be sure, but the 
Constitution's method of securing this efficacy, "even where the prohibitions 
are laid upon the States," is to "regulate and govern the conduct of 
individuals" and to "visit penalties upon individual offenders who are the 
instruments of the wrong." (By "individuals," the Court clearly is referring to 
individual state officials.) Visiting penalties upon the states themselves was 
either not perceived to be necessary to give the Constitution the desired 
efficacy, or was understood to be forbidden. It is noteworthy that the Justices 
who wrote and concurred in this forceful paean to the importance of 
constitutional remedies also concurred in the Hans decision. And it is even 
more significant that no one suggested the possibility of obtaining these 
remedies from the state itself in Poindexter, even though the suit was brought 
and litigated in the state courts.414 
There is, in addition, significant support in the statements of the Framers 
of the original Constitution for the proposition that they contemplated that the 
obligations of the state governments would be enforced in court by means of 
suits against state officials, not against the states themselves. After discussing 
the methods by which the Constitution would provide for the efficacy of 
federal obligations, the Founders decided not to retain the scheme set up by the 
Articles of Confederation, under which federal norms were enforceable only 
against the states as political bodies. They opted instead to give Congress the 
power to make federal legislation operative on individuals and enforceable in 
the courts against individuals. Although the Founders were making a broader 
point than the one we are considering, their expressed reasons for preferring 
the new system are relevant here as well. The Founders rejected the prevalent 
system because they believed that duties could be enforced against political 
bodies only through military force. Against individuals, by contrast, duties 
could be enforced through the courts: 
413. Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 291-92. 
414. In Vazquez, supra note 80, I offer a more extensive textual and jurisprudential defense of the idea 
that the Supremacy Clause is the source of a constitutional law of remedies for constitutional violations, 
as well as a more detailed doctrinal defense of the proposition and an examination of the doctrinal 
implications of adopting the theory. 
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Hence we see how necessary for the Union is a coercive principle. No 
man pretends the contrary: we all see and feel this necessity. The only 
question is, Shall it be a coercion of law, or a coercion of arms? 
There is no other possible alternative. Where will those who oppose 
a coercion of law come out? Where will they end? A necessary 
consequence of their principles is a war of the states one against the 
other. I am for coercion by law-that coercion which acts only upon 
delinquent individuals. This Constitution does not attempt to coerce 
sovereign bodies, states, in their political capacity. No coercion is 
applicable to such bodies, but that of an armed force. If we should 
attempt to execute the laws of the Union by sending an armed force 
against a delinquent state, it would involve the good and the bad, the 
innocent and guilty, in the same calamity. 
But this legal coercion singles out the guilty individual, and 
punishes him for breaking the laws of the Union.415 
The fear that any attempt to enforce federal laws against the states as political 
bodies would necessarily involve military force appears in retrospect to have 
been exaggerated, but what is important for present purposes is that the 
Founders feared such violence and for that reason rejected the notion of 
enforcing federal obligations against the states as collective political bodies. 
Moreover, their discussions reveal that they viewed "legal" obligations as by 
their nature enforceable in courts, and they appeared to assume that judicial 
proceedings could be maintained only against individuals.416 
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in New York v. United States417 
relied in part on this history to justify the holding that Congress generally may 
not impose obligations on states as states418 (although, as noted, she 
somewhat inconsistently upheld Garcia insofar as it allowed Congress to 
regulate states as part of a broader class).419 These statements do not, 
however, support the Court's holding. After all, the Constitution itself imposes 
obligations directly on the states. It is thus difficult to interpret these 
statements as contemplating that there would be no federal obligations 
operative on states as political bodies. The Framers' statements are best taken 
as statements about remedies and enforcement, not the existence vel non of 
legal obligations. The Framers' concerns support the conclusion that the federal 
415. 2 DEBATES, supra note 231, at 197 (statement of Oliver Ellsworth) (emphasis added). William 
Samuel Johnson's statement to the Connecticut ratifying convention was to the same effect: "The force, 
which is to be employed [to carry out the laws of the Union] is the energy of Law; and this force is to 
operate only upon individuals, who fail in their duty to their country." William Samuel Johnson, Speech 
in the Connecticut Ratifying Convention (Jan. 4, 1788), reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 248-49 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984). 
416. See generally Vazquez, supra note 105, at 1097-101 (arguing that Framers viewed Jaws as 
operating on individuals and being enforceable in courts). 
417. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
418. See id. at 163-66. 
419. See supra text accompanying note 99. 
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obligations of the states-those imposed by the Constitution and those imposed 
on the states by Congress-are, as a constitutional matter, to be enforced in 
suits against the individual state officials who violate federal law. In other 
words, the remedy the Constitution contemplates for the enforcement of federal 
obligations of the states (and the federal government, too) is a remedy against 
individual officials. 
Interpreting McKesson as a Supremacy Clause case establishing a 
constitutional right of action for damages against state officials responsible for 
violating federal law is faithful to as much of the Court's decision in the case 
as possible while avoiding the doctrinal problems that led us to reject the due 
process rationale. Like the due process rationale, the Supremacy Clause 
rationale allows us to give effect to the Court's evident intent to articulate a 
generally applicable remedial principle, but the Supremacy Clause rationale is 
better than the due process rationale at accommodating a congressional 
determination that damages should not be available for violations of federal 
statutes. That is because the purpose of the damage remedy under the 
Supremacy Clause rationale is to ensure the efficacy of federal law. If 
Congress passes a statute but determines that a private right of action for 
damages should not be available, that is presumably because Congress has 
established alternative mechanisms that it believes adequate to secure the 
efficacy of that statute. Nothing in the Supremacy Clause makes the courts a 
better judge of that question than Congress. It is conceivable that Congress 
would pass a law and preclude private damage actions because it does not 
want the statute to be "fully" enforced. The Supremacy Clause rationale can 
accommodate that judgment as well. If Congress denied a private damage 
action because it was only half-heartedly behind the federal statute, then that 
is presumably because the nation is only half-heartedly behind the statute. In 
such circumstances, half-hearted enforcement is the "correct" degree of 
enforcement; any more would be overenforcement.420 
This sort of flexibility would be unavailable if the right to damage were 
located in the Due Process Clause. As discussed, the doctrinal gloss that has 
accreted around the Clause requires, among other things, a strict separation 
between the concepts of substance and procedure. Thus, if the Due Process 
Clause conferred a right to damages (something it could do only if we 
classified damages as "procedure") then it would not be within Congress's 
420. There are, admittedly, rule-of-law considerations that might lead one to disable Congress from 
enacting laws that it does not want vigorously enforced. Most significantly, respect for law is reduced if 
the citizenry observes a proliferation of "laws" that are frequently violated with no consequences. It is to 
protect this rule-of-law value that I argue that the Supremacy Clause should be read to establish a 
presumption of a private right of action for damages against state officials who violate federal statutes and 
treaties. See Vazquez, supra note 80, at 74-75. But the decisions discussed at the end of Part IV rule out 
the conclusion that Congress lacks the power under our Constitution to deny a private right of action to 
beneficiaries of the statutes it passes. For further discussion of this issue, see supra note 21. 
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power in creating a substantive obligation to deny such relief to persons 
injured by a statutory violation. 
With respect to federal statutes, the private damage action grounded in the 
Supremacy Clause can at best be presumptive-i.e., subject to a congressional 
negation. By contrast, a federal statute purporting to cut back on available 
remedies for constitutional violations by state or federal officials would raise 
grave concerns under the Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause right of 
action for damages for constitutional violations is accordingly one that would 
not be subject to congressional negation. It is this aspect of McKesson, 
interpreted as a Supremacy Clause case about official liability, that I regard as 
most important. Indeed, for this reason, I regard the adoption of this 
interpretation of McKesson to be far more important from a rule-of-law 
perspective than adoption of the diversity interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment would be. Under the diversity view, as currently embraced by at 
least three of the dissenters in Seminole Tribe, the availability of relief against 
the states depends in the end on a congressional decision to withdraw the 
states' sovereign immunity. A remedy for constitutional violations that depends 
on Congress's affirmative action is far from ideal, as Congress, being the 
majoritarian branch, is unlikely to pay due regard to the countermajoritarian 
norms of the Constitution. The courts and private parties are the best defenders 
of these norms, and McKesson, if read to support the existence of a 
constitutionally based private right of action, would go far to advance this rule-
of-law goal. 
Reading McKesson to confer a right to damages against officials rather 
than the state itself would also make sense of the Court's own statement that 
the Supreme Court's power to review state court judgments in suits against 
states is contingent on the state's assent. We give effect to the assent language 
by recognizing that the state's decision to permit a suit against itself is purely 
voluntary; the Constitution does not subject the state to liability. We 
nevertheless give effect to the McKesson Court's apparent conviction that a 
remedy in that case was required by recognizing that the Constitution requires 
a damage remedy against the officer. The state does not have to consent to a 
suit against itself, but it must do so if it wishes to shield its officers from 
liability. As it will often wish to do so, the interpretation of McKesson 
defended here will place some pressure on the states to consent to federal 
liability. 
Interpreting McKesson as a Supremacy Clause case would mean that the 
damage remedy it recognizes would not apply to deprivations of property that 
violate state law. This may well reduce the interpretation's appeal. I am 
sympathetic to the view that when the state requires you to pay taxes first and 
litigate later, the state should be required to make available a full refund 
remedy not only when the tax is determined to have violated federal law, but 
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also when the tax turns out to have been invalid because it violated state law 
or when the tax was found not to be owing because state law did not require 
its payment in the first place.421 Such a rule would admittedly protect rule-of-
law values such as the interest in procedural regularity. These are the same 
values that underlie the Amett!Loudermill line of cases, but, for reasons 
already discussed, the claim that the Due Process Clause unyieldingly protects 
these values is difficult to square with cases recognizing the legislature's 
power to deny private remedies for the violation of the obligations it creates. 
The latter cases suggest that the protection of those rule-of-law values has been 
left by our Constitution, to some extent at least, to the legislature that created 
the substantive norm. 
At any rate, despite its express reliance on the Due Process Clause, the 
McKesson opinion in the end appears not to go so far as to affirm the 
constitutional need for a refund when the tax violated only state law. All of the 
precedents the Court regarded as support for the conclusion that the states are 
obligated to provide a refund remedy were cases in which the tax was alleged 
to have violated federal law. At several points, the Court described its holding 
421. Because by hypothesis the taxpayer is making the initial findings of fact and application of law 
to fact in these cases, it is difficult to think of a situation in which the taxpayer would have cause to 
complain about having been required to pay taxes that the statute does not actually purport to require. The 
problem would arise only if some state agency interpreted the statute one way and threatened substantial 
penalties if the taxes covered by such interpretation were not paid, but the taxpayer disagrees with the 
interpretation and ultimately gets a court to agree. Assume, for example, that the state agency responsible 
for taxes has interpreted the state law to require a certain form of accounting and the taxpayer believes that 
that is an erroneous interpretation of the state statute. If the state requires you to pay first and litigate later, 
then it may be unfair for the state not to offer a refund if the court agrees with the taxpayer and not the 
agency. Notice that this analysis relies on the availability of judicial review of agency interpretations of 
statutes. To say that the Due Process Clause requires a remedy in these circumstances would appear to read 
that Clause as imposing on the states a very particular system of separation of powers-a system, for 
example, that denies the state legislature the power to delegate to the agency the authority to interpret state 
statutes authoritatively pending a contrary interpretation by the judicial branch. It is difficult to maintain 
that the Constitution requires the states even to give their courts the power to reject the interpretations given 
to statutes by state agencies. If so, it is even more difficult to read into the Constitution a requirement that 
state court rejection of such interpretations be given retroactive effect. 
There is a more plausible argument to be made that the Due Process Clause requires the state to 
adhere roughly to some substantive norm when it deals with its citizens, that is, that it not act in an 
arbitrary or capricious way. In this respect, a state's violation of its own law that results in a deprivation 
of liberty or property implicates the Due Process Clause and, it might be argued, requires the state to offer 
a postdeprivation damage remedy. This was, of course, the issue in the Parratt/Zinermon line of cases. If 
those cases are read to hold that the Due Process Clause requires a damage remedy for the violation of state 
laws that do not confer a damage remedy, they would be consistent with Amett/Loudermill but would 
conflict with Sea Clammers and the other cases discussed above. Holding that the right to damages, if any, 
comes from the Supremacy Clause rather than the Due Process Clause would appear to reject a federal 
constitutional right to damages for the violation of state law. Perhaps a constitutional right to damages 
under the Supremacy Clause might be said to exist when the state acts in an arbitrary way, on the theory 
that such conduct violates substantive due process. This would deal with the Sea Clammers line of cases 
by accepting that damages may not be available where a statute that denies damages was not complied with 
(so long as the failure to comply was not so egregious as to be "arbitrary"), while satisfying the intuition 
that the Constitution confers protection against arbitrary governmental action and should provide a damage 
remedy for it. Scholars have argued that the Parratt line of cases should be understood as substantive due 
process cases. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 335; Monaghan, supra note 352. 
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as a requirement that the state provide a remedy for its "unconstitutional" 
deprivations.422 In its final paragraph, it summed up its holding as follows: 
When a State penalizes taxpayers for failure to remit their taxes 
in timely fashion, thus requiring them to pay first before obtaining 
review of the tax's validity, federal due process principles long 
recognized by our cases require the State's postdeprivation procedure 
to provide a "clear and certain remedy" for the deprivation of tax 
moneys in an unconstitutional manner.423 
These statements suggest that the remedial principle the Court recognized 
extends only to taxes that violate the federal Constitution.424 Other parts of 
the opinion suggest that the principle applies to taxes that violate federal 
statutes as wel1.425 Finally, in Reich v. Collins,426 the Court stated that 
McKesson and the cases McKesson relied on "stand for the proposition that 'a 
denial by a state court of a recovery of taxes exacted in violation of the laws 
or Constitution of the United States by compulsion is itself in contravention 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. "'427 The Supremacy Clause rationale explains 
why the refund remedy is required when the deprivation violated the federal 
Constitution and federal statutes, but not when the deprivation merely violated 
state law. If the basis of the refund remedy were the Due Process Clause, on 
the other hand, it would be difficult to explain why the remedy is limited to 
deprivations that are unlawful because they violate federal law. The Supremacy 
Clause rationale thus helps explain this feature of the McKesson and Reich 
decisions as well. 
D. What Remains of the Forum-Allocation Interpretation? 
I offer this rather extended reinterpretation of McKesson's due process 
holding not just because of its importance for our law of constitutional 
remedies, but also because of what it tells us about the nature of Eleventh 
422. See McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990) 
(holding that Due Process Clause "obligates the State to provide meaningful backward-looking relief to 
rectify any unconstitutional deprivation"); id. at 46 (referring to "unconstitutional deprivation of property"). 
423. ld. at 51 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
424. The Court cannot be understood to be saying that the taxes were "unconstitutional" in these cases 
because the state denied a refund remedy. The Court was discussing what the Due Process Clause required, 
and it made it quite clear that the Due Process Clause is satisfied in tax cases even if the state does not 
offer a predeprivation hearing, but only if it provides a refund remedy. Its statements that a refund remedy 
is required when the tax is "unconstitutional" must therefore mean that the remedy is required when the 
tax violates some other provision of the Constitution. 
425. This is suggested by its quotation from Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 369 (1930), see 496 
U.S. at 34. 
426. 115 S. Ct. 547 (1994). 
427. Id. at 549 (quoting Carpenter, 280 U.S. at 369) (emphasis added). 
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Amendment immunity. To say that the Constitution relies on private damages 
actions against state officials as the mechanism to give efficacy to the federal 
obligations of the states is not necessarily to say that the Constitution disables 
Congress from subjecting the states themselves to damage liability. It is quite 
plausible to conclude that the Constitution sets up a default system for 
enforcing federal norms-suits against officials-but gives Congress the power 
to supplement that system by making the states themselves liable. Neither the 
cases recognizing the liability of officials for constitutional violations, nor the 
absence of cases finding the states themselves liable, is in direct conflict with 
the idea that Congress has the power to make the states themselves liable. The 
evidence of Framers' intent I pointed to above is equivocal on this score as 
well. The Framers were clearly concerned that enforcing federal norms against 
states as political bodies would require the frequent exercise of military force, 
with undesired consequences, but it is also evident that they contemplated that 
military force would sometimes be necessary to enforce federal law against 
recalcitrant states. The question is whether they intended to establish a 
constitutional principle requiring that federal norms be enforced against state 
officials first, a course likely to obviate resort to military force, or instead left 
it to Congress to decide whether the risk of resort to military force was 
sufficiently small in a given context that placing a liability on states should not 
be a concern. Their statements do not answer that more specific question. 
My reinterpretation of McKesson's due process holding as affirming the 
constitutional availability of damage relief against state officials who violate 
federal law does not, therefore, provide affirmative support for the conclusion 
that Congress lacks the power to subject the states to damage liability to 
individuals. It does, however, strengthen the case for the immunity-from-
liability view. By helping explain the Court's reference to the state's "assent" 
in that case, it makes it possible to read the case as conditioning the Supreme 
Court's jurisdiction on the state's consent to being sued in the state courts. As 
discussed above, if the states have the power to evade Supreme Court review 
by refusing to consent to suits against them, then any liability Congress 
imposes on the states will be illusory. This interpretation of McKesson, in turn, 
removes McKesson and Reich from the ranks of the cases that support the 
forum-allocation view and adds them to the already impressive array of 
authority supporting the immunity-from-liability interpretation. In this Section, 
I consider the support for the forum-allocation view that remains after the 
defection of McKesson and Reich. 
I begin by discussing how the abrogation reductio fares under the 
immunity-from-liability view. In Part IV, I concluded that if we make certain 
assumptions about the scope of the Section 5 enforcement power, we can avoid 
the abrogation reductio even if we assume that the Due Process Clause requires 
a damage remedy. We avoid the reductio on that assumption only if we 
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assume the correctness of the forum-allocation interpretation, for the price the 
states must pay to avoid congressional abrogation of their immunity is to 
submit to liability and suit in their own courts. Can the reductio be avoided if 
we assume that the Eleventh Amendment confers an immunity from liability? 
If we assume that the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from subjecting 
states to damage liability and that the Due Process Clause does not itself 
require a damage remedy for state deprivations of property, it seems easier to 
avoid the reductio. It is true that a patent is still property and that states are 
still required to provide some sort of protection for it. It is also true that under 
this interpretation state officials may be personally liable for patent 
infringement, at least if Congress makes them liable. If we assume that 
Eleventh Amendment immunity is immunity from liability, then Congress can 
"abrogate" it, meaning it can subject the states to liability, only if the states fail 
to take the required steps to protect the underlying right. Note that these steps 
do not include subjecting itself to damage liability. The obligation of the 
officials to pay damages does not come from the Due Process Clause, so the 
state's failure to entertain damage suits against its officials in its courts would 
not support an abrogation power.428 Of course, some of the broader theories 
of congressional power under Section 5 might support a power to abrogate 
immunity even in these circumstances, given that a property right concededly 
exists. For this reason, avoiding the reductio will in the end depend either on 
the Court's narrow construction of Section 5 generally or on its exemption of 
procedural due process cases from whatever broad enforcement power may 
exist in other contexts. At any rate, avoiding the reductio is no more difficult 
under the immunity-from-liability interpretation than under the forum-allocation 
interpretation, and, depending on how the Court interprets Section 5, it may be 
easier under the immunity-from-liability view. 
Apart from the dicta in such cases as Employees and Atascadero,429 the 
remaining support for the forum-allocation view consists of the takings 
cases430 and Hilton.431 Can the takings cases be reconciled with an 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as establishing an immunity of states 
from liability to individuals? Perhaps not, as these cases establish that the 
states must provide a monetary remedy when they take property for a public 
428. The states may be required to entertain such actions in their courts anyway, see Howlett v. Rose, 
496 U.S. 356, 383 (1990); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947), but this obligation does not come from 
the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court's power to review cases from the state courts against state 
officials is not affected by the Eleventh Amendment, as such suits are not suits against the state. For the 
same reason, the lower federal courts can be given original jurisdiction over such cases. 
429. I refer here to the Atascadero footnote and Justice Marshall's analysis in Employees. See supra 
Section II.B. As noted above, Atascadero may in fact be consistent with the immunity-from-liability 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. See supra note 144; see also supra notes 390-91 (discussing 
compatibility with immunity-from-liability view of other cases sometimes cited as support for forum-
allocation view). 
430. See supra Section II.A. 
431. See supra text accompanying notes 144-51; infra text accompanying notes 433-40. 
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purpose. Conceivably, these cases might be explained on a "consent" theory 
similar to that of the proffered interpretation of McKesson, since all states 
permit inverse condemnation actions, but if these cases turned on consent, then 
the states could defeat the remedy, or at least Supreme Court enforcement of 
the remedy, simply by repealing their laws on that subject. A more promising 
way to reconcile the takings cases with the immunity-from-liability 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment would be simply to regard the 
Takings Clause as sui generis in that it is the only constitutional provision that 
expressly entitles individuals to retrospective relief from the states.432 As 
such, it may be said to establish a limited constitutional exception to the 
immunity from liability that the Eleventh Amendment otherwise confers. 
That leaves Hilton. In that case, a bare majority of the Court held that 
Congress subjected the states to damage liability to individuals when it enacted 
FELA,433 a liability that because of the Eleventh Amendment, is not 
enforceable in the lower federal courts. The Court also indicated clearly that 
the Supremacy Clause requires the state courts to enforce that liability.434 It 
would seem inconsistent with the latter statement to permit the state courts to 
decline to provide the remedy on sovereign immunity grounds. The Court's 
citation of Howleu v. Rose435 is an indication that it believed that a state's 
invocation of sovereign immunity for this purpose would violate the 
Supremacy Clause.436 
However, the Court did not say anything about its own jurisdiction to 
review state court decisions in FELA cases. The state court in Hilton did not 
dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds; instead, it dismissed on the merits, 
holding that Congress had imposed no liability.437 The Supreme Court 
reviewed that judgment, but its exercise of appellate jurisdiction could be 
reconciled with McKesson and Seminole Tribe on the ground that the state had 
consented to the suit by not raising a sovereign immunity defense. If so, then 
a future state court could gut the state's duty to pay damages under FELA 
simply by invoking the state's own law of sovereign immunity and thus 
making it clear that it does not consent to the suit. 
If the Court were to reconcile Hilton with Seminole Tribe in this way, it 
would be affirming on the one hand the state courts' obligation under the 
Supremacy Clause to afford a remedy and their duty not to refuse to do so on 
sovereign immunity grounds, but on the other hand, it would be recognizing 
432. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 849. 
433. See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 200 (1991). 
434. See id. at 207. 
435. 496 U.S. 356, 367--68 (1990), cited with approval in Hilton, 502 U.S. at 207. 
436. But cf Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994) (stating in FELA case that 
applicability of Eleventh Amendment relegates claimants to suits in state courts "if the state permits"); 
supra text accompanying note 255. 
437. See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 200. 
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its own powerlessness to intervene where the states have violated that duty. Its 
affirmation in Hilton that states are under a federal obligation to pay damages 
to individuals under FELA might thus be interpreted as a rejection of my 
earlier dismissal of federal liabilities not enforceable in any federal court as no 
liability at all. If so, the refusal of the Justices in the Seminole Tribe majority 
to go along with my characterization would be in keeping with their 
confidence in the state courts' ability and willingness to enforce federal law 
faithfully. Like Chief Justice Marshall, I find such confidence to be misplaced, 
especially in this context, not because I hold a particularly unfavorable opinion 
of the character of state court judges, but because I hold a realistic opinion 
regarding the strengths and weaknesses of human beings generally. Persons 
whose jobs are dependent on the favorable opinion of the state's more overtly 
political branches are unlikely to be reliable enforcers of obligations imposed 
on state governments from without. To give Congress the power to obligate the 
states to pay damages to individuals and to expect the state courts to enforce 
this obligation without monitoring by a federal court calls to mind an aspect 
of the scheme set up by the Articles of Confederation that Hamilton (and 
others) decried as "imbecili[ c ]" :438 
There was a time when we were told that breaches by the States of 
the regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected; that 
a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the 
respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all the 
constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the present 
day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now hear from 
the same quarter will be thought, when we shall have received further 
lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience. It at all times 
betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is 
actuated, and belied the original inducements to the establishment of 
civil power. Why has government been instituted at all? Because the 
passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice 
without constraint.439 
Having learned this lesson so recently, it is highly unlikely that the Founders 
would have given the federal government the power to obligate the states to 
pay damages to individuals without also giving the federal courts the power 
to enforce that obligation should the states prove recalcitrant. The Court would 
be truer to the Founders' convictions if it either overruled Hilton (insofar as 
it holds that Congress has the power to impose damage liability on the states) 
438. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 107 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
439. ld. at 110. It is worth recalling here as well Madison's statements in The Federalist No. 51: 
"[W]hat is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no 
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on 
government would be necessary." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
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or rejected the "consent" requirement alluded to in McKesson and Seminole 
Tribe. To do neither would be to recognize the theoretical existence of a legal 
obligation that would in reality have the force of a dead letter.440 
VI. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AS IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY: 
IMPLICATIONS, OPEN QUESTIONS, AND COMPATIBILITY WITH THE 
RULE OF LAW 
This Article began by noting the serious questions that have long been 
raised about the Eleventh Amendment's conformity with the nation's rule-of-
law aspirations. The forum-allocation interpretation of the Amendment would 
have greatly alleviated these problems, if not totally cured them. This Part 
assesses the nature and seriousness of the rule-of-law problems that would 
remain if the Court were to adopt the immunity-from-liability interpretation of 
the Eleventh Amendment. I conclude that as long as the Constitution continues 
to be interpreted to authorize private suits against state officers who violate 
federal law, an interpretation of the Constitution as barring private damage 
actions against the states themselves does not raise severe rule-of-law 
problems. Indeed, as noted, an interpretation of McKesson and such other cases 
as Poindexter, Ex parte Young, and Bivens as recognizing a right of action 
against state officials who violate the Constitution, a right of action grounded 
in the Constitution itself and not subject to congressional narrowing, would do 
more to advance the rule of law than would adoption of the diversity 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, which, as embraced by the 
dissenting Justices in Seminole Tribe, would recognize a remedy against the 
states only if Congress provides one. I do not, of course, maintain that the two 
are mutually exclusive, but I do suggest that the rule of law would be better 
served if energies that have heretofore been directed at defending the diversity 
and forum-allocation theories were directed instead to exploring the remedial 
avenues that may remain open under an official-liability regime. 
What are those remedial possibilities for, say, an individual who claims 
that a state is infringing her patent? First, as the Court indicated in Seminole 
Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the federal courts from awarding 
injunctive relief against state officials who violate federal laws.441 Although 
440. The Hess opinion shows how easy it is for Justices who lack confidence in the state courts' 
willingness to enforce federal liabilities of the states to equate the lack of Supreme Court review over a 
certain category of case with the absence of a state court obligation to entertain such cases. See Hess, 115 
S. Ct. 394; supra notes 255-63 and accompanying text. 
441. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.16 (1996). In International Postal Supply 
Co. v. Bruce, 194 U.S. 601 (1904), and Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896), the Court held that even 
though the patent law's prohibition of infringement applies to the federal government, the sovereign 
immunity of the United States precludes courts from enjoining federal officials from using federal property 
that infringes a patent. Given Congress's power to waive sovereign immunity, it is difficult to conceive of 
this as a constitutional holding. The Court in Belknap did, however, rely on Eleventh Amendment holdings 
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the Seminole Tribe Court's Ex parte Young holding muddies the waters a bit 
concerning the circumstances in which such relief will be available, it seems 
clear that such relief is available at least if Congress has clearly so provided. 
There is some authority for the proposition that monetary sanctions for failure 
to comply with a prospective court order can be assessed against the state 
itself, as opposed to the official.442 Adoption of the immunity-from-liability 
interpretation may call into question the vitality of that authority where the 
order requires compliance with a duty imposed on the state pursuant to 
Article 1.443 But, at a minimum, a state official who violates a court order not 
to infringe a patent would be personally subject to contempt sanctions. This 
appears effective to ensure prospective compliance with the federal obligation 
not to infringe. 
Our analysis of Zinermon in Part IV suggested that the Due Process Clause 
may impose a duty on states to set up a procedure whereby officials who are 
contemplating using patented material would be required to obtain 
preclearance, a procedure that might include notice to the patent holder and an 
opportunity to adjudicate the patent's validity and whether the contemplated 
conduct infringes. As noted, it seems odd to read the Due Process Clause to 
require this procedure when the patent laws require no similar procedure of 
private parties. At any rate, it appears unlikely that a court would require the 
creation of such a bureaucracy when Congress has not so required. This raises 
the question whether Congress can require that the states set up such 
procedures. On the one hand, to impose such requirements on the states 
without imposing parallel requirements on private individuals would appear to 
single out the state for regulation in violation of New York. On the other hand, 
it is only because the states are immune from damage liability that Congress 
would even consider this scheme. Perhaps a congressional requirement along 
these lines would be upheld by the Court as a valid "enforcement" of the 
States' due process obligations with respect to an admitted property right. 
Congress may additionally have the option of easing standing and ripeness 
obstacles to injunctive relief. How far the Court would allow it to go in this 
in reaching its conclusions. See 161 U.S. at 18-23. To the extent that the Court regarded this holding as 
applying as well to the states, the decision would appear to have been superseded by such more recent 
decisions as the second Pennhurst decision, in which the Court stated that "when a plaintiff sues a state 
official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court may award an injunction that governs the 
official's future conduct .... Under the theory of Young, such a suit would not be one against the State 
since the federal-law allegation would strip the state officer of his official authority." Pennhurst State Sch. 
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 102-03 (1981 ). The aspect of the Belknap decision that does retain current 
relevance is the Court's affirmation of the availability of damages in an action at law against the federal 
officials responsible for infringing patents. See 161 U.S. at 26. 
442. See supra note 108 and accompanying text; see also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). 
443. To the extent that the Court in these cases relied on the conclusion that Congress abrogated 
sovereign immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994), Seminole Tribe would appear to call into 
question the courts' power to award such penalties and costs when the federal law that the state officer 
violated was enacted by Congress under Article I. 
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direction is unclear after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,444 but the concurring 
Justices seemed to be willing to give Congress substantialleeway.445 It is not 
clear that this avenue would be productive in the patent context, but Congress 
may find it useful in other contexts. 
Relying on prospective relief only, however, even if broadened in the ways 
suggested, would still leave states with the ability to violate federal obligations 
for a time. Such a regime leaves the states with little incentive to take any 
federal obligations seriously until confronted with a suit seeking to stop an 
ongoing violation. The state could, without assuming any risk, conduct itself 
entirely without regard to any possible federal obligations until confronted with 
a legal challenge. In the meantime, the interests underlying the federal 
obligation have been compromised. 
To address this problem, Congress might impose a penalty for past 
violations of federal obligations payable to the federal government. It is 
established that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits by the federal 
government. The prospect of such a penalty should lead the state to pay more 
attention to possible federal obligations, but this technique of enforcement 
could be costly, as it requires setting up a federal bureaucracy to monitor state 
activities in the area. It has been suggested that the federal government has the 
power to authorize private parties to bring suit on its behalf, and perhaps also 
to allow the private party to keep the penalty if it prevails.446 This qui tam-
type arrangement, however, would appear to come so close to replicating the 
barred liability to individuals that the Court would probably strike it down.447 
The arrangement would stand a greater chance of passing muster if the suit 
were brought by private individuals in the name of the United States but the 
penalty were required to be turned over to the United States. This arrangement 
might work if the federal obligations involved had broad public impact and 
there existed public interest organizations willing to take on such projects. It 
may work, for example, in the environmental area. With respect to federal 
obligations that benefit discrete categories of individuals, such as the obligation 
not to infringe patents or copyrights or to engage in false advertising, affected 
individuals would seem to lack an incentive to bring an action if they cannot 
keep the "penalty." Perhaps if such individuals were permitted to add a 
"penalty-to-the-United-States" count to an action they would otherwise bring 
for injunctive relief, they would have an adequate incentive to do so, if only 
to deter future infringements. If this arrangement were found to comport with 
the Eleventh Amendment, the concerns raised above about states simply 
444. 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see also supra note 288. 
445. Justices Kennedy and Souter appear to contemplate little more than a clear statement rule, under 
which Congress would be required to identify the interest it seeks to protect and the plaintiff's connection 
to that interest. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
446. See Siegel, supra note 110. 
447. See supra notes 110-1 I. 
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ignoring their federal obligations until called to account would be further 
alleviated. 
A scheme in which the rightholder could be compensated for past 
violations would obviously be . preferable. It is here that our reinterpreted 
McKesson and such related cases as Poindexter and Bivens become relevant. 
As interpreted above, these cases stand for the proposition that the Supremacy 
Clause establishes a private damage action against state officials who violate 
the Constitution. I have argued elsewhere that the Supremacy Clause should 
be read to establish a presumption that federal statutes that impose obligations 
on government provide a private damage action against government officials 
to the individuals the statute was designed to protect.448 Even if this 
presumption were rejected, however, Congress would retain the power to make 
state officials personally liable for their violations of federal statutes. Current 
case law recognizes this power, as the Court in Maine v. Thiboutof'49 
construed section 1983 to make state officials personally liable for violating 
statutory obligations imposed pursuant to Article 1.450 It has been suggested 
that the Thiboutot decision is endangered after Seminole Tribe,451 but even 
the dissenters in Thiboutot did not deny that Congress had the power to impose 
such liability; they merely argued that Congress had not done so when it 
passed section 1983.452 
If there is a problem with the suggestion that Congress may make state 
officers personally liable for violating statutes that validly place obligations on 
states, the problem stems not so much from the Eleventh Amendment, which 
has long been understood not to apply to suits seeking damages from officers 
personally, but from the Tenth Amendment, and the New York decision in 
particular. For example, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification 
Act makes "employers" liable in damages in certain circumstances, but if the 
employer is a corporation, the statute does not subject the corporation's 
officers or directors to personalliability.453 Would an amendment to that Act 
making state officials personally liable for violations of the Act run afoul of 
New York's apparent holding that Congress may impose the same obligations 
448. See supra note 420. 
449. 448 U.S. 1. 
450. Although the 7hiboutot case itself was against the state of Maine, the Court was well aware that 
its holding would make officers personally liable. See id. at 22 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("In practical effect, 
today's decision means that state and local governments, officers, and employees now may face liability 
whenever a person believes he has been injured by the administration of any federal-state cooperative 
program, whether or not that program is related to equal or civil rights.") (citations omitted). To the extent 
that the Court held (or assumed) that section 1983 created a cause of action against states, it is no longer 
good law. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); supra Subsection ill.B.4. 
451. See Jackson, supra note 15. 
452. Indeed, Justice Powell's dissent states that he "do[es] not mean to imply that either[§ 1983 or 
§ 1988] must be limited strictly to claims arising under the post-Civil War Amendments." See 7hiboutot, 
448 U.S. at 25 n.l5 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
453. See 29 U.S.C. § 210l(a)(l) (1994) (defining "employer" as including certain "business 
enterprise[s]"); id. § 2104(a) (making employers liable to employees in particular circumstances). 
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on states that it imposes on private individuals, but not more? Perhaps the 
Court would hold that state officials are not the state for New York purposes, 
just as they are not the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. This may not 
be likely, as the Court already defines the state more broadly for Garcia/New 
York purposes than it does for Eleventh Amendment purposes.454 A stronger 
argument is that the power to make state officials personally liable comes from 
the Supremacy Clause and the need to give efficacy to the statutes Congress 
has the power to enact. By preventing Congress from making the states 
themselves liable, the Eleventh Amendment makes it impossible for Congress 
to employ with respect to the states the same enforcement scheme it has 
chosen for private parties. As argued above, the Supremacy Clause establishes 
a right of action against state officials as the default mechanism for giving 
efficacy to those officials' constitutional obligations. If the Constitution permits 
Congress to impose additional obligations on the states, then it should be 
construed to authorize Congress to give efficacy to those obligations by 
making state officials personally liable. 
But, even if I am wrong, the problem is not an insuperable one, as 
Congress can surely make state officials personally liable if it makes similarly 
situated employees and directors of private companies liable as well. If that is 
what it takes to provide a retrospective remedy for state violations, then 
Congress would have little reason not to do so. Where the claimant has the 
option of suing both the employee or director and the corporation, the deeper 
pocket will wind up paying the judgment. While it may be a nuisance to 
individual corporate employees or directors to be named as a defendant, 
anyone who has sufficient resources to make an appealing target is also likely 
to be sophisticated enough to have arranged for full indemnification (including 
for litigation costs).455 Indeed, Congress appears to have made corporate 
officers and directors personally liable for such legal violations as failure of 
the company to pay a minimum wage,456 yet suits naming officers personally 
for failure to pay the minimum wage are rare.457 It appears that state officials 
may now be sued personally for failure to pay the minimum wage, even 
though the state itself may not be (at least if the immunity-from-liability 
interpretation is correct).458 Unlike employees of private companies, however, 
employees of state agencies do have an incentive to sue their bosses 
personally. 
454. See supra note 100. 
455. Such an agreement may not protect the officer if the company should declare bankruptcy, but a 
sophisticated officer could protect herself from this possibility by obtaining liability insurance. 
456. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1994) (defining "employer'' as including 
persons acting for employer); id. § 216(b) (making employer liable for failure to pay minimum wage). See 
also supra note 441 (noting that government officials are liable in damages for patent infringement). 
457. Telephone interview with Mary Qualiana, Labor and Employment Attorney, Washington, D.C. 
(Feb. 7, 1997). 
458. See supra note 102 (noting cases finding FLSA's abrogation of state immunity unconstitutional). 
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A possibly significant obstacle to recovery against a state official for 
statutory violations is "official" immunity. Under current doctrine, state 
officials sued in their personal capacities are entitled to an immunity that 
protects them from liability unless they violated "clearly established" law.459 
As this standard is currently applied, the law must have been clearly 
established at the level of application of law to fact. 460 This may pose 
problems for certain types of claimants. Patent holders, for example, would 
presumably have to show that prior authorities "clearly established" both that 
the patent was valid and that the defendant's conduct infringed it. But official 
immunity is generally regarded as subconstitutional in stature.461 If so, then 
presumably Congress can do away with it. This would appear to present no 
problems under New York as long as the same standard of liability applies to 
state employees as to private employees. Indeed, it may even be open to 
Congress to impose a form of "strict" liability on heads of agencies by 
enacting a law providing that the CEO of any entity that infringes a patent 
(defined to include the head of any state agency) shall be personally liable to 
the patent holder to the same extent as the company itself. 
Does an official-liability regime for violations of federal law satisfy rule-
of-law concerns? As noted, it is often said that the rule of law requires that 
there be remedies for the violation of legal rights.462 Would an official-
liability regime be effective at compensating persons whose rights have been 
violated? An obvious concern is that officials will frequently have insufficient 
assets to satisfy a judgment. This is particularly likely to be the case if the 
legal violation involves the collection of an unconstitutional tax from a large 
corporation or the infringement of a valuable patent or copyright. It will also 
often be the case when a police officer unlawfully causes severe injury to an 
individual. If the injured party were in fact limited to the officer's personal 
assets, then chances are that she would not receive full compensation. 
But the injured party will usually not be so restricted. If the law makes 
state officials personally liable for, say, the collection of unlawful taxes or the 
infringement of a patent, then states will inevitably find it necessary to offer 
to compensate their officials for any liability assessed against them, except 
perhaps where the official's violation of law was egregious, or at least to pay 
their officials higher salaries to enable them to obtain liability insurance. 
Otherwise, few would agree to work for the state.463 Virtually all states have 
459. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
460. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
461. See, e.g., Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914,923 (1984) (holding that immunity for public defenders 
did not exist at common law); Fallon, supra note 335, at 356; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 16, at 1785. 
But cf Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.15 (1996) (suggesting that official immunity may 
have constitutional stature). 
462. See supra text accompanying notes 2, 16. 
463. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 812 (1994) 
("Without indemnification who would agree to work for the government?"). 
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statutes agreeing to reimburse their officials in specified circumstances for 
damages assessed against them for conduct performed within the scope of their 
employment.464 States also often agree by contract to reimburse their 
employees for damage liability, and sometimes they follow a policy of 
reimbursing their officials even when not required to do so by statute or 
contract.465 Particularly if federal statutes remove the common law immunity 
the official otherwise would enjoy, any rational state official would insist on 
some such arrangement before taking a job that exposes her to such 
liability.466 If the state has agreed to compensate the official, the patent 
holder will eventually receive his full measure of damages from the state 
(indirectly) without running afoul of the Eleventh Amendment.467 
464. See ALA. CODE§ 41-9-74(a) (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 41-621 (West Supp. 1996); ARK. 
CODE ANN.§ 21-9-203 (Michie 1996); CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 825(a) (West Supp. 19%); COLO. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 24-10-110(l)(b)(i) (West Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-14ld(a) (West Supp. 1996); 
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 4002 (Michie Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 111.071 (Harrison 1985); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 45-9-60 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 26-35.5 (1995); IDAHO CODE§ 6-903(b)-(c) (Michie 
1990); SILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 350/2 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN.§ 34-4-16.7-1 (Michie 1986); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 669.21 (West, WESTLAW through end of 1995 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 75-6109 
(West, WESTLAW through end of 1995 Reg. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.753 (Banks-Baldwin, 
WESTLAW current through end of 1995 3d Ex. Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5108.1 (West, 
WESTLAW current through all 1995 Reg. Sess. Acts); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8112 (West, 
WESTLAW current through end of 1995 First Reg. Sess.); Mo. CoDE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 12-404 
(Michie 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 9 (West 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 691.1408 
(West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 3.736 (West Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE ANN.§ 11-46-7 (Supp. 1996); 
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 107.170(5) (West Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-305 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§81-8,239.05 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.0349 (Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 99-D:2 
(1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-1 (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4 (Michie Supp. 1996); N.Y. 
PUB. OFF. LAW § 17(3)(a) (McKinney 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 32-12.1-04 (19%); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2744.07(A) (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51,§ 162(A) (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. 
STAT.§ 30.285 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 9-31-12 (Michie Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 15-78-70 (Law 
Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAws§ 3-19-1 (Michie 1994); TEX. CN. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 104.002 (West Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-36 (Michie 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 
5606(a) (West Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN.§ 2.1-526.8(A) (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 
4.24.490(1) (West Supp. 1997); W.VA. CODE§ 29-12A-ll(a)(2) (1992); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 895.46(l)(a) 
(West Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-104 (Michie 1988). The courts that have considered the 
question have held that the existence of a state law duty to reimburse an official does not transform a suit 
against the official into a suit against the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See HART & WECHSLER, 
supra note 100, at 1076-77. 
465. See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 707-08 (1994). Additionally, "it is not 
uncommon for organizations of public employees, such as a peace officers' association, to make 
arrangements for low cost group insurance coverage against personal liability for certain kinds of torts (e.g., 
wrongful arrest, assault and battery, etc.)." SHO SATO & ARVO VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW 784 (2d ed. 1977). "Careful counsel may also discover that in some jurisdictions 
mandatory official bonds covering certain positions may be written in terms broad enough to include 
tortious injuries, with liability running in favor of members of the public." Id. (citations omitted). 
466. It is well-settled that a state's agreement to reimburse its officials does not transform a suit 
against the official into a suit against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, even though the 
damages will ultimately come from the state treasury. See Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 411, 412 
(1799) (stating that "remote interest of the State, in making retribution to her grantees" does not deprive 
federal court of jurisdiction); Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1146-48 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
state's agreement to indemnify does not transform suit against official into suit against state for Eleventh 
Amendment purposes). 
467. It is the practice of local governments that have agreed to compensate their officials-and 
probably of most states as well-to pay judgments against their officials directly to the plaintiff. Telephone 
interview with Benjamin L. Hall, III, former City Attorney for Houston, Texas (Feb. 13, 1997). If a state 
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In the end, it may not be necessary for the patent holder even to sue the 
officer in court. As interpreted above, McKesson recognizes the state's freedom 
to substitute itself for the officer as the defendant, and certainly Congress can 
make it clear in the statute that the state has this option. The state would have 
a number of incentives to do so. First, it would greatly simplify the process for 
all concerned, including its officers and itself. The cost of administering an 
officer-liability-plus-state-reimbursement scheme is likely to be greater for the 
state than the cost of administering a straight state-liability regime. For 
example, the state will no doubt want its own lawyer to control the defense, 
but unless the officer is dismissed as a defendant the officer is likely to want 
his own lawyer as well (and this is presumably a cost that the state will 
ultimately have to pick up). Second, the prospect of personal liability is likely 
to lead risk-averse officers to steer excessively clear of the line drawn by the 
law, and, if so, the state will forgo an excessive amount of conduct that does 
not in fact violate the law. The state can remove some of this excessive 
deterrence by agreeing to reimburse the official or to pay her insurance, but it 
can go further to neutralize this problem by committing itself in advance to 
being the sole defendant in the case. Finally, agreeing to be substituted as the 
defendant may be the only way for the state to avoid a trial in federal court. 
As noted, the state official can be made suable in federal court without raising 
Eleventh Amendment problems. The state could, consistent with McKesson, 
agree to be substituted as the sole defendant in a state court proceeding 
only,468 and if it does so, the Supreme Court can review any decision the 
did not wish to be cooperative, it could force the plaintiff to seek enforcement from the official, and then 
reimburse the official for what he paid to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff were forced to proceed against the 
official and part of the judgment remained unpaid because the official lacked sufficient personal resources 
to satisfy the entire judgment, the plaintiff should be able to recover the unpaid portion of the judgment 
after the official receives reimbursement from the state of the amount paid by him to the plaintiff the first 
time. In this way, the plaintiff should eventually recover the whole judgment. 
Presumably, a state would not be free to say that any amounts paid to the official by the state as 
reimbursement for damages shall be exempt from attachment by the judgment creditor. A state law to that 
effect would arguably constitute an impermissible burden on the constitutionally required remedy against 
state officials and thus violate the Supremacy Clause. If the exemption applied only to damages for 
violations of federal law, it would probably also amount to unconstitutional discrimination against the 
federal rights violated by the official. Cf McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 234 
(1934) ("A state may not discriminate against rights arising under federal laws."). A broader state law rule 
shielding from execution any amounts traceable to money paid to the official by the state would certainly 
not be permissible, as most of the personal resources of state officials are presumably the proceeds of 
money paid to the official by the state as salary. In any event, I am not aware of any state law that purports 
to shield from attachment by judgment creditors amounts paid to the official by the state as reimbursement 
or salary. 
468. It has long been established that states may consent to be sued only in their own courts. See 
Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900). However, as McKesson established, see McKesson Corp. v. Division 
of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 30 (1990), and Seminole Tribe reaffirmed, see Seminole 
Tribe v. Aorida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.l4 (1996), a state's consent to be sued in its own courts also 
constitutes consent to the Supreme Court's review of any federal claims resolved in such a suit. It is true 
that the state may not in fact be voluntarily agreeing to Supreme Court review, but our discussion of 
McKesson above showed why the state does not have the option of consenting to suit in its own courts but 
not to Supreme Court review: The state's consent to be sued in its courts typically replaces the right the 
claimant would otherwise have had to recover against state officials, and a suit against state officials could 
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state court rendered. Congress could perhaps provide by statute that to avoid 
a suit against the official, the state must consent to being sued in the lower 
federal court. Such consent would avoid any Eleventh Amendment problems 
with the federal courts' original jurisdiction, but such a provision would 
remove one of the three incentives the states would have to consent. (Whether 
the remaining incentives suffice to meet the federal interests involved is of 
course a judgment for Congress to make.) 
If Congress does indeed have the power to withdraw or narrow official 
immunity, then Congress would have the power to design an official liability 
scheme that should achieve roughly the same degree of compensation for 
victims as a government liability scheme. In particular, a statute designating 
agency (and company) heads as strictly liable for their agency's (or 
company's) violations of certain statutes is very likely to produce either an 
agreement between the head and the agency providing for full indemnification 
or a straight waiver of immunity. But this scheme achieves full compensation 
by successfully encouraging-some might say coercing-states to take on a 
liability that we are assuming Congress lacks the power to impose on them 
directly. The scheme seems so well-calculated to achieve Congress's goal of 
getting the state to pay that it may cast doubt on the conclusion that Congress 
indeed possesses this power. Recall that much of the support for the immunity-
from-liability interpretation comes from the authorities establishing that one of 
the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment is to protect state treasuries. We 
found the forum-allocation interpretation inconsistent with any such intent 
because, if the states are liable under federal law and the Supreme Court is 
available to enforce the liability, the states' treasuries would not in the end be 
protected. It might similarly be argued that if Congress has the power to place 
obligations on state officials that are all but certain to lead states to "consent" 
to take on the liability itself, then the state treasuries have not been protected 
either. If so, the official-liability regime seems just as inconsistent with the 
purpose of protecting state treasuries as the forum-allocation interpretation. 
The argument is not devoid of merit, but there does seem to be a 
difference in kind between imposing a liability on the state directly and 
imposing one on an officer in the hope and expectation that the state will agree 
to take on the liability itself. It has long been recognized that "the purpose of 
allowing actions against officers is ... to find a conduit to the treasury in 
cases where there should be compensation and where no other device is 
provided"-to bring "pressure to bear in favor of a remedy [from the 
treasury]."469 And it is well established that success in this regard does not 
be reviewed by the Court with no Eleventh Amendment problems. A consent to suit without Supreme Court 
review would be inadequate to protect the federal interests at stake and so is rightly regarded as ineffective 
to justify a withdrawal of the official's liability. 
469. Jaffe, supra note 392, at 227-28. 
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imbue the official with the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, even 
though the damages will in such a case come from the state treasury.470 
Congress's establishment of a strict liability standard for agency heads would 
not in fact differ significantly from the standards the Court itself once applied 
to determine federal officials' susceptibility to damage liability.471 To say 
such legislation unduly coerces the states' consent seems no more apt than 
saying that a private party coerces the states by refusing to do business with 
them unless they agree to waive their immunity. Perhaps all of this goes to 
show that the real purpose of sovereign immunity is not to protect the state 
treasury, that it advances instead only the state's dignitary interest in not being 
subjected to liability unless it has consented. But perhaps it shows instead that 
the immunity protects the states' treasuries only at the margins. To recognize 
Congress's power to impose strict liability on officials, as suggested above, 
may mean that the margin is getting smaller. Be that as it may, the margin 
would entirely disappear were we to accept the forum-allocation view. The 
suggested officer liability scheme is thus at least marginally more faithful to 
the purpose of protecting state treasuries than the forum-allocation 
interpretation. 
At any rate, if the claimed conflict with the purpose to protect state 
treasuries were deemed problematic, it could be addressed by denying 
Congress the power to render state officials strictly liable for their agencies' 
statutory violations, without going further and denying Congress the power to 
remove the rather stringent "official" liability the Court has given them. To do 
the latter would contradict many years of treating this immunity as 
subconstitutional.472 There is, however, some intimation in Seminole Tribe 
that the Court may be heading in that direction.473 If it does, then Congress 
would be able to subject state officials to personal liability only for their 
violations of "clearly established" law. Congress's only option in that event 
would be to provide as much detail in its statutes as possible. 
Where Congress has not taken special steps to increase the likelihood that 
officials will have obtained a commitment of full indemnification-and this 
will typically be the case for constitutional violations, as the majoritarian 
branch is unlikely to be as intent on securing compensation for violations of 
these countermajoritarian norms-then the chances that victims of legal 
violations will not be fully compensated are very real. For example, as noted, 
many state indemnification statutes exclude indemnification for particularly 
470. See supra note 466. 
471. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804) (holding naval captain liable for 
seizure of neutral vessel pursuant to executive order). See generally Engdahl, supra note 42; Ann 
Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 396, 453-57 (1986-87). 
472. See supra text accompanying note 461. 
473. See 116 S. Ct. at 1131 n.15 ("[E]ven assuming [the immunity enjoyed by state and federal 
officials] has no constitutional foundation, .... "). 
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egregious violations of law. An official-liability regime will therefore not 
entirely satisfy those who insist that there must be full remediation. But, 
contrary to the claims of some scholars,474 neither the rule of law as an ideal, 
nor the Anglo-American legal tradition, demand that everyone who has 
received unjust or unfair treatment at the hands of government be fully 
compensated for his injury. Take just one uncontroversial example: An 
innocent person who has been accused of a crime, has been duly indicted and 
tried and acquitted, but whose liberty was restrained for a lengthy period of 
time pending completion of the trial, is not entitled to a damage remedy 
against the state or its officials (except perhaps in very rare circumstances). 
The injury suffered by innocent persons forced to defend themselves in a 
criminal trial, even if not confined, is of the most acute kind, and it is not 
alleviated by the knowledge that the evidence points to him as the perpetrator. 
The absence of a remedy in such circumstances cannot be reconciled with any 
principle of full remediation, if understood as full compensation for undeserved 
governmental injuries, yet our system does not offer him one, nor can it 
without bankrupting the state. 
What the rule of law does require, and what our legal system has 
traditionally sought to provide, is a remedial scheme that is generally effective 
at producing systematic compliance with legal norms. With respect to 
constitutional norms, because they are countermajoritarian, and perhaps with 
respect to all norms applicable to government, the remedial scheme will be 
effective only if the power to obtain the remedies resides in private individuals. 
Our law of constitutional remedies has accordingly always relied on private 
rights of action against state officials, and it is this scheme of remedies that I 
maintain is grounded in the Supremacy Clause. It is a happy consequence of 
this reliance on private rights of action that the scheme, to a considerable 
degree, yields compensation to those injured by violations of federal law. But 
the focus of the Supremacy Clause's remedial scheme, and of the rule-of-law 
goal, is deterrence: securing prospective compliance with law by threatening 
a sanction in the event of a violation.475 In truth, the maxim that for every 
right there must be a remedy is a less unyielding command of the rule of law 
than the maxim that for every law there must be a sanction.476 
474. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 7, at 1485-86 ("Few propositions of law are as basic today ... as 
the ancient legal maxim ... : Where there is a right, there should be a remedy."). 
475. A fault-based liability regime-a regime that would deny relief, for example, to our innocent, 
subsequently acquitted defendant-might, to be sure, be defended on noninstrumental grounds. See John 
C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. 
L. REv. 82,93-101 (1989) (defending such regime on grounds of corrective justice). My claim here is that 
the Supremacy Clause should be regarded as the basis of a fault-based scheme of constitutional remedies 
for constitutional violations designed to achieve general and systematic compliance with constitutional 
norms. 
476. Hamilton invoked the latter principle in The Federalist No. 15, and I rely on it strongly in 
interpreting the Supremacy Clause's declaration that the Constitution is the "law" of the land as the source 
of a constitutional law of remedies for violations of the Constitution. See Vazquez, supra note 80. 
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That our law of constitutional remedies focuses on deterrence is evident. 
Official immunity, for example, is clearly geared toward that goal, the apparent 
theory being that you cannot deter violations of an ambiguous legal norm 
without overdeterring. Although the Court may apply the principle too 
stringently, leaving undeterred too much conduct that could and should be 
deterred, the principle itself seems sound from a deterrence perspective. 
The Due Process Clause might perhaps have been regarded as the source 
of a justice-based constitutional interest in full remediation, but the Court's due 
process jurisprudence appears designed to advance instead the deterrence goals 
that I argue underlie the Supremacy Clause. This is reflected in the Court's 
holding that a government official's negligent conduct does not violate the Due 
Process Clause, even if it produces "serious injury."477 That is because the 
Clause protects individuals against "abusive governmental conduct."478 This 
suggests that there may not be very much distance between my interpretation 
of the Supremacy Clause and the Court's interpretation of the Due Process 
Clause, and thus between my recharacterization of McKesson and the 
conventional one.479 
How does the official-liability regime fare from a deterrence perspective? 
One would expect a regime of personal liability to be more effective at 
deterring unlawful conduct than a regime of entity liability.480 If the liability 
falls on the individual officer, then that officer is more likely to be deterred 
than if the liability is borne by the government and thus spread among all 
taxpayers. If this intuition holds, then from a rule-of-law perspective, there 
may be a problem with agreements to indemnify, as they take the sting off the 
sanction. There is evidence, however, that the stigma of being sued personally 
By emphasizing the deterrence goal, I do not mean to disparage the interest in compensating victims 
of injustice. I agree with John Finnis's statement that "[i]f 'effectiveness' is to be contrasted (as it need not 
be) with 'justice,' the coercive force of law is not merely a matter of effectiveness." JOHN FINNIS, 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 260 (1980). However, Finnis is here referring to the injustice that 
the law-abiding suffer if the law-breaker is not punished, and he too seems to have a form of deterrence 
in mind. He seems to fear that the law-abiding will stop abiding the law if they see law-breakers going 
unpunished. See id. at 262-{)3. I recognize the importance of compensating victims of wrongs simply for 
the noninstrumental justice of it, but in our constitutional system this interest clearly can be sacrificed for 
the common good, which includes notably the need to deter violations of law. It is this need that clearly 
drives the existing remedial scheme, and properly so from a rule-of-law perspective. 
477. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986). 
478. ld. at 348. 
479. The Court in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), said that "like its forebear in the Magna 
Carta," the Due Process Clause was "'intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the 
powers of government."' Id. at 331 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1887)). The forebear 
in the Magna Carta was that document's reference to the "law of the land." The Court in Mu"ay's Lessee 
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (8 How.) 272 (1856), explained that "[t]he words, 'due 
process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words, 'by law of the land,' 
in Magna Charta." !d. at 276. 
480. The Supreme Court appears to share this intuition. See FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1005 
(1994) (suggesting that effectiveness of Bivens remedy lies in enabling recovery against officer); Carlson 
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980) ("Because the Bivens remedy is recoverable against individuals, it is a 
more effective deterrent than the [Tort Claims Act] remedy against the United States."). 
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leads to overdeterrence despite the broad protection officials receive from 
official immunity doctrines,481 and despite the widespread practice of 
indemnifying officers.482 
Some scholars have argued that an entity liability regime is superior to an 
official-liability regime from the deterrence perspective. Larry Kramer and 
Alan Sykes conclude that the choice between government liability and officer 
liability is, as a matter of economic efficiency, "a matter of indifference"483 
if the officer has sufficient resources to pay any judgment (and the transaction 
costs of negotiating employment contracts is low), or if the state has agreed to 
indemnify the official.484 They identify several inefficiencies that would be 
produced by an official liability rule if the officer lacked the resources to cover 
a judgment. Most pertinent are the inefficiencies that tend to lead to inadequate 
precautions against violations of law. On this score, their views about an 
official liability rule seem equivocal. They note that "it is conceivable that ... 
employees may exercise inefficiently high levels of care due to the conjunction 
of risk aversion with personal liability, or to the fact that the burden of 
overcautious behavior falls on the general public and not on the 
employees.'>485 They acknowledge that the government may correct this 
problem by offering to indemnify, but they conclude that the government 
might find the cost too high because it would mean forgoing the benefits of 
cost externalization.486 What, specifically, are these benefits? An enterprise 
decreases its cost of doing business by allowing the losses it causes to fall on 
the injured third party. This net benefit, they claim, "can be divided between 
the employer and the employee (in the form of higher wages) to make them 
both better off at the expense of the injured party whose judgment goes wholly 
or partially unsatisfied.''487 It is not entirely clear why these possible benefits 
would deter an employer from agreeing to indemnify if it fears that the 
employee would take inefficiently high levels of care, for in such 
circumstances the employer would not realize the benefits of cost 
externalization. Those benefits would be realized only if the employee were 
not risk averse. There are, of course, degrees of risk aversion. With respect to 
any but the least risk averse employee, the appeal of an arrangement of the 
481. See Nina Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Failure of Official Liability Under Bivens 39-40 
(Jan. 24, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
482. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 641, 686 (1987) (noting that "rampant official fear of personal liability may be an 
overreaction" in light of practice of indemnification). 
483. Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 249, 277 n.95. 
484. See id. at 272, 277 n.95. 
485. /d. at 280. 
486. See id. 
487. /d. at 278. This is a description of one of the inefficiencies of a personal liability regime in the 
private sector, but the authors conclude that these concerns apply "[t]o a considerable extent" in the public 
sector as well. /d. 
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type Kramer and Sykes fear would appear to depend significantly on her 
ability to avoid severe economic consequences by declaring bankruptcy.488 
But, if the right to an effective system of constitutional remedies has its source 
in the Supremacy Clause, then to the extent that a system of 
bankruptcy-which is, after all, only statutory-undermines it, we would 
expect the latter to have to give way. Even if the substantive legal norm to 
which we want to give efficacy is statutory, and thus the right to damages as 
well, it is possible that Congress may have the power to deny bankruptcy 
protection to state officials, although this suggestion admittedly raises problems 
under New York of the sort we have already encountered. In any event, while 
such an arrangement between employer and employee might be something to 
apprehend in the private sector, it seems highly unlikely when the employer 
is a non-profit-maximizing state government and the employee is a civil 
servant whose salary is probably highly regulated and not individually 
negotiated. 
Peter Schuck has argued that a government liability regime is superior 
from the perspective of reducing violations of law "because much official 
wrongdoing is ultimately rooted in organizational conditions and can only be 
organizationally deterred."489 Placing the liability on the agency rather than 
on the street-level officer, he argues, will be more effective at producing the 
sort of system-wide change that will often be necessary to reduce legal 
violations. This seems like a persuasive case for placing the liability on higher-
level officials instead of street-level officials, as Congress would do by making 
agency heads strictly liable for statutory violations, but it is not necessarily a 
reason for abandoning the officer-liability regime entirely. It is true that a 
system that makes supervisors liable for their failure to take steps to correct 
a system-wide problem might produce "intolerable litigation costs."490 Such 
a rule would "tempt plaintiffs to implead any number of . . . officials. Each 
might well want his own attorney, and the ensuing litigation over which 
official was the 'negligent' one would consume considerable resources."491 
488. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1241-42 (1984). 
The Bankruptcy Code itself, however, places significant limits on the ability of an employer and employee 
to profit through such a scheme. Under Chapter 7, a debt is not dischargeable if it represents liability for 
"willful and malicious injury" caused by the debtor. II U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1994). Under Chapter 13, such 
debts are not expressly made nondischargeable, but any plans proposed under this chapter must be 
presented in "good faith." II U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1994). See BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. REsNICK, 
·BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, at 'l[ 9.14[3) (3d ed. 1992). Among the factors courts have regarded as 
relevant in detennining whether a plan is proposed in good faith are whether the debt is dischargeable 
under Chapter 7, and "the motivation and sincerity of the debtor in seeking Chapter 13 relief." In re Estus, 
695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982). Thus, if the violation of federal law was willful and malicious, it would 
appear that the officer would have difficulty discharging the debt under either chapter, and even if the 
violation was not willful and malicious, a plan that results from the type of arrangement feared by Kramer 
and Sykes might well fail the "good faith" requirement. 
489. I'F.TER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 98 (1983). 
490. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 483, at 284. 
491. /d. 
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But, at the same time, the prospect of such costs should help induce the 
relevant officers to take the desired steps in the first place. Moreover, if a 
government-liability system were ultimately preferable, making supervisory 
officials liable would be likely to approximate it, as such officials are likely 
to be risk averse and, because of their positions, would be in a good position 
to procure indemnification agreements. 
If the right of individuals to recover against state officials who violate the 
federal Constitution or statutes is unaffected by the Eleventh Amendment, as 
I suggest, then the Eleventh Amendment, interpreted to give states immunity 
from liability, would at bottom be a rule about vicarious liability: a rule 
precluding the federal government from imposing vicarious liability on the 
states. Government liability is always vicarious liability, as governments, like 
corporations, "are a legal fiction . . . . [They] do not act, do not make 
contracts, sell property, or commit torts; their agents do."492 It may seem odd 
to conclude that the Constitution imposes a rule against vicarious liability, but 
it is also strange to say that the rule of law requires a system of vicarious 
liability. Law is addressed at bottom to natural persons. Only natural persons 
can violate legal norms, and only natural persons can be deterred from 
violating legal norms. It should accordingly be possible to design a system that 
imposes sanctions on natural persons that would be effective at securing 
compliance with the law. Vicarious liability may be a convenient and perhaps 
less costly way to ferret out the persons responsible for a legal violation, but 
to say that without it the rule of law is seriously jeopardized seems an 
overstatement. To the extent that an official-liability regime would be less 
efficient or less effective, we may in the end just have to chalk those problems 
up to the Eleventh Amendment. But the problems, such as they are, hardly 
warrant the assertion that our system of constitutional remedies, or of remedies 
for violations by states of federal statutes, is in conflict in some fundamental 
way with rule-of-law values. 
VII. CONCLUSION: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND THE RULE OF LAW 
The two rule-of-law principles I described at the beginning of this 
Article-that for every right there must be a remedy, and that the judicial 
power be coextensive with the legislative-and closely related one I mentioned 
later-that for every law there must be a sanction-are not the only demands 
of the rule of law. Also important, perhaps more so, is the citizenry's, and 
hence the other branches', continuing respect for the judiciary as the 
authoritative interpreter and enforcer ofthe law. John Orth's scholarship on the 
Eleventh Amendment has suggested that the Hans interpretation of the 
492. /d. at 249. 
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Amendment was driven by a fear that any judgments rendered against the 
states in the 1890s would have been disregarded by the states and not enforced 
by the Executive Branch.493 Such a judgment, while apparently in conflict 
with the need for a remedy for the violation of rights, was at least defensible 
on "higher" rule-of-law grounds.494 A blatantly disregarded Supreme Court 
opinion would quite possibly have reduced the public's and the other branches' 
respect for the institution, to such an extent as to undermine its ability to serve 
the vital rule-of-law functions it serves in our government, including most 
importantly the function of keeping the other branches within the bounds of 
their constitutional authority. The blow to rule-of-law values was in any event 
softened in such decisions as Poindexter, which supplied the groundwork for 
a virtual reconciliation of the Eleventh Amendment with the rule of law. 
The reasons that led the Court to interpret the Eleventh Amendment the 
way it did in Hans may not have much current resonance, but to throw out a 
century-old Supreme Court precedent, often relied upon in the interim, would 
raise rule-of-law problems of a different sort. It is essential to the rule of law 
that the Court take seriously its own prior decisions, including its stated 
reasons for reaching those decisions. Similar concerns demand that the Court 
seek to make the law as coherent as possible. It is in part because of my belief 
in the importance of coherence in law for the rule of law that I have taken 
seriously the Court's decisions in both Seminole Tribe and McKesson and have 
striven to retain as much of both as would be possible without altering too 
much settled precedent. And it is because of the importance to the rule of law 
of respect for precedent and of doctrinal coherence that I find ironic, to say the 
least, the rule-of-law-based calls for drastic doctrinal changes in this area.495 
Over a century ago, the Court, in Hans and Poindexter, opted for officer 
liability as the means to give efficacy to the federal obligations of the states, 
a decision that was consonant with evidence of what the Framers intended. 
With one short-lived exception, the Court has adhered to that choice ever 
since. Respect for precedent and for coherence and continuity in the law 
should impel us to direct our energies to perfecting the officer-liability regime 
rather than to switch now to a government liability regime. 
Finally, the rule of law is but a means to other ends. Among the reasons 
we value the rule of law is that it enables us to make decisions about how to 
493. See generally ORTH, supra note 42. 
494. If so, the Eleventh Amendment, as interpreted in Hans, might be regarded as one of what 
Alexander Bickel has called "the passive virtues." See ALExANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
495. To the extent Hans had been read as a constitutional holding and relied on in the period before 
Union Gas, these two rule-of-law values pulled in somewhat different directions for the Seminole Tribe 
Coun. The Coun resolved the tension by treating the Union Gas precedent as vulnerable from the stan 
because of the lack of a rationale for the judgment commanding a majority of the Coun. After the Seminole 
Tribe decision, however, both of these rule-of-law values cut decidedly against the calls by the dissenting 
Justices for yet another doctrinal shift. 
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live our lives with a certain measure of confidence in the consequences of 
those decisions.496 To that end, it is sometimes better that things be settled 
than that they be settled "correctly." The frequent volatility of doctrine in the 
area of state sovereign immunity at various points in our history has seriously 
undermined that interest. For example, the Eleventh Amendment cases from 
the 1890s involved the enforceability of state bonds. Persons who purchased 
the bonds in the expectation that the courts would enforce them paid a 
premium that they would not otherwise have paid. The States who prevailed 
in Hans and related cases, in tum, enjoyed a corresponding windfall. Had the 
law been clear from the start, of course, the buyers would have discounted the 
unenforceable bonds and the states would have gotten only the amount that 
such a risky investment would have been worth. 
The state of Eleventh Amendment law in recent years has similarly been 
in flux. As a consequence, an Indian Tribe that was authorized to sue the State 
of Florida in federal court by a Congress that had been conceded that power 
by the Supreme Court found itself thrown out of court. Had the law been 
clearer, Congress could easily have achieved the desired result by authorizing 
a suit against the Governor. Similarly, patent holders who have been given a 
right to recover damages against the states find their entitlement in doubt. Had 
Congress known, it could have pursued other means of protecting the public 
interests served by granting these monopolies. I have suggested in this Article 
that one of these other means, the foundations of which are firmly established 
but the contours of which have been underexplored, is to make state officials 
personally liable for infringements, in the hope and expectation that states will 
regard it as better for all concerned to consent to bear the financial burden 
themselves. While there may be doctrinal or historical arguments to be made 
in favor of the diversity interpretation or the forum-allocation interpretation of 
the Eleventh Amendment, it may in the interest of certainty and predictability 
be preferable to abandon those projects and to begin to put in place the officer 
liability rules, and indemnity or insurance arrangements, that will, I think, at 
least approximate the rule-of-law benefits that many think can be attained only 
by making the states themselves liable. If I am right about the potential 
efficacy of an officer-liability regime at producing compliance with federal 
law, then which of the competing interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment 
the Court adopts matters less, from a rule-of-law perspective, than that the 
Court clearly and definitively adopt one or the other.497 
496. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 
COLUM. L. REv. I, 7-8 (1997). 
497. Cf Daniel A. Farber, The Coase Theorem and the Eleventh Amendment, 13 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 141, 141 (1996) ("According to standard law and economics reasoning, the Eleventh 
Amendment may well be irrelevant."). The Court's choice, however, will of course be of enormous 
significance to Congress in designing an enforcement scheme, as well as to states and state officials, who 
must respond to Congress's choice by putting in place the necessary indemnification or insurance 
arrangements. 
